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With the Russian annexation of Crimea and the undeclared conflict in eastern 
Ukraine, Western policy analysts have asked if Russia’s actions represent a new, more 
covert approach to warfare. Understanding Russia’s perspective on international relations 
is imperative to supporting potential targets of future Russian action, and specifically, to 
updating NATO’s defensive protocols that are predicated on response to clear military 
violations of sovereignty. This study uses an existing model for the weaponization of all 
instruments of state power to examine three case studies that exemplify hybrid political 
and military forms of war: the 2008 Russian War with Georgia, the 2014 Russian 
annexation of Crimea, and the 2014–2015 war in eastern Ukraine. This analysis reveals 
that the concept of hybrid warfare is often too narrowly focused on a conflict’s “kinetic” 
aspects. In practice, hybrid warfare begins by establishing strategic objectives and 
employing means that violate another state’s sovereignty during a time of peace. Findings 
further point to successful outcomes when coercive violence is timed to minimize the 
chances of international military response. Hybrid warfare also holds promise for other 
malign actors who wish to pursue objectives without directly confronting Western 
military strength.  
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. THE STATUS OF HYBRID WARFARE ...........................................................1 
A. THE NATURE OF WARFARE AND THE ROLE OF THE 
STATE ........................................................................................................3 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION .........................................................................4 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................4 
D. APPROACH .............................................................................................14 
II. HYBRID WARFARE: TOWARD A THEORETICAL MODEL ..................19 
A. STRATEGY..............................................................................................19 
B. POWER ....................................................................................................22 
C. BALANCE OF POWER .........................................................................25 
D. HYBRID WARFARE ..............................................................................26 
1. The Nature of the Aggressor .......................................................29 
a. Synchronizing Elements of National Power ....................30 
b. Employing Limited Levels of Violence .............................31 
2. Conditions for Hybrid Warfare ..................................................32 
a. Determining Strategic Goals ............................................32 
b. Masking the Dynamic Change to the Status Quo ............33 
III. RUSSIAN POLITICAL-MILITARY THINKING: THE PATH TO 
CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE ...................................37 
A. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................38 
B. THE SOVIET ROOTS OF MODERN RUSSIAN THINKING ..........49 
C. CONTEMPORARY PUTIN ...................................................................58 
D. RUSSIAN GRAND STRATEGIC GOALS ...........................................65 
E. RUSSIAN ELEMENTS OF POWER ....................................................67 
F. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................74 
IV. RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR, 2008 ......................................................................77 
A. HYBRID WARFARE REQUISITE CONDITIONS ............................83 
1. Russian Strategic Goals ...............................................................83 
2. Masking the Dynamic Change to the Status Quo .....................87 
B. ABOVE-MILITARY FORMS OF WAR: INFORMATION 
DOMINANCE, DIPLOMATIC WARFARE ........................................88 
C. NON-MILITARY FORMS OF WAR: ECONOMIC, LEGAL, 
PROPAGANDA, AND MIGRATION WARFARE .............................91 
D. MILITARY FORMS OF WAR ..............................................................94 
 viii 
E. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................100 
V. RUSSIAN ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA, 2014 .............................................103 
A. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................103 
B. HYBRID WARFARE REQUISITE CONDITIONS ..........................116 
1. Russian Strategic Goals .............................................................116 
2. Masking the Dynamic Change to the Status Quo ...................120 
C. ABOVE-MILITARY FORMS OF WAR: DIPLOMATIC, 
CULTURAL, LEGAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND NETWORK 
WARFARE .............................................................................................122 
D. NON-MILITARY FORMS OF WAR: TRADE AND 
MEDIA/PROPAGANDA WARFARE.................................................129 
E. MILITARY FORMS OF WAR ............................................................132 
F. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................141 
VI. RUSSIA IN DONBAS, UKRAINE, 2014–2015 ...............................................145 
A. HYBRID WARFARE REQUISITE CONDITIONS ..........................150 
1. Russian Strategic Goals .............................................................150 
2. Masking the Dynamic Change to the Status Quo ...................152 
B. ABOVE-MILITARY FORMS OF WAR: DIPLOMATIC 
WARFARE .............................................................................................154 
C. NON-MILITARY FORMS OF WAR: ECONOMIC, LEGAL, 
AND PROPAGANDA WARFARE ......................................................158 
D. MILITARY FORMS OF WAR ............................................................159 
E. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................167 
VII. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION ....................................................................171 
A. SUMMARY—THE UTILITY OF HYBRID WARFARE .................171 
B. SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES ........................................................172 
C. A THEORY OF RUSSIAN HYBRID WAR .......................................175 
1. Preliminary Theoretical Framework Development ................176 
2. Framework Applied to Three Cases ........................................177 
3. The New Russian Way of War ..................................................177 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY REGARDING RUSSIA ................178 
E. TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF HYBRID WARFARE .......184 
LIST OF REFERENCES ..............................................................................................187 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................................................................201 
 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Callard and Faber’s 27 Forms of Warfare, Further Divided as 
Military and Political Warfare ...................................................................16 
Figure 2. Map of Georgia with Breakaway Regions Abkhazia (Green) and 
South Ossetia (Purple) ...............................................................................78 
Figure 3. Map of Ukraine ........................................................................................104 
Figure 4. Gerasimov’s New-Generation Warfare Model ........................................113 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 xi 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
4GW 4th Generation Warfare 
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States 
DDOS Distributed Denial of Service 
DIME-FIL  Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economics, Finance, 
Intelligence and Legal/ Law Enforcement.   
DPR Donetsk People’s Republic 
FSB Federal Security Service (Russian Acronym) 
FSR Former Soviet Republic 
GRU Foreign Intelligence Service (Russian Acronym) 
IW Irregular Warfare 
KGB Committee for State Security (Russian Acronym) 
LPR Luhansk People’s Republic 
MD Military District 
NATO National Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
RF Russian Federation 
UN United Nations 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 









The term “hybrid warfare” is used by policy analysts, military leaders, 
international organizations, and news outlets to cover a wide range of non-traditional 
actions that apparently lack a unifying context. Dismissing hybrid warfare as meaningless 
jargon is pointless, however, because it has already gained a level of common usage, 
particularly with regard to observations of Russian foreign policy. What hybrid warfare 
lacks is a general theory that will serve to frame its use in a meaningful manner, and that 
helps distinguish it from the host of other types of “warfare.” More importantly, a good 
theory can facilitate an understanding of hybrid warfare’s impact on conventional 
deterrence, defensive alliances, and meaningful counteractions. The purpose of this 
research was to establish the utility of the concept of hybrid warfare and set a framework 
toward a general theory. 
This research began with a review of the existing definitions and positions on the 
idea of hybrid warfare and discovered that there was a gap between the current thinking 
and the foundational understanding of strategy, warfare, and state power. The most 
common definitions of hybrid warfare focus too narrowly on the blending of 
conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal organizations and tactics - sometimes 
including a supporting information campaign and cyber warfare. Hybrid warfare has also 
been attributed to all manner of state and non-state actors, blurring the obvious 
differences between a powerful actor who employs select methods as a matter of choice 
and a weaker entity whose means of aggression are limited. Based on these observations, 
the following hypothesis was formulated:  In a condition of total war, a state would 
employ every instrument of its national power toward achieving its strategic end but the 
determinative instrument would be the state’s military. In a condition of limited war, the 
commitment of national power would usually be limited to the strategic objective and 
only the force necessary to achieve the objective would be employed. Both of these 
pursuits entail a degree of risk to the aggressor’s military. If a state were to attempt to 
reach the same strategic objectives through all elements of power while preserving its 
military strength, the objectives of war would be pursued during a time of peace and 
 xiv 
through a hybrid mixture of political warfare and limited violence. An existing model of 
potential forms of political and military warfare could then serve as a wider aperture 
through which to test hybrid warfare. 
The methods used for this research involved a summary study of the nature of 
strategic theory and interstate power. With contemporary Russia selected to limit 
independent variables, Russian political and military theory was examined in its 
contemporary and Soviet-era forms for indications of a disposition favorable to hybrid 
warfare. An investigative analysis of three cases—the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, the 
2014 Annexation of Crimea, and the 2014–2015 War in Eastern Ukraine was then 
conducted utilizing the Callard and Faber Model of the potential forms of war.1 
The results of this research indicate that hybrid warfare is a way of synchronizing 
the range of possible means toward achieving a desired end, while minimizing the risks 
associated with direct military confrontation. Putin’s Russia is an increasingly 
authoritarian, offensive-realist state; it has a high-degree of centralized control over all 
domains of national power, unity of strategic vision, and a seeming disposition to violate 
other nations’ sovereignty during times of peace. Russia has three strategic themes that 
shape its objectives: strengthen Putin’s hold on Russian power; affirm Russian 
dominance in the post-Soviet space; and the reestablishment of Russia as global power. 
In Georgia, Russia created and then froze ethnic rebel conflicts as a point of leverage in 
Georgian politics. In both Georgia and Ukraine, Moscow engaged in political subversion, 
armed proxy groups, manipulated economic conditions and used different levels of 
violence toward achieving strategic objectives for years before the brief introduction of 
more traditional forms of military warfare. In Georgia and Crimea, Russia masked the 
dynamic change of the status quo behind other world events and kept the level of 
violence below a threshold that might induce foreign intervention. In Donbas, Russia 
lacked a clear strategic objective and attempted to capitalize on the Crimean success 
while world attention was focused on Ukraine, resulting in a costly war that escalated and 
risked Western intervention. In all three cases, hybrid warfare continued after the 
                                                 
1 James Callard and Peter Faber, “An Emerging Synthesis for a New Way of War: Combination 
Warfare and Future Innovation,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (Winter/ Spring, 2002): 63. 
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reduction of overt warfare as Moscow worked to prevent the opposition governments 
from establishing stable democratic environments and reestablishing sovereign control of 
their territories. 
The implications for policy are that defensive alliances and expectations for 
deterrence against military threats are inadequate when they are limited to defending 
against a narrow range of military action. Putin knows he cannot defeat the West 
militarily and for all of his nuclear saber rattling, he is pragmatic and calculating in his 
calculations about building a strong Russian state, meaning he will back down before he 
crosses a line that risks the destruction of his government. Policy should therefore be 
crafted to reduce strategic vulnerabilities in non-military domains and limit Russian 
options to the military domain. Putin is a realist who believes that only Russia can 
guarantee Russia’s security. The international community, agreements and diplomatic 
assurances are tools that he will employ toward Russian interests and discard at their first 
inconvenience.   Putin will likely target any Western influence in Russia and will retain 
the initiative for future action by fomenting and freezing conflict in the near-abroad to 
coerce his neighbors and as leverage against Western “interference.”  Finally, Putin 
believes in the relative nature of power. He will not only continue to build his military 
strength and demonstrate it to the world, but he will seek to exploit the rifts in what he 
perceives are his principle geo-political rivals – the United States, the European Union 
and NATO. Hybrid warfare is a vehicle for working toward all of these themes while 
retaining the ability to exploit the systems of the globalized, interconnected, and open 
West to construct an alternate reality where disturber of the peace can be perceived as a 
defender of virtue, and appeasement-minded leaders are offered excuses for inaction.   
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 1 
I. THE STATUS OF HYBRID WARFARE  
On March 18th 2014, the stability of the international order was rocked when 
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the formal admission of Crimea and the Federal 
City of Sevastopol into the Russian Federation, completing a nearly bloodless occupation 
of the peninsula in less than a month. While the seizure of such a large piece of strategic 
territory from a sovereign nation certainly sent shockwaves through the European 
continent—whose post-Westphalian sense of stability is bound by a shared belief in the 
permanence of geo-political boundaries—the cries of outrage were not accompanied by 
significant calls to action. In the past, such a brazen act could have signaled the opening 
move of a continental war. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea was the culminating 
event in a cleverly executed series of actions aimed at undermining Ukraine’s national 
sovereignty. This operation’s individual components—political subversion, economic 
coercion, information warfare, irregular warfare, and ultimately conventional force—
were not particularly unique or novel. Taken together, however, the employment of these 
components in a synergistic, hybridization of political and military warfare, singularly 
focused on a strategic outcome, resulted in a decisive victory that surpassed Moscow’s 
expectations for success.2  As this manufactured “crisis” was unfolding, Western 
policymakers, strategists, and media were still struggling to frame a coherent description 
of what they were seeing, let alone offer an appropriate counter-action.   
Russia employed elements from across its complete spectrum of national power 
as the means to acquire strategically important territory; a comprehensive term defining 
this type of action, however, remains elusive in the West. With such little violence (only 
two Ukrainian soldiers were killed) some international observers have even failed to 
                                                 
2 Michael Birnbaum, “Putin was Surprised at how easily Russia Took Control of Crimea,” Washington 
Post, March 15, 2015. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/putin-was-surprised-at-how-easily-
russia-took-control-of-crimea/2015/03/15/94b7c82e-c9c1-11e4-bea5-
b893e7ac3fb3_story.html?tid=HP_more?tid=HP_more. Putin has the benefit of hindsight to extol his own 
brilliance. With an uncontested success, he was free to claim that he orchestrated every aspect of the 
Crimean operation. It is worth commenting that he was surprised at how easy it was, which may have 
affected his calculus about how hard a similar operation would be in eastern Ukraine.   An estimation that 
was arguably not quite right, despite Russian successes.    
 2 
accurately identify the Crimean annexation as a war.3  Others have explained the 
operation as “irregular warfare,” in which irregular troops were used to support a 
conventional occupation.4  Despite the presence of irregular forces, the occupation was 
carried out by regular Russian troops, leading others to conclude that the operation was a 
traditional military operation, unique only in the persistent denial of involvement by 
Moscow and the lack of violence that ensued.   
Despite the frequent use of the term, there is no theory of hybrid warfare and the 
uncertain parameters of the term have frustrated efforts to frame actions like the Russian 
annexation of Crimea. The narrow focus on the military aspects of the Crimean operation 
tends to gloss over the manipulation of Crimean political processes to promote pseudo-
legitimacy, stifle opposition, and slow Ukrainian military countermeasures. A purely 
military focus also tends to miss the systematic years-long process of subverting the 
Ukrainian political system through voter manipulation, economic coercion, and the 
fostering of financial dependency in the years leading up to the 2014 takeover. To 
dismiss these actions as anything other than deliberate acts of war that enabled the 
occupation would be like using only the knock-out punch in a late-round boxing match to 
describe how the dominant fighter won the bout, without looking at all of the body blows 
that were landed in the earlier rounds or questioning why the winner intentionally 
selected the timing for the end of the fight. A more holistic assessment of Russia’s 
actions will lead to a theoretical construct that will facilitate the discussion of 
counteractions and set the foundation for a generalizable theory that will apply to other 
actors. 
                                                 
3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 75. Clausewitz also provided a simple differentiation between total and 
limited war. War takes one of two forms: either it is meant to destroy an enemy’s ability to resist, or it is 
meant to seize a piece of territory along the enemy’s frontier with the intention of keeping it or of using it 
as a means of leverage in future negotiation.   
4 DoDD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014), 14. Irregular 
warfare is a “characterization used to describe a deviation from the traditional form of warfare where actors 
may use non-traditional methods such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, subversion, criminal 
activities, and insurgency for control of relevant populations.”  This definition includes many of the 
components that have been associated with hybrid warfare – the “hybridity” being the mixed use of regular 
military and irregular actors. This thesis proposes a broader definition of hybridity that focuses on the 
mixture of political and military forms of war. 
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A. THE NATURE OF WARFARE AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to 
fulfill our will. 
—Carl von Clausewitz5 
As force and the threat of violence was used to impose Russia’s will on Ukraine, 
resulting in the complete capitulation of all Ukrainian forces in Crimea, Ukraine’s 
ejection from the peninsula, and the imposition of Russian political control over the 
space, Russia’s actions fit Clausewitz’ simplest definition and typology of warfare, 
despite the limited level of bloodshed.6  Russia did not, however, proceed along an 
expected linear progression of setting the military objective of acquiring new territory, 
escalating tensions, massing its relatively capable mechanized brigades on the border, 
bombing military objectives in preparation for a ground attack, and conventionally 
marching its formations across the desired territory. Nor did it turn its naval guns on the 
Ukrainian symbols of power, which it could have done without lifting anchor. Russia’s 
military invasion constitutes an act of war, but its very nature has been questioned 
because it did not follow Clausewitz’ proposal for the maximum use of force.7  The low 
level of violence was not, however, due to any Russian aversion to shedding blood. It was 
instead part of a deliberate calculation meant to create the perceived legitimacy of the 
action and to preserve Russia’s military means of power by preventing a direct clash of 
military force with the West.      
In the post-September 11th era, it has become fashionable to ascribe the world’s 
woes to non-state actors and invisible networks of transnational terrorists. While these 
entities certainly do pose a threat to Western interests and the world order, the level of 
that threat is diminished somewhat when a nuclear-armed state begins carving off 
                                                 
5 Clausewitz, On War, 75. 
6 Thomas G. Mahnken, “Strategic Theory,” in Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction 
to Strategic Studies, eds. John Baylis, James J. Wirtz and Colin S. Gray (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 67–81.   
7 Clausewitz, On War, 75. Clausewitz proposed the maximum use of force to bring a conflict to a 
swift, definitive solution. Hybrid warfare pursues the objectives of war through a slow process of attrition 
and “frozen” conflict that are contrary to this idea.   
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portions of sovereign neighbors in a region as presumptively “stable” as Europe. The 
paradigm of asymmetrical warfare methodologies attributed to weak entities wishing to 
attack the strong has been flipped on its head by a relatively strong power using hybrid, 
cross-domain approaches to achieve strategic outcomes against a weaker neighbor 
without relying primarily on the application of overwhelming conventional force. Russia 
has certainly provided a remarkable contemporary example of this methodology, but the 
Russians did not suddenly grasp the potential of hybrid warfare absent a costly learning 
curve, nor did they discover that the conditions for the successful implementation of their 
innovative approach were less than universal before paying another butcher’s bill. It 
should be assumed, however, that they are learning and adapting these methods and that 
they are not alone. If hybrid warfare is to become increasingly common among actors 
who are in general discord with the West and who wish to avoid the overwhelming 
dominance of conventional Western military power, then the modeling and study of these 
approaches is an imperative as they may have important implications for expectations of 
deterrence, estimations of power, and the significance of defensive alliances.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis seeks to answer the following questions: What is the fundamental 
nature of hybrid warfare?  What are the characteristics of an actor that facilitate the 
conduct of hybrid warfare?  What conditions must exist or need to be created in order for 
an aggressor to conduct hybrid warfare?  Does an existing model of military and political 
forms of war adequately describe the means of conducting hybrid warfare? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
After years of simmering debate in academic and military circles, the term 
“hybrid” as an approach to warfare was thrust to the fore in 2010 when U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates published the Quadrennial Defense Review and used the term to 
describe the sophisticated means that both state and non-state actors would employ to 
mitigate a conventional disadvantage with the United States.8  Secretary Gates’ 
                                                 
8 Robert M. Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Dept. of Defense, 2010).   
 5 
comments under the heading “Shifting Operational Landscape” hypothesized general 
descriptions of a hybrid threat that could involve “protracted forms of warfare, use of 
proxy forces for coercion and intimidation, terrorism and criminality to manipulate the 
information environment, target energy resources, attack economic vulnerabilities and 
exploit diplomatic leverage.”9  This description covers a range of means that might be 
employed by an aggressor as well as potential methodologies and targets, but it does little 
to characterize the nature of the actor or to connect the potential targets to a coherent 
strategic intent. Without this framework, hybrid warfare is indistinguishable from its 
more visible irregular, asymmetric, or unconventional components. 
Since September 11th, 2001 there has been no shortage of terms that have come 
into vogue as means of describing the type of war(s) in which the U.S. and its allies have 
become participants. Some of these terms come from a long lineage of military thought 
and are rooted firmly in the doctrine of the Armed Forces, yet even those definitions may 
not reflect the intended meaning when the terms are used loosely in policy circles. Others 
are the creative inventions of modern thinkers, toiling to put a form and function to 
observations of behavior that seem to fall outside of established paradigms. Some have 
overlapping definitions, while others merely sound similar. These terms are legion: 
asymmetric warfare, irregular conflict, compound warfare, combination warfare, 
distraction warfare, fourth-generation warfare, low-intensity conflict, limited war, 
unrestricted warfare, special warfare, unconventional warfare and a host of dimensions 
where the term “warfare” and the role of force is far from obvious: cyber-warfare, 
economic warfare, political warfare, cultural warfare, and the like. It is part of the human 
condition that leads us to try to contextualize things that are new or that we don’t 
understand, so it is worth noting how many of those words in the first group have a 
negative construction.  “We use ‘not’ words to describe things that we deeply believe 
should not be: non-state actors, failed states, irregular/ unconventional/ unrestricted/ 
                                                 
9 Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. 
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asymmetrical conflict.”10 Thus, the conventional advocates of “regular” war have 
couched those categories as aberrations to a more pure form of traditional warfare. 
The sudden (re)emergence of the notion of hybrid warfare led to a scramble to 
update existing definitions, reconsider its utility in the context of 2010, and even to 
discount its usefulness altogether.11 Among this latter group, strategists like Colin Gray 
believe we should “forget qualifying adjectives: irregular war; guerrilla war; nuclear war; 
naval strategy; counterinsurgent strategy. The many modes of warfare and tools of 
strategy are of no significance for the nature of war and strategy. A general theory of war 
and strategy, such as that offered by Clausewitz and in different ways also by Sun Tzu 
and Thucydides, is a theory with universal applicability.”12  It is in this same publication, 
however, that Gray asserts the United States military is too conventional to adapt to 
irregular threats, threats that are difficult to explain without some of those “qualifying 
adjectives.”13  A problem arises when the adjective itself is the source of confusion.  
“Hybrid” warfare implies a combination of at least two things to produce a unique 
offspring. The ambiguity lies in what is being combined.   
From those who find some utility in the concept of hybrid warfare, there are two 
general schools of thought. The first group believes that hybrid warfare is a useful 
concept, but that it is anything but new. They contend that hybrid warfare is simply the 
combination of regular and irregular forces on the battlefield; “irregulars” being defined 
                                                 
10 Montgomery McFate and Andrea V. Jackson, “The Object Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the 
Four Tools of Political Competition,” in Unrestricted Warfare Symposium: Proceedings on Strategy, 
Analysis, and Technology, 14–15 March 2006, ed. Ronald R. Luman (Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University, Applied Physics Laboratory, 2006), 143–178.   
11 Davi M. D’Agostino, Hybrid Warfare: GAO Report to Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2010).    In response to a request from Congress to define Hybrid 
Warfare, the Government Accountability Office surveyed the services and came away with various 
answers. Several services had definitions within service doctrine, but there is no Joint definition, nor was 
there a plan to write one. The consensus was that whatever “Hybrid Warfare” is, it is covered within the 
defined spectrum of conflict and there is no reason to add a new definition; “The War of New Words: Why 
Military History Trumps Buzzwords.” Armed Forces Journal (2009).   
12 Colin S. Gray, Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: The Sovereignty 
of Context (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 4. Gray’s 
affirmation of the enduring understanding of the nature of war and strategy are an important part in the 
framing of this research, which seeks to connect hybrid warfare to these established foundations. 
13 Ibid., 4. 
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as militia, guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists.14  The U.S. Army TRADOC G-2 expands 
this list slightly to include “two or more of the following: military forces, nation-state 
paramilitary forces (such as internal security forces, police, or border guards), insurgent 
organizations (movements that primarily rely on subversion and violence to change the 
status quo), guerrilla units (irregular indigenous forces operating in occupied territory), 
and criminal organizations (such as gangs, drug cartels, or hackers)” with a heavy 
emphasis on the use of cyber operations.15  This view of hybrid warfare, as limited to 
combinations of conventional and irregular forces, perceives only the combinations of the 
military forms of war along with criminal elements and cyber-warfare. It is interesting to 
the historical study of battles and campaigns but it is of little use in explaining the 
combination of military and non-military instruments of power in achieving objectives 
that were once the exclusive role of military force.16  It also fails to grasp the nature of an 
actor and the circumstances of less-than-overt hostilities that would have to exist for the 
effective sponsorship of criminal networks or cyber-attacks.  
The second school of thought has numerous definitions for what constitutes 
hybrid warfare. Most of these definitions also include conventional and irregular forces, 
but give special categorization to the operational reach of terrorism, and then include a 
wide variety of innovative approaches to applying technology and resourcefulness to 
negate an opponent’s military superiority; a weaker-attacking-stronger dynamic that is 
generally associated with asymmetric warfare.17  Others define ‘hybrid’ as the mixture of 
battlefields in the information warfare domain through the simultaneous efforts to win 
influence over the “populations in the conflict zone, on the home front, and in the 
                                                 
14 Peter R. Mansoor, “Hybrid Warfare in History,” in Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents 
from the Ancient World to the Present, eds. Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1–17.   
15 TRADOC G-2, “Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land 
Operations” (August, 2012), 5. 
16 Clausewitz, On War. Clausewitz describes the exclusivity of military force to the conduct of 
warfare due to the inability of any other implement of power during his time to either attrite enemy forces, 
or seize and hold desired territory. 
17 Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson, “Hybrid Warfare,” JSOU Report 13–4 (August, 2013); 
Nathan P. Freier, Strategic Competition and Resistance in the 21st Century: Irregular, Catastrophic, 
Traditional, and Hybrid Challenges in Context (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, 2007). 
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international community.”18  The most revolutionary of these thinkers don’t use the term 
“hybrid” at all.  “Unrestricted warfare,” as proposed by People’s Liberation Army 
Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui claim [Clausewitz’] “principles of warfare are 
no longer ‘using armed force to compel an enemy to submit to one’s will’, but rather are 
using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, 
and lethal and non-lethal means to compel an enemy to accept one’s interests.”19 This 
idea involves a truly long term approach to achieving strategic objectives, but most 
germane to hybrid warfare is the assertion that weapons, and their relative effectiveness, 
should no longer be measured by levels of lethality.20  Common aspects of peaceful 
society such as economics, politics, immigration, and culture “will cause ordinary people 
and military alike to be greatly astonished at the fact that commonplace things that are 
close to them can also become weapons with which to engage in war.”21  Liang and 
Xiangsui would contend that warfare on such a wide spectrum would necessitate 
measuring the incremental achievement of a strategic objective to determine the most 
effective weapons in a particular arsenal. In summarizing Liang and Xiangsui’s theory, 
LTC Nathan Freier adequately covers the range of hybrid warfare by listing the 
complimentary use of selective violence along with “political agitation, social 
mobilization and political or economic assault at the international, national and 
subnational levels.”22 Unfortunately, Freier limits the target of this anticipated aggression 
to the United States, and to key allies as a means of disrupting U.S. interests, in what he 
                                                 
18 Jack McCuen, “Strategy of Hybrid War,” in Hybrid Warfare and Transnational Threats: 
Perspectives for an Era of Persistent Conflict, eds. Paul Brister, William H. Natter and Robert R. Tomes 
(New York, NY: Council for Emerging National Security Affairs, 2011), 70–82.   
19 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Panama City: Pan American Publishing, 
2002), xxi-xxii.  
20 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 2–3. David Kilcullen describes the U.S. as trapped in a 
conventional thinking cycle that is blinded by its conviction of its own dominance. While America’s focus 
has been on conventional strength, other nations have moved to significantly reduce the role of 
conventional forces in the conduct of warfare by ‘weaponizing’ other dimensions of their strategic arsenals. 
21 Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, 16–17 
22 Nathan P. Freier, Strategic Competition and Resistance in the 21st Century: Irregular, 
Catastrophic, Traditional, and Hybrid Challenges in Context (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007), 38. Freier calls these efforts “purposeful irregular resistance” 
where containment of the U.S. is the primary objective for competitor/ adversary states.     
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describes as a new type of anti-American containment conducted by rising competitors.23  
Freier hints at the military-like effects that might be achieved against U.S. interests 
through economic or political disruption, but his analysis does not cover how this same 
power could be used to disrupt a smaller, less developed state.  
The weaponization of what Joseph Nye famously categorized as soft power is a 
key ingredient to the usefulness of studying hybrid warfare in more immediate 
applications, and are the best methods to meet the economic, diplomatic and 
informational aspects of hybrid threats as outlined by Secretary Gates.24  While Nye 
characterized soft power as a generally positive means of attraction, these same 
mechanisms can be weaponized as forces of coercion and employed in lieu of, or in 
concert with, the application of violence. The diplomatic, informational, economic, 
financial, intelligence, and legal/ law enforcement portions of the DIME-FIL model of 
national power also figure very prominently in the definition of Fourth-Generation 
Warfare (4GW).25 4GW, however, assumes that the nature of war would not change; 
only the antagonists and their motivations would be different.26  4GW comes close to 
realizing the components of hybrid conflict by “using all of a society’s networks—
political, economic, social, and military—to carry on the fight,” but it is too oriented on 
the perspective of resistance and insurgency and becomes unnecessarily limited in 
pursuing an objective other than “immediate military victory” by attempting to convince 
                                                 
23 Nathan P. Freier, Known Unknowns: Unconventional “Strategic Shocks” in Defense Strategy 
Development (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 34. Freier 
points all of the efforts of hybrid campaigns toward containing U.S. influence without directly confronting 
the U.S. in a conventional military manner.   The Russians are very likely interested in rolling back US/ 
Western influence in Eurasia, and these effects may be indicative of a Russian Grand Strategy, but the 
effects on the U.S. are not the sole reason for Russia to undertake a limited, hybrid action against its weaker 
neighbors. There are very real short-term strategic objectives that can be realized more safely and 
efficiently through hybrid means than with a full-scale military invasion.   
24 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York, NY: Public 
Affairs, 2004).   
25 Thomas X. Hammes, “Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation,” in Unrestricted Warfare 
Symposium: Proceedings on Strategy, Analysis, and Technology, 14–15 March 2006, ed. Ronald R. Luman 
(Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University, Applied Physics Laboratory, 2006), 65–88.   
26 Frank Hoffman, “The Hybrid Character of Modern Conflict,” in Hybrid Warfare and Transnational 
Threats: Perspectives for an Era of Persistent Conflict, eds. Paul Brister, William H. Natter and Robert R. 
Tomes (New York, NY: Council for Emerging National Security Affairs, 2011), 38. 
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the political leadership of an invading force that the continuation of the war is futile.27  
4GW is not a formula for the invading force.  
McCulloh and Johnson argued for the importance of understanding the nature and 
principles of hybrid warfare. They proposed seven principles of hybrid warfare that they 
supported with examinations of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War and the Soviet Partisan 
efforts on the Eastern Front from 1941–1945.28  Unfortunately, their principles were built 
from the perspective of a lesser power employing hybrid techniques to counter the 
conventional advantage of a superior adversary. These principles assume an asymmetric 
disadvantage for a hybrid force and are not adequate for characterizing the nature of a 
hybrid conflict when undertaken by a conventionally advantaged aggressor.   
Frank Hoffman is a leading advocate for the study of hybrid warfare. He credits  
“new wars,” “open source warfare,” “modern wars,” “polymorphic conflict,” 
combinational wars,” and “4th Generation Warfare” as the feeder schools of thought that 
have both informed and stymied the thinking that has led to the emergence of the term 
hybrid warfare.29  “Hybrid warfare is different because it addresses the difference in 
“how” the adversary plans to fight.”30  Hoffman considers hybridity—which by 
definition is a mixture of two or more things—to be the combination of conventional 
forces, irregulars, terrorists and criminals. This framework helps conceptualize non-
traditional actors (terrorists and criminals) as instruments of the state with a unique 
ability to shape an objective during a time of peace, but it also unnecessarily limits the 
scope of hybridity to a narrow range of a state’s means.  
[There is an] increased merging … of conflict and war forms. The 
potential for types of conflict that blur the distinction between war and 
peace, and combatants and non-combatants, appear to be on the rise.31  
                                                 
27 Hammes, Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation, 65. 
28 Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson, “Hybrid Warfare,” JSOU Report 13–4 (August, 2013).    
29 Hoffman, The Hybrid Character of Modern Conflict, 37–38. 
30 Ibid., 38. Interestingly, Hoffman hits on the notion of “how” the adversary plans to fight, or the 
“way” that the means will be employed, but his definitions are usually referenced with emphasis on the 
means (conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal). 
31 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac 
Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 7. 
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Hoffman also highlights the idea that these elements have some level of 
centralized control. These activities have to be able to be coordinated and directed to 
achieve synergy that works toward desired political objectives. The implication is that the 
ability to direct action across all domains is a requirement to conduct hybrid warfare. 
Hybrid wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare including 
conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts 
including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal 
disorder.”  These multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate 
units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and 
tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve 
synergistic effects.32 
Hoffman later expanded his idea of the battlefield to include the physical and 
psychological dimensions of conflict—or the target state’s ability and will to resist—in 
Clausewitz’s terms. 
Hybrid adversaries simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of 
conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behavior 
in the battlespace to obtain their political objectives….directed and 
coordinated within the battlespace to achieve synergistic effects in the 
physical and psychological dimensions of conflict.33 
Hoffman specifically identified the blurring of the lines between war and peace, 
and supports this with the conceptualization of the war-like effects that can be achieved 
through criminal organizations and terrorists, against a target during a time of peace.  
What this framework takes for granted is the nature of an aggressor state that is 
comfortable employing terrorists and criminal networks to fulfill strategic objectives that 
violate another state’s sovereignty; an act of warfare. It then follows that if a state was 
willing to sponsor those types of actions to meet its strategic ends, the same state would 
be willing to employ economic, diplomatic, and informational efforts toward the same 
outcome. Therefore, hybridity must encompass a range of activity that is outside of the 
military forms of war and suitable for employment during a time of supposed peace. 
                                                 
32 Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, 14. 
33 Hoffman, The Hybrid Character of Modern Conflict, 40. 
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George Kennan, the father of containment theory, called this range of actions “political 
warfare.” 
Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time 
of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all 
the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national 
objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from 
such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures, and “white” 
propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of “friendly” 
foreign elements, “black” psychological warfare, and even encouragement 
of underground resistance in hostile states.34 
Paul Brister points the concept of hybrid warfare back at the strategic utility of 
limited warfare.  “The aim of military strategy is to create a dilemma for the enemy, and 
make him choose which objective he will defend, a challenge in the modern era due to 
the isolation of numerous potential objectives from interdiction by military force.”35  
Extending operational reach to affect these objectives may be difficult, but it is also a 
compelling argument for a hybrid form of war that transcends the purely military 
sphere.36  Extending operational reach can also be interpreted not just as a function of 
projecting forces over physical distance, but as a means of disrupting a target around the 
barriers of international sanctions or the expected reactions of defensive alliances and 
                                                 
34 George F. Kennan, The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare (Washington, DC: Central 
Intelligence Agency, 1948). Emphasis added. 
35 Paul Brister, “Revisiting the Gordian Knot: Strategic Considerations for Hybrid Warfare.” in 
Hybrid Warfare and Transnational Threats: Perspectives for an Era of Persistent Conflict, eds. Paul 
Brister, William H. Natter and Robert R. Tomes (New York, NY: Council for Emerging National Security 
Affairs, 2011): 51. 
36 Ronald R. Luman, “Introduction,” in Unrestricted Warfare Symposium: Proceedings on Strategy, 
Analysis, and Technology, 14–15 March 2006, ed. Ronald R. Luman (Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University, Applied Physics Laboratory, 2006). In discussing Liang and Xiangsui’s theory of Unrestricted 
Warfare, Luman makes the common mistake of assuming that asymmetry is only characterized by the weak 
attacking the strong, and that “unrestricted” means there are no rules, 2. He corrects this idea later when he 
explains that only the measures are unrestricted, but the objective is “the accomplishment of limited 
tailored objectives – a disciplined approach,” 2. Warfare remains limited, tailored, and disciplined only 
when there are very explicit rules. Hybrid warfare helps identify the asymmetry of strong-attacking weak 
using means that are designed to ensure the kinetic parts of the war stay as limited as the attacker desires. 
Luman describes the combatants in Unrestricted Warfare as “small, cell like units that have global reach,” 
2. That is certainly true for some domains (cyber warfare, terrorism) where certain effects can be realized 
through cyberspace or through commercial travel to a vulnerable target. This cellular description only 
applies to certain elements of the hybrid threat, however, as there is still a place for conventionally 
organized maneuver forces. 
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other standards of deterrence theories.37  For example, a target state’s ability to defend a 
critical economic function is more likely to be degraded by a simultaneous cyber-attack 
on its banking institutions, blocking the importation of a critical resource, and the 
sabotage of a refinery in a chokepoint for international shipping than it is by a tank 
brigade moving across a border, particularly if the target nation has domestic defense 
laws or alliances that would only be activated in response to a clear conventional 
violation of its sovereignty.38 “The object of strategy should be to establish political 
systems that even the defeated finds acceptable. This focuses violence to the point that 
certain institutions survive to serve as the structures of functioning governance after a 
conflict.”39  In the hybrid context, this means that a medium such as economic warfare 
should be used up to the point where it breaks an enemy’s ability or will to resist, but not 
to the point where an economic system is irretrievably shattered. Hybrid warfare is 
therefore expected to be deliberately restrained in its application.   
Taken as a whole, the preceding literature shows that the components of hybrid 
warfare are not new.40  The mounted cavalryman and the bow were also not “new” when 
the first outriders of the Golden Horde set out on the steppe. It was the unique 
combination and employment of known capabilities that made the Mongols so difficult to 
counter. Hybrid warfare is similarly a new perspective for an old way of warfare, and its 
                                                 
37 Mike Winnerstig, Tools of Destabilization: Russian Soft Power and Non-Military Influence in the 
Baltic States (Stockholm, Sweden: FOIR, 2014): 4. 
38 Michael Moberg, James Mashiri and Charly Salonius-Pasternak, “What if Russia Demands a Naval 
Base in Finland Or Invades a Swedish Island?” Suomen Kuvalethi, no. 9/2015 (27 February, 2015).    
Several Finnish military officers war-gamed three different scenarios where Russian hybrid warfare 
techniques might circumvent Finland’s national defensive measures by not presenting the conditions 
required to trigger domestic emergency laws or defensive alliance responses. Their three scenarios involve 
plausible threats to their national strategic access to open transit of the Baltic Sea. The idea of not triggering 
defense mechanisms has been a central discussion within NATO following the Crimean crisis as NATO 
members sought assurances of what actions would precipitate an Article V response of the alliance. 
39 Brister, Revisiting the Gordian Knot: Strategic Considerations for Hybrid Warfare, 51. 
40 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. David 
Kilcullen describes Hybrid Warfare’s importance, particularly as conducted by nation-states as “new actors 
with new technology threaten new or transfigured ways of war, but the old threats also remain and have to 
be dealt with  in the same time and space, stressing the resources and overloading the systems of western 
militaries,” 5–6. See also: David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013). Kilcullen also describes hybrid threats as the combination 
of state and irregular forces that will employ any variety of weapons and tactics to “minimize detection and 
retaliation,” 105. 
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numerous forms have taken on new significance in the contemporary world due to 
globalization, mass communications, and the speed of technological innovation. It is 
distinct from the narrow options of asymmetric necessity that are shaped by the limited 
means available to a stateless terrorist organization.   
Hybrid warfare is instead the deliberate choice of a state or pseudo-state that 
could introduce larger degrees of conventional force, but instead attempts to realize some 
of the objectives of limited war through other than purely conventional military means. In 
a hybrid campaign, traditional military forces have a role that may be significant, or may 
be all but invisible. While at least the plausible threat of overwhelming force is an 
important component, traditional military force is the lesser, supporting effort of a hybrid 
campaign. Clausewitz’ claim that war is “a continuation of political intercourse, carried 
on with other means” implies a distinct point where political discourse stops and military 
contest begins.41  Hybrid warfare needs no such delineation. The goals of warfare are still 
political, but the use of force is not restricted to a time of overt war. Hybrid warfare is 
also not defined by any new technology or ability in one domain, but when those means 
are available they are added to an aggressor state’s arsenal to support or take the place of 
other means of state power as needed. For the purposes of this research, hybrid warfare 
will be defined as: the synchronized application of political and military forms of war, 
through direct and indirect means, in order to satisfy strategic objectives while 
minimizing the political risks associated with traditional war.  
D. APPROACH 
This research project began with the following hypothesis: Following the end of 
the Cold War and the spectacular display of overwhelming Western conventional 
firepower and technology during the 1991 Gulf War, rising powers have continued to 
pursue strategic objectives while taking care to minimize the risk to their conventional 
armed forces. These actions employ a variety of combinations of forms as they are 
adapted to particular targets and geopolitical situations, yet they require certain 
conditions that can help identify when they are taking place and suggest what range of 
                                                 
41 Clausewitz, On War, 87. 
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counteractions might be successful. If rising nation states are using hybrid warfare to 
impose their will on weaker neighbors, then hybrid aggression may not be inhibited by 
conventional means of deterrence. The economic and military alliances formed to bring 
stability between regional partners could also be undermined without activating the 
defensive measures that are built to react to clear acts of overt aggression. 
This research involved a heuristic analysis of multiple case studies in an effort to 
identify common forms and conditions that will assist in developing a general theory of 
hybrid warfare. The case studies selected all involve modern Russia under Vladimir Putin 
due to Russia’s determined efforts to realize the potential of combining political warfare 
and violence. Russia is a pioneer in this mode of conflict and is worthy of study. Russia 
has repeatedly demonstrated aggression toward smaller adjacent neighboring states. As 
the coming pages will illustrate, this aggression has been to secure limited political 
objectives and not the outright capitulation of the target state. By limiting the cases to 
post-1991, the Gulf War watershed moment described by Liang and Xiangsui, this study 
will examine contemporary Russian conflicts whose hybrid nature may be partially 
enabled by emerging technology, and also limited in scale out of potential concern for 
provoking a significant military response from the West. Russia has a wide menu of state 
means in the form of a relatively developed economy, technical sector, diplomatic core, 
and media enterprise, in addition to a relative advantage (compared to its adjacent 
neighbors) in conventional military power. These available means distinguish the use of 
hybrid warfare as a matter of choice, as opposed to a weak entity that employs any means 
at their disposal out of necessity. The case studies examined were: 
• Russia—2008 Georgian War 
• Russia—2014 Annexation of Crimea 
• Russia—2014 War in Donbas, east Ukraine 
Unfortunately, DIME-FIL is too simplistic to adequately analyze a hybrid 
campaign, as, for example, “M” would attempt to encompass the range of military forms 
from conventional to irregular to terrorism to nuclear warfare in one single category 
without consideration for the level of unique utility that each subordinate form might 
have. James Callard and Peter Faber categorized Liang and Xiangsui’s “10,000 forms of 
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beyond-limits combined war” as military forms of war, non-military forms of war, and 
above-military forms of war (Figure 1). Each of these categories contains nine forms of 
warfare, resulting in a menu list of 27 items that can be employed in any variety of 
combinations against an enemy.42  These identified forms are by no means exhaustive, 
but they provide an adequate frame for beginning to examine the efforts beyond pure 
force that may be employed in the pursuit of strategic objectives. 
Figure 1.  Callard and Faber’s 27 Forms of Warfare, Further Divided as 
Military and Political Warfare 
 
Adapted from: James Callard and Peter Faber, “An Emerging Synthesis for a New Way 
of War: Combination Warfare and Future Innovation,” Georgetown Journal of 
International Affairs (Winter/ Spring, 2002): 63. 
Before evaluating the cases for instances of combined military and political 
warfare, it was necessary to first examine Russian military thinking for the requisite 
understanding of utilizing political tools as weapons and for the general perception it 
holds of international relations. Each case was then reviewed for evidence of a Russian 
strategic objective that violates the target state’s sovereignty. Following a hypothesis that 
                                                 
42 James Callard and Peter Faber, “An Emerging Synthesis for a New Way of War: Combination 
Warfare and Future Innovation,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (Winter/ Spring, 2002): 63. 
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hybrid warfare is essentially a way to minimize the risk associated with conventional 
military warfare and that surprise is therefore an essential aspect during a shift to overt 
military force, conditions and methods that help mask this dynamic change in the 
interstate relationship were then analyzed. The Callard-Faber model was then tested in 
each case in order to identify the various forms of warfare employed against the target 
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II. HYBRID WARFARE: TOWARD A THEORETICAL MODEL 
In order to make a case for the strategic importance of hybrid warfare, it is first 
necessary to examine the fundamentals of strategy, several applicable theories of power, 
how power is used to deter and ultimately where a hybrid approach to warfare nests 
within some of these commonly held concepts. It is well beyond the scope of this project 
to summarize all of the thinking on topics as widely fielded as strategy, power, and 
deterrence. Instead, this chapter serves as a very brief overview of several of the most 
commonly accepted assertions, and only to the depth were the objectives of warfare—the 
tradition role of the military in the Clausewitzian trinity—may be demonstrated to be 
attainable through other means. 
A. STRATEGY 
In its simplest form, strategy describes the desired ends that can be achieved and 
the ways those ends can be reached with available means. Colin Gray refines this concept 
in the Clausewitzian tradition with his emphasis on the role of coercive power by 
“insist[ing] that strategy is about the use made of force and the threat of force for the 
goals of policy.”43  Strategic skill is found in the effective bridging of the gap between 
the instruments of power and the desired policy outcome. An effective strategy therefore 
has to balance the desire to reach a certain result, the available instruments at an actor’s 
disposal, and an appropriate appreciation of how those instruments can be employed 
toward the desired end. The strategic means available to a state are often also called the 
elements of national power: Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economics, Finance, 
Intelligence and Legal/ Law Enforcement (DIME-FIL). Historically, when a state looked 
at a neighbor and determined to seize all or part of the neighbor’s territory (the strategic 
end), it has turned to its means of seizing territory (the military) and then formulated the 
way (warfare) for the latter to bring about the former. The strength of the state’s military, 
specifically the standing Army, is typically the first figure that a state uses to determine 
                                                 
43 Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War 
Adapt? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 14.                           
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its ability to attack others or to defend itself from attack.44  This measurement of strength 
is of course relative to the comparable strength of a potential adversary.45  The military 
has historically been categorized as a unitary element—the so-called “big M” in DIME—
regardless of the sea, air, or land domain in which any particular portion of the military is 
tailored to operate. Western states also traditionally prefer to perceive a binary quality to 
their relationship with other states; meaning that the two countries are either in a state of 
peace or war. Granted that there can be degrees of good relations from a close alliance to 
bitter competition, but in the post-Westphalian order the directing of the state’s 
instrument of force to cross into the territory of another represents a change in the nature 
of the inter-state relationship from peace to war.   
Hybrid warfare changes the strategic dynamic by dividing the military forms of 
war into elements whose employment may remain below the threshold of traditional war 
and synergizing those efforts with the coercive and destructive effects with non-military 
forms of war.  “Hybridity” is found in the combination of the various political and violent 
means, and the synergistic effect of that combination produces a unique way to realize an 
end.46  By splitting the “big- M” into conventional forces, special operations forces, 
paramilitary forces, surrogate groups, saboteurs, and terrorists, the state can more easily 
envision options for conducting a certain level of violence against another state with 
                                                 
44 Naval and Air Forces can affect the calculus of relative strength, but land combat power is the 
traditional benchmark for a state’s ability to wage war and defend against aggression. Nuclear weapons and 
nuclear deterrence are unique factors in shaping states’ objectives for war.     
45 There are numerous factors that may influence a calculation of strength that exceed just the 
numbers of fighting men in uniform or main battle tanks. These can include the state’s production capacity, 
population of fighting age males, ability to convert economy to war time production, food production, and 
availability of raw materials, to name a few. 
46 Nadia Schadlow, “The Problem with Hybrid Warfare,” War on the Rocks (April 2, 2015). Schadlow 
is correct in observing that the “hybrid” definition refers to the different means that are used. The level, 
extent, and synergistic attributes of the hybrid effort, however makes hybrid warfare a way of reaching a 
strategic end. This becomes more apparent when the means being combined are not all aspects of the 
military forms of war, but when non-military forms are used to achieve military-like effects. Take the 
ubiquitous ball bearing factory during World War II for example. If blowing up the factory is the only way 
to realize the desired end of interrupting the manufacture of a critical component, then air sorties, artillery, 
or saboteur are interchangeable for their kinetic military effect. If the same end can be achieved before the 
onset of military hostilities by controlling the factory’s labor force, forcing the factory into bankruptcy, 
directing criminals to steal factory parts, or purchasing the factory outright, the target state’s ability to rely 
on its domestic war time capabilities begins to be undermined. When this is intended and is synchronized to 
other acts of warfare, the war has assumed a hybrid nature that began well before the traditional clash of 
military power. 
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varying degrees of attribution and without committing to a full status of open war. This 
conceptualization allows the state to consider new ways to reach desired goals by 
degrading the will and ability of the opponent to resist through violence, while decreasing 
the level of conventional force put at risk to reach a similar outcome. Because the 
acknowledged or overt participation of military forces may not occur until late in a hybrid 
campaign, the initial ‘military’ violence (surrogate sponsorship, terrorism, sabotage) 
should occur during a time of supposed peace, before the targeted state or other actors 
recognize that a condition of hostility exists.   
The conclusion of warfare traditionally results when one of the belligerents is 
either annihilated in a decisive battle or is exhausted beyond the point of further 
resistance.47  An aggressor state typically has three, non-mutually exclusive choices 
when considering the use of force against another: a limited aims strategy, rapid offensive 
strategy, or a strategy of attrition.48  The goal of a limited aims strategy is to seize a 
desired objective through surprise, assume a defensive posture, and then challenge the 
victim to either accept the new situation as political reality or to respond by commencing 
a war of attrition against a fully alerted enemy in the defense.49  A rapid offensive 
strategy does not focus on the territory of the enemy, but instead has the primary 
objective of destroying the victim’s armed forces before they can be fully mobilized.50  A 
strategy of attrition also seeks the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces, but through 
an exhaustive, protracted conflict that the aggressor calculates will be won through his 
ability to outlast his opponent.51   
The strategy of attrition is the simplest description of conventional warfare. As 
the main effort is defined by the overt clash of military forces and all other elements of 
                                                 
47Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1975), 135–136. 
48 Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1988), 35. See also: John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1983), 23–65.  
49 Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, 35–36. This strategy could be ascribed to 
the Crimea’s occupation, but it would not encompass the larger Russian effort against Ukraine. 
50 Ibid., 36. 
51 Ibid., 37. 
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national power are in support of that effort, it is difficult to argue a case for hybrid 
warfare when considering the military dimension alone. However, in Chapter 3, 
Alexander Svechin’s Strategy of Attrition will describe the use of political warfare to 
exhaust a target state’s military forces. A rapid offensive strategy might be facilitated 
through hybrid warfare as a means of preparing the battlefield, but it becomes less hybrid 
and significantly more “conventional” when the regular echelons of an aggressor’s force 
become the main effort. The limited aims strategy is particularly well suited to a hybrid 
warfare campaign. The aggressor determines the physical extent of the desired objective, 
and then focuses his political warfare efforts at undermining the target state’s ability to 
project control over that territory well in advance of the application of decisive force. 
B. POWER 
There are two traditions regarding the relationship between conflict and politics: 
realism and liberalism.  “For the realist, the central problem of international politics is 
war and the use of force, and the central actors are states.”52 The realist is pragmatic in 
that he expects that others will try to take what he is unable to defend so he must 
demonstrate strength to ensure his sovereignty. By maximizing one’s own power, one 
minimizes the ability of other states to threaten one’s security.53  At a certain point 
however, the realist becomes strong enough that he begins considering what he might be 
able to take from a weaker neighbor. The “offensive realist” does not even think there is a 
choice; the only way he can better his odds of survival is to have more relative power 
than his potential enemies, a gulf he can widen by physically reducing his adversary’s 
strength.54  Realists see the contemporary international system as anarchic—there is no 
central or governing power- so the only things that enforce order are the individual states’ 
ability and willingness to fight to maintain the status quo.55   
                                                 
52 Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 4th 
ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2003), 4. 
53 Ibid., 5. 
54 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 21.     
55 Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 3. 
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Neo-liberalism envisions “a global society that functions alongside the states and 
sets part of the context for the states.”56  Liberalism promotes the view not just of 
international governing bodies and legal restraint, but also that interdependent trade, 
monetary systems, and cross border communication have evolved into a transnational 
society where conflict is less likely. This is the essence of globalization, and is the 
preferred view of the world generally held in the West. Realists counter that there will 
always be a potential for a future state of war and one had better be ready to protect 
against it. Offensive realism is not a popular concept in the liberal-minded West because 
it tends to be at odds with our traditionally optimistic values.57   It is the difference in 
world view of relation power that explains why a country like Russia would suddenly 
seize Crimea, or why China would rapidly expand into its neighbors’ territorial waters. If 
a state views the world through the realist lens, specifically from the position of offensive 
realism, that state’s actions often appear irrational to liberal outsiders as those actions 
undermine the best interests of the international community. They appear much more 
pragmatic when they are seen to increase the relative power, and therefore the chances of 
survival, of the aggressor state. While this realist perspective might be depressing, “it 
behooves us to see the world as it is, not as we would like it to be.”58  
It would be a mistake for a weaker power, or the international community, to 
assume that an aggressor shares a similar view of the strategic options that are available 
to each side. If the weaker state prefers the position of power liberalism, he would be 
inclined to look for cooperative strategies that would yield the best result for both parties. 
If the aggressor is an offensive-realist, the parties of liberalism would continuously be 
confounded as the realist regularly made and then broke agreements or pursued strategies 
that were painful for both sides. The realist views international competition as zero-sum; 
there is a winner and a loser. Pursuing a win-win strategy for a realist only makes sense if 
                                                 
56 Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 5. The term 
“liberalism” will be used through the rest of this study in keeping with the sources referenced. Classical 
liberalism involves the freedom of the individual, and neo-liberalism is the inter-relations of states through 
an agreed upon context. 
57 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 23.                                     
58 Ibid., 4.  
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his gains are greater than and outpacing his opponent’s, because the result is the realist’s 
greater relative power. For the same reason, the realist is also willing to accept a loss, so 
long as the opponent’s loss is greater and the gap is increasing.   
One useful definition of power is described by the ability a nation can exert to 
positively (attract) or negatively (coerce) influence another entity in order to reach a 
preferred outcome.59  States that employ a mix of hard and soft power approaches 
employ what Joseph Nye calls “smart power” as a means of converting available 
resources into desired outcomes.60  Nye uses the analogy of disaster relief to demonstrate 
how military forces can be used in a “soft” manner to engender good will. A basic 
premise of hybrid warfare is that the inverse is also possible and that normally benign 
instruments of soft power can be weaponized to coerce and inflict harm. When the 
desired outcome is the breaking of an adversary’s ability or will to resist the imposition 
of the aggressor’s will, then smart power is synonymous with hybrid warfare.   
Power projection is the ability to exercise force relative to distance. Historically, 
those who are most vulnerable to an aggressor are those along its contiguous borders, 
making armies, or land-power, the traditional yardstick for measuring a nation’s existing 
strength.61  Adversaries separated by bodies of water require naval forces to control the 
intermediate maritime domain, exert force on maritime vessels and ports, transport 
invading forces and sustain those forces through a campaign.62  Stephen Biddle offers a 
definition of military power that promotes the importance of the land domain by 
emphasizing the military’s primary mission of controlling territory during mid to high 
intensity “continental warfare.”  A military’s power is measured in its ability to 
                                                 
59 Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011): 10. 
60 Ibid., 23. 
61 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 43–44. 
62 Ibid., 44. Mearsheimer addresses the value of naval and air forces to projecting power and 
deterrence. He fundamentally disagrees with the notion that air or naval power alone constitutes a valuable 
measure of national power. Those forces can play a critical role in degrading or destroying an enemy but it 
is ultimately the role of the land force to be decisive. Mearsheimer did address the 1999 NATO air war 
against Yugoslavia, which is often used to make the case that airpower alone can determine the outcome of 
a conflict. He finds that this conflict was an exception rather than a rule, and that Milosevic’s capitulation 
was likely due to a number of domestic socio-political factors rather than the capitulation of an entire 
national system as a result of the aerial bombardment. 
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accomplish this mission through “the destruction of hostile forces while preserving one’s 
own, the ability to take and hold ground, and the time required to do so.”63  In the age of 
an interdependent global economy, Internet based banking and mass communications 
systems there are increasingly innovative possibilities for exerting coercive force on a 
state that is not immediately adjacent to an aggressor through cyber-attack, propaganda 
saturation, and economic or financial disruption. While hybrid warfare is not contingent 
upon any of these, or any future innovation, its practitioner will recognize the 
possibilities that these domains provide to increase his options for action that would have 
once been beyond the reach of his land forces.  
C. BALANCE OF POWER 
A balance of power typically exists when a state weighs its elements of power and 
upon comparing them to a rival finds that neither side has a distinct advantage. This lack 
of advantage means that any attempt to directly challenge an adversary would risk 
incurring a cost that outweighs the expected value of the desired objective. Accurately 
estimating the existing balance of power, however, is a highly subjective process that 
requires a holistic understanding of an adversary’s capability and willingness to resist 
coercion. This calculus is made more difficult with the presence of defensive alliances, 
international agreements, economic relationships, and historical or cultural linkage 
between an adversary and other entities.64  Failure to accurately assess the balance of 
power has resulted in numerous strategic blunders throughout history. For example, 
Saddam Hussein miscalculated the cost of attempting to secure a larger stake in the world 
oil market when he decided to invade Kuwait in 1990. The Iraqi Army was vastly larger 
and better equipped than their Kuwaiti counterparts and Hussein correctly surmised that a 
military victory would be relatively inexpensive (cost being a factor not just of monetary 
value but also the losses to his forces as an overall depreciation of his strategic means). 
                                                 
63 Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 6. 
64 Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, 14. Biddle believes that 
the employment of forces is the best indicator of a nation’s military power. He is highly critical of models 
that focus on the traditional factors of numerical superiority (preponderance), technology, or inflexible 
constants that represent force employment.   
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Hussein failed to anticipate the change to the power dynamic that would not materialize 
until after he invaded Kuwait, forcing other offensive-realist states to have to consider the 
unknown elements of force that might figure in the relative-power calculation. He also 
failed to understand the importance the international community would place on stability 
of the international energy market. As a result, what Hussein expected to be a relatively 
low-cost adventure resulted in the near annihilation of his land forces and a subsequent 
attempt to exploit this weakened power status by both Shia and Kurdish rebel groups.   
D. HYBRID WARFARE 
There is no existing theory of hybrid warfare; however, the term has been used to 
loosely describe a variety of forms of war without examining the nature of the aggressor 
state. Hybrid warfare is a natural complement to Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive 
realism and the struggle to maximize relative power. Offensive realism functions under 
several assumptions that are also applicable in framing the appeal of hybrid warfare:   
1. The natural state of the international system is anarchy.  
2. [States] inherently possess some military capability. 
3. States can never be sure about other state’s intentions. 
4. Survival [territorial integrity and political autonomy] is the primary goal 
of the [state]. 
5. [States] are rational actors.65 
This conceptualization is helpful to visualize the role of hybrid warfare from a 
non-Western point of view. While Westerners may prefer to hold a liberal view of the 
international arena, rising regional powers—with expectations of regional primacy—
likely have a world view that is much closer to the offensive-realist’s perspective. 
Mearsheimer’s list requires one addition in order for an offensive-realist to be capable of 
pursuing hybrid warfare: 
6. States inherently possess other than military means of interacting with 
other states. 
                                                 
65 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 30–31. Mearsheimer uses the term “great 
power” in his listing of the assumptions for offensive realism. I have substituted “great power” with “state” 
here to prevent confusion.   
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An offensive-realist who is willing to use force to ensure its dominance over potential 
adversaries is likely to consider all means at the state’s disposal for the same purpose. 
There are three principal considerations that determine the ‘hybridity’ of warfare: 
1) the nature of the aggressor state, 2) the presence of requisite conditions, and 3) the 
primacy and combination of other-than-conventional military forms of warfare. “Hybrid” 
by definition requires a combination of different types of warfare. As combining efforts 
within the military forms of warfare, conventional and irregular, or surrogate and 
terrorist, is fairly common, it is too narrow in scope to serve describe the unique effects 
that a hybrid campaign can actually achieve. Instead, warfare should only be considered 
“hybrid” if it aims to achieve the objectives of strategy with a combination of political 
(non-military, above-military) and military forms of warfare.   
The advantage of hybrid warfare is found in the unique ways it provides a state 
for employing existing elements of national power in coercive pursuit of strategic ends. 
There are “three different aspects of relational power: commanding change, controlling 
agendas, and establishing preferences.”66  The case for warfare is easier to make for the 
first two aspects, but to the degree that preferences are established against the will of the 
target state in order to set the conditions for the aggressor’s domination, and coercive 
force is either used or threatened to shape these preferences, then the aggressor’s actions 
can be considered warfare. This distinction can create a level of angst for those who 
believe that “warfare” is defined solely by violent, military involvement, or for those who 
think “wars” between cola companies and television networks has completely excised 
any value from the word. Warfare in the traditionally non-military domains is also easy to 
mistake for aggressive competition or criminality (and so those activities can also be 
mistaken for an act of war by those who are so inclined).67 
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Hybrid warfare requires an evaluation of both the existing balance of power and 
the mechanisms of deterrence to identify the thresholds or constraints for those defensive 
mechanisms to be activated. The aggressor must then be able to marshal a significant 
degree of the means available to the state and apply them deliberately, synchronizing 
their effects across all domains, in an effort to reduce the potential risk of conventional 
military warfare. The conventional military element of power, the “big M,” plays an 
important role in this effort, but that role is primarily as a threat of far greater escalation 
of force against the target state, rather than as the primary instrument of aggressive 
policy. By not committing the entirety of the state’s conventional military force, the 
aggressor protects that force from destruction, circumvents many of the deterrent 
mechanisms that are built to trigger responses to conventional attack, and forces any 
response to be measured lest the aggressor be “provoked” into escalating the level of 
conventional violence involved with the conflict. Hybrid warfare therefore is true to the 
maxim of economy of force—achieving the desired ends in an efficient manner.   
Conventional occupations not only face the taxing prospect of countering 
insurgent movements, but the introduction of regular forces also incurs an increased level 
of international and domestic political risk. Conventional force is usually attributable to 
an aggressor, making the sponsor vulnerable to counterattack, international sanctions, or 
other punitive measures. Not only do conventional losses degrade an aggressor’s 
aggregate combat power, but mounting casualties can increase domestic political 
resistance to continued involvement in a conflict.68  Many nations have a strong aversion 
to casualties when a war is not seen as existential in nature.69  In hybrid warfare the 
conventional force may be the strategic reserve while other forms of military violence 
including surrogates, terrorists, and saboteurs remain available for utilization at a much 
lower threshold for commitment of power, and with a different degree of domestic 
political risk for the aggressor who maintains a modicum of plausible deniability.   
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1. The Nature of the Aggressor 
Hybrid warfare requires an aggressor to be willing to violate a target state’s 
sovereignty, to include the promotion of violence, during a time of supposed peace. This 
perspective contrasts with the Western preference for delineation between peace and war 
(with an admittedly “gray zone” between the two that has been the space of covert action, 
propaganda, and less-than-war coercive or punitive military actions).70  American 
military thinkers are prone to view the non-military elements of national power, DI_E-
FIL, as the tools available to meet strategic objectives prior to a “critical moment” when 
“M” becomes the primary instrument for continuing the policy.71  The non-military 
forms of national power that are necessary for warfare to be truly “hybrid” are often most 
effectively applied well before the existence of an easily definable state of open warfare. 
This temporal disassociation from a traditional linear view of a road to war between two 
states is a critical component in conceptualizing the value of hybrid warfare. Once that 
determination has been made and the aggressor, mindful of the existing deterrent forces, 
has begun to direct its national power toward that end, a state of war exists because the 
aggressor perceives it as being so, despite any formal declaration or use of overt military 
force.    
                                                 
70 Kennan, The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare. See also: Nadia Schadlow, “Peace and 
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a. Synchronizing Elements of National Power 
Aggressors whose governments are centralized and authoritarian in nature possess 
a distinct advantage in synchronizing all of the elements of national power. While this is 
more reflective of the nature of the state, it is not an absolute prerequisite. Liberal states 
can nationalize economies and information domains, but this is usually indicative of a 
state of total war and cannot be regularly implemented for limited, hybrid warfare 
without undermining the liberal nature of the state. Synchronization of the political forms 
of warfare enables the aggressor state to obscure its intentions, isolate the objective from 
the target state’s control, weaken the target state and international resolve, dissuade 
external influence, and magnify the perceived cost of resistance.   
One of the most critical dimensions in fusing the efforts of military and political 
warfare is the overlapping application of information warfare.  “In the information 
age…the outcomes are shaped not merely by the side whose army wins but also by 
whose story wins.”72  Information warfare is used to separate the objective area’s 
population from the target state, to manufacture legitimacy by fabricating a pretext for 
“intervention,” to prevent the target state from responding effectively, and to reduce the 
chances of external interference. The most successful hybrid campaign will break the 
enemy’s ability or will to resist ahead of the overt introduction of force—the nature of 
which can now be characterized as an instrument of stability (i.e., peacekeepers) instead 
of the instrument that created the instability.   
 State control of all print media, television and radio broadcasts and Internet 
access makes achieving information dominance over the domestic audience much more 
likely. To the degree that this control includes the target state, the themes and messages 
can directly undermine the target population’s will to resist. In the spheres where the 
aggressor’s message has to compete with the international press and an unregulated 
Internet, the specificity of themes are less important than the saturation of these domains 
with the disinformation to help obscure the aggressor’s actions. The goal in this domain 
is not to generate support so much as it is to continue to mask intentions and to 
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undermine international resolve by planting doubt about the nature of the conflict or the 
involvement of the aggressor. Similarly, economic warfare toward a specific end is much 
easier to orchestrate when the state directly controls the economic means of power. 
Western nations use economic pressure to attempt to force other states to make certain 
choices, but marshalling all of the various parts of a free market toward that end is 
extremely difficult. The impact of information themes and economic coercion can be 
enhanced through the selective application of violence against the target state.   
b. Employing Limited Levels of Violence  
A hybrid aggressor must be willing to employ or threaten to use select levels of 
violence against a target state through the formation and sponsorship of terrorists, 
resistance movements, agitators and saboteurs in order to strike targets that will 
exacerbate tensions, undermine the target state’s governance in an area, and enhance the 
effects of efforts in other domains. These kinetic actions are meant to compliment other 
political efforts to separate the objective from the target state’s sphere of control. The 
combined efforts may be aimed at isolating a specific objective or at subverting the target 
state more generally. This means that violence can either be focused near the expected 
line of contact (the “front,” or boundary of the contested area) or throughout the target 
state’s strategic depth.73  The aggressor may also mobilize conventional military forces 
under the auspices of training exercises, weapons tests, border security drills, snap 
inspections, or increased naval and air patrols. While a mobilized training exercise near a 
border can be a convenient pretext before an invasion, the very visible mobilization and 
maneuver of forces is first intended to amplify the effects of information operations or 
other coercive pressures. It is important that the reminder of conventional power not be 
seen principally as a communications device for signaling the adversary. They are an 
instrument of coercion, and the threat of their employment should be made to compel the 
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target to accept the aggressor’s will.74  The individual components of hybrid warfare are 
interchangeable as long as they can achieve the desired effects. By controlling the amount 
of violence as a means of providing coercive leverage to diplomatic, informational, or 
economic progress, the aggressor also maximizes its ability to exploit international 
diplomatic efforts to end the conflict once the violence escalates.   
2. Conditions for Hybrid Warfare 
Given that an aggressor is an offensive realist with the ability to synchronize all 
elements of national power and a willingness to employ violence during a time of peace, 
the hybrid actor needs a strategic end toward which it can direct its efforts. At some 
point, the aggressor will determine the target state’s ability to protect the objective has 
been significantly reduced and the aggressor will dynamically change the inter-state 
relationship through unexpected force. This change happens on the aggressor’s initiative 
and is based on an assessment of how quickly the objective can be accomplished and the 
level of violence reduced to prevent a determined resistance by the target state or an 
intervention from third parties.  
a. Determining Strategic Goals 
Warfare is conducted in pursuit of a political objective—the strategic end—and it 
can either be total or limited in scope.75 It can include the complete destruction of an 
adversary’s ability or will to resist, or only the force necessary for the aggressor to 
impose his will in a desired space. For the practice of hybrid warfare, an aggressor state 
must first establish strategic goals that violate a neighbor’s sovereignty, toward which it 
can direct the non-military elements of state power, prior to introducing conventional 
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force. The understanding of the strategic goal, and that the imposition of the aggressor’s 
will is the determinative point of victory is what distinguishes the hybrid warfare mindset 
from the war-or-peace binary conception preferred by liberal states. For example, a state 
that believes itself to be at peace might still seek to gain a competitive economic 
advantage over another state, or might attempt to influence a political process toward a 
preferred outcome, but the goal of these activities is to manipulate the atmosphere of the 
relational environment with recognition of mutual sovereignty. In a perceived state of 
war, those same processes are used to force an opponent to accept conditions dictated by 
the aggressor in direct contravention of sovereignty.76  Inherent in selecting hybrid 
warfare as the way to pursue desired ends, is the calculation of the aggressor’s strength 
relative to the target state, and a respect for the incalculable response of the international 
community. While every effort is made to mask, obfuscate, and deny the pursuit of 
offensive objectives, there always lies the risk of external factors driving a foreign 
response to the crisis. Minimizing these “known unknowns” is the principle reason for a 
hybrid approach to warfare as opposed to the straightforward invasions that have marked 
the larger history of inter-state conflict. 
b. Masking the Dynamic Change to the Status Quo
States that determine to seek political objectives through hybrid warfare 
necessarily need to conceal their intentions from the outset so that the efforts of 
diplomatic, economic, and informational coercion are less readily identified as acts of 
hostility and countered in kind. While the aggressor may not delineate between peace and 
war, he is keenly aware that others do. He uses this awareness to his advantage by 
avoiding the thresholds that will lead the target state to officially change the status of the 
relationship to open warfare. The aggressor also uses the instruments of the liberal 
international order: UN mandates, international treaties, environmental laws, commercial 
agreements, etc., to his advantage for as long as they serve his objectives. When these 
instruments negatively impact his relational power, he will set them aside in favor of 
76 This concept can lead to some interesting conclusions about the perspective of a transaction where 
one side believes it is pursuing its interests in a peacetime environment, while the other has a view of a 
constant state of war and believes it is being forced to accept the dominant state’s will only because it lacks 
the ability to resist.   
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promoting his own survival.77  At some point, the aggressor will chose to dynamically 
change the political relationship with the target state. This is the moment of vulnerability 
for the aggressor when his intentions suddenly become known and when he might be 
countered before he consolidates his control over the objective. Unlike traditional 
warfare, the aggressor needs to prevent a gradual increase in tensions, matching increases 
in defensive postures, and the linear increase in belligerence which is expected to precede 
a traditional military conflict. Instead, the aggressor masks any buildup in forces behind 
claims of maneuvers, readiness inspections, or other security activity. The aggressor 
retains the initiative and conceals the sudden introduction of forces behind other 
significant world events that are dominating the attention of the international media while 
employing deception operations to hide the change in activity for as long as possible. 
Any dynamic action involving the use of military force should also be calculated to 
achieve the desired objective and then dramatically reduce the associated violence in the 
shortest time possible in order to reduce the motivation for international intervention. The 
goal is to present the world with a fait accompli, where intervention would be the cause 
of additional violence, not the solution. 
An important aspect of hybrid warfare is non-linearity in the application of power. 
At any point, the perceived nature of diplomacy, the audience or message of an 
information campaign or the selective application of violence might change direction in 
order to exploit opportunities, respond to changing pressures, bypass some form of 
resistance, or otherwise maintain the aggressor’s initiative. Hybrid campaigns are defined 
by the level of adaptability they afford to the aggressor before the full commitment of his 
national combat power.78  This level of adaptability is predicated upon an understanding 
of the battlefield, and the existing balances of power. As no two situations are ever likely 
to be identical, it would be illogical to presume the existence of a traditional doctrine for 
hybrid warfare beyond the most general principles. Hybrid warfare requires a plan that is 
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very clear, has multiple branches and sequels, and yet is shallow enough in detail that it 
remains as flexible as possible. Recognizing its employment by others will be a challenge 
in that the hybrid aggressor will not likely follow a specific template pattern of behavior.  
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III. RUSSIAN POLITICAL-MILITARY THINKING: THE PATH 
TO CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE 
Hybrid warfare is not a practical paradigm for the United States or most 
democratic nations. Free societies typically lack the necessary level of centralized 
government control over the economic and informational domains to adequately 
synchronize them toward military-like objectives. Democracies are also subject to policy 
changes within representative governments that can affect the permanency of strategic 
ends across different administrations. Additionally, a cultural resistance against 
employing strategic deception and a preference for a philosophical delineation between 
states of peace and war preclude most Western states from setting the requisite conditions 
and effectively employing the necessary range of the forms of war needed to design or 
effectively execute a hybrid campaign.79  Most importantly, hybrid warfare takes the 
means of positive interaction between liberal states; diplomatic, economic, and financial, 
and ‘weaponizes’ them to replace a commensurate military effort. To effectively employ 
hybrid warfare, not only would liberal states have to overcome the conflicts between 
declared values and enjoying the full range of kinetic options to include terrorism and 
criminal networks, but they would also have to deal with the dilemma of the use of 
instruments of peace to carry out acts of war when no state of war exists.   
These restraining characteristics are not necessarily shared by offensive-realist, 
authoritarian regimes like Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Therefore, hybrid warfare can be a 
practical way for those states to manifest desired outcomes without relying solely on 
conventional military force, particularly when the capabilities of the conventional 
military are questionable. Before examining case studies for the conditions and forms of 
hybrid warfare, it is first necessary to survey Russia’s political-military organization to 
demonstrate that the general structure and predilections for hybrid warfare are in fact 
present. 
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reluctance to recognize the realities of international relations…” 
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A. BACKGROUND 
Anticipating an aggressor’s cost/ benefit calculation is based on an understanding 
of the fundamental elements of the aggressor’s political and military systems, how they 
interconnect, what the decision making processes are, and what presumptions they might 
hold about a defender’s intentions, capabilities and resolve.80  In order to understand how 
the Russian view regarding the use of coercion was shaped prior to the 2008 invasion of 
Georgia and continued to evolve through the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent 
operations in Donbas, it is important to examine how Russia’s view of itself emerged 
following the breakup of the Soviet Union. As this perspective was not written on a clean 
slate of political-military thought, and as Russia has rapidly regressed towards 
authoritarianism, it is also necessary to visit some of the Soviet-era notions of strategy 
and offensive power-realism that have helped shape the contemporary Russian thinking 
that lays a foundation for hybrid warfare.   
Hybrid warfare requires a high level of unified purpose and direction in order to 
be conceptually possible, let alone effective. It must be acknowledged that there is danger 
in oversimplifying the complex geo-political structure and mechanics of what remains the 
geographically largest country on Earth. Inarguably, there are powerful forces and 
competing interests exerting varying levels of influence both within the Russian 
government and from the parallel oligarchy that provides much of the functionality for 
the Russian system. There are also different political camps within the current Russian 
administration that hold divergent attitudes toward Russian foreign and domestic 
policy.81  These competing entities notwithstanding, what has emerged on the 
international stage is a deliberate manifestation of a fairly unitary worldview that has 
                                                 
80 Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War. Huth cautions against the “tendency of 
foreign policy leaders to view the actions of an adversary as a well-thought-out plan of action and 
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81 Graham Allison and Dimitri K. Simes, “Russia and America: Stumbling to War,” The National 
Interest (April 20, 2015). 
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only become more firm in its nationalistic trajectory since December of 1999 when Boris 
Yeltsin handed the broken empire to a former KGB lieutenant-colonel, Vladimir Putin. 
Over the course of Putin’s presidencies and the orchestrated 2008–2012 hiatus as prime 
minister, Vladimir Putin has methodically marginalized any real opposition to his agenda 
for Russia and shrunk his pool of advisors to a political spectrum that runs from 
pragmatic nationalists to hardline neo-imperialists.82  So, to a high degree, the current 
conflicts between Russia and Ukraine are manifestations of Putin’s deliberate intent - 
long in the making- and not the unfortunate result of failed diplomacy, an accident of 
unexpected escalation or any other apologist’s perspective. Through the manifestation of 
his “power vertical,” Vladimir Putin has consolidated enough control over the various 
elements of Russian state power that he can selectively direct their employment. The 
singular “Russia” will therefore be used to describe the increasingly centralized, unitary 
dictates of the Putin regime.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the re-emergence of a dormant 
debate within Russian society. The two principal groups were torn between Russia either 
adopting Western governmental and economic practices to become a fully integrated 
member of the Western world, or the strengthening of Russia’s Eurasian identity so that 
Russia could regain its dominant position with respect to Asian influence. The Western, 
cosmopolitan, “Atlanticists” initially made up the reformative cabinets of Gorbachev and 
Yeltsin, but they were always strongly opposed by the “nationalist Eurasianists,” to 
whom a post-Soviet doctrine included “a priority for the protection of Russians in other 
countries … and an appreciable redistribution of [Russian] resources, options, ties, and 
interests in favor of Asia, or the eastern direction.”83  Among the nationalists, there was a 
further division between the Russian nationalists who “advocated a new Russia that 
encompassed all Russians and were closely tied to Orthodox Byelorussians and 
Ukrainians—but no one else” and the imperial nationalists who wanted to rebuild the 
                                                 
82 Allison and Simes, “Russia and America: Stumbling to War.”  Allison and Simes caution that Putin 
is “not the hardest of the hardliners” and is far more pragmatic than the “hotheads” who see overt military 
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83 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1996), 143. See also:  Alexander Dugin, Putin vs Putin, 2014, 10–16. 
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dominance and influence of the Czarist and Soviet Empires.84  Throughout the ‘90s, the 
Russian elites and public remained divided at roughly 40 percent in favor of western 
reforms, 40 percent supporting the various nationalist and former communist initiatives, 
and the remaining 20 percent undecided between the two.85  
The 1991 Moscow coup attempt punctuated the end of the Soviet Empire, and the 
western world slowly exhaled as its long standing communist archrival fragmented along 
older ethno-linguistic, cultural and religious lines.86  This fragmentation occurred with 
relatively little violence and without losing control of the Soviets’ massive stockpile of 
nuclear weapons.87  The political turmoil and economic collapse of the USSR meant that 
the Russians’ ability to maintain a massive conventional military force was also no longer 
possible. Where there was once a monolithic unitary threat, there were now 15 
independent states, each seemingly full of eager young democrats and entrepreneurs, 
poised to embrace Western values and readily enter the world market place.88  This 
optimistic assessment and an American desire to enjoy the “peace dividend” helped 
conceal the true nature of the fragments of the empire.89  While many young Russians 
did make an effort to embrace previously denied freedoms and opportunities, the 
surviving structure of Russian governance was a mixed network of sullen communist 
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86 The Soviet Union wasn’t formally dissolved until four months after the coup when Mikhail 
Gorbachev resigned on Christmas Day, 1991, and the Supreme Soviet decreed the Soviet Union no longer 
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89 For a brief summary of some of the optimistic assessments of Russia’s setting aside of imperial 
aspirations to join the Western order, see: Marcel Van Herpen, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New 
Imperialism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 239–241.  
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apparatchiks, angry at their loss of power and determined to retain some control over the 
shaping of the new Russian Federation, and an opportunistic nouveaux-riches oligarchy 
who had emerged as the winners during the often corrupt transition from state-owned to 
privatized business.90 
The 12 Former-Soviet States that would form the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) were of course not equal with regard to national power regardless of the 
wording of the CIS charter.91  The Russian Federation was the geographically, 
economically, and militarily largest of the members and the Russians demanded a 
correspondingly high degree of control over the policies and relationships of CIS 
members with the outside world. This dominion would later be challenged when the 
former Soviet Republics of Georgia and Ukraine both began making significant moves 
toward European economic integration and potential NATO membership.92  
Unfortunately, in the early 1990s the West was determined to see Russia in the most 
optimistic of lights and certain concessions were made to Russian regional dominance 
that cemented Russia’s ability to manipulate and coerce its lesser partners for the next 
two decades. The most notable of these concessions is the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, 
which saw Ukraine voluntarily surrender the third largest nuclear weapons stockpile in 
the world to Russian control in exchange for guarantees of territorial sovereignty from 
Russian, the United States, and the UK.93  
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When the Moscow putsch demonstrated the degree to which Soviet central power 
had been reduced, an avalanche of declarations of sovereignty ran through the Soviet 
Union resulting in numerous new “republics,” autonomous districts, and a declaration of 
independence from Russia by Chechnya.94  The non-Russian republics that broke from 
the Soviet Union did so primarily along national boundary lines that preceded the 
formation of the Soviet Union, with little accounting for the demographic shifts that 
occurred during the Soviet era. At the time of the fragmenting of the USSR, as many as 
25 million ethnic Russians lived outside the borders of the Russian Federation, resulting 
in a population that did not necessarily regard the new “national” borders as immutable 
based on their ethnic association with Mother Russia.95  Yeltsin was of course aware of 
this sentiment and may have intentionally undermined the permanent resolution of a 
number of border issues in order to leave the door open for future incorporation of these 
areas into the Russian Federation once the challenges to state-power in Moscow had been 
resolved.96 
In the first years of the post-Soviet era, Russia sought to maintain a high level of 
influence over a number of breakaway Soviet Republics, while simultaneously dealing 
with the fractured national political trajectories of different players within the Kremlin. 
Russian Army units stationed in the breakaway regions often became involved on the 
side of one faction or another for a host of reasons including ethnicity, political ideology, 
or religious identity. The army often assumed positions reflexively that ran counter to the 
wishes of the leadership in Moscow, such as the army’s support for pro-communist 
factions during the Tajikistan civil war while President Yeltsin was attempting to distance 
the country from residual elements of the communist party.97  Similarly, the actions of 
the Russian 14th Army in the Transdniestria/ Moldova conflict demonstrated that the 
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Russian central government lacked complete control over its forces. The army acted on 
its own initiative, and created Russian foreign policy with little steering from Moscow.98   
In February 1993, Boris Yeltsin declared an official policy for Russia to have a 
determinative role, sanctioned by the UN, as the “guarantor of peace and stability in the 
former regions of the USSR” based on Russia’s special relationship with its neighbors.99  
As U.S. and Western militaries of the 1990s developed new theories for military 
involvement in operations other than war, specifically “peacekeeping,” the Russians 
seized on the term, if not the conceptual practice.100  Russia used the idea of 
“peacekeeping” and its’ trappings of international legitimacy through international (CIS) 
resolutions and conflict arbitration decisions, but with a vastly different interpretation of 
what the role of those “peacekeeping” forces was. Russia became the sole arbiter for 
peacekeeping in the post-Soviet space, a role the international community seemed willing 
to accept at face value but which really belied Russia’s intent to maintain regional 
dominance.101  While UN-mandated peacekeepers were notoriously ‘neutral’ and 
frequently stood by as genocide occurred in Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia, Russian 
peacekeepers were just as often party to the conflicts. Russian peacekeepers were 
habitually involved in backing a particular side or outcome with weapons or direct 
participation, and predictably moved these conflicts toward whatever outcome resulted in 
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99 Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, Back in the USSR: Russia’s Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the 
Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy toward Russia (Boston, MA: John 
F. Kennedy School Of Government, Harvard University, 1994), 1. Not only did Yeltsin declare Russian 
primacy for peacekeeping efforts in the post-Soviet space, his foreign minister secured a mandate from the 
UN to that affect, along with UN funding. This may have made sense from the perspective of Russia 
becoming a liberal, Western state, but in reality it ended up shutting out other peace-brokers and observers, 
allowing Russia to secure its strategic objectives through active support to various belligerent parties and 
through direct military action. 
100 The idea of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) was similarly interpreted differently 
by COLs Liang and Xiangsui in Unrestricted Warfare. The Chinese were disappointed to see an American 
insistence on limiting the notion to the generally non-kinetic role of the military in times of crisis, instead 
of exploring the interpretation of the “non-military methods of waging war.”  Similarly, Liang and 
Xiangsui note how close the idea of full-dimensional operations in U.S. Army doctrine (TRADOC 
Pamphlet 525–5) had come to their concept of supra-domain combinations but failed to realize its potential 
due to conventional constraints on thinking about the role of the military and the nature of war. See: Liang 
and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (36-37, 161–164). 
101 Kevin Fedarko, “In Russia’s Shadow,” TIME Magazine, October 11, 1993. 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,979366,00.html. 
 44 
a greater degree of political control over the space for Moscow; to include the instigation 
of new conflicts or the prolonging of violence to create the pretext for greater Russian 
involvement at a time of the Kremlin’s choosing. 
After Yeltsin demanded the absolute right to determine and enforce any peace 
agreements between belligerents within the former territory of the USSR, Russia secured 
its dominance in the affairs of its “near-abroad” and minimized the level of external 
actors who might attempt to shape the outcome of any of these local conflicts.102 The 
power of the different semi-autonomous Russian districts within the Federation, 
particularly Tatarstan and Chechnya, led to different arrangements for governance and 
taxation between the central Russian government and other regions, resulting in an 
emerging sense of resentment for the central government from many of the less 
influential districts.103  Yeltsin finally dissolved the ineffectual Federal Congress in 1994 
and pressured Tatarstan to sign a treaty that acknowledged it was an inseparable part of 
Russia proper.104  With ethnically motivated genocide unfolding throughout the early 
1990s in Africa and the former Yugoslavia, it was of only passing concern in the West 
when the Russians determined that the independence of any of the Russian Federation’s 
organic districts or provinces represented an existential threat. Russia needed to bring the 
first region to rebel back into line quickly, and with a certain level of violence as a lesson 
to any other independence-minded region. The test of this resolve would come from the 
small, mostly Muslim province of Chechnya.   
When the Chechens declared independence from the Russian Federation in 1994, 
the hollowed-out shell of the Red Army invaded. What should have been a significant 
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mismatch favoring superior Russian numbers was marked by a series of conventional 
defeats and bitter partisan warfare that were all too reminiscent of the Russians’ 
disastrous campaign in Afghanistan.105  During the First Chechen War, the Russian 
governing elites began to grasp the problems that attrition-oriented forces encounter 
when facing “relational-maneuver” forces.106  The Russian army was still structured and 
equipped to fight the war it thought it wanted to fight, where divisions of tanks and 
mechanized infantry would envelop lesser numbers of similar NATO forces on the 
European plain, and not the battlefield of rocky mountain passes and tangled city blocks 
where an adaptable “local” enemy consolidated, fought, and fluidly dispersed among the 
population. The First Chechen War (1994–1996) ended with a Russian declared 
“ceasefire” in 1996, which was in reality a humiliating defeat that exposed the weak state 
of the woefully underfunded and mismanaged Russian Army.107   
To combat the growing independence movements in other Russian districts, Boris 
Yeltsin reestablished central authority through the nationalist block of his cabinet and 
through the appointment and dismissal of a succession of politically powerful prime 
ministers before settling on his new Presidential Chief of Staff, the former KGB operative 
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Vladimir Putin.108  Moscow’s desire to reassert central authority was aided by a series of 
apartment bombings in several major Russian cities, which pushed public sentiment 
toward both strong, nationalistic leadership and deliberate retaliation.109  As a result of 
these attacks, Russian troops were soon back in Chechnya for the Second Chechen War 
(1999–2009) to regain Russia’s physical control of the territory and then to conduct an 
extended “anti-terrorist” campaign against the Muslim separatists. The Second Chechen 
War was vociferously promoted as a matter of Russian state survival by the then largely 
unknown Vladimir Putin, then serving as Yeltsin’s appointed acting Russian Prime 
Minister. Putin would ride the Russian nationalist sentiment of the Unity Party to an 
electoral affirmation of his popularity and the Russian Presidency in May of 2000.110   
One of Putin’s first acts upon assuming the presidency from Yeltsin was to 
cement his relationship with the Russian military by traveling to visit the Russian troops 
fighting in Chechnya.111  Putin also took immediate steps to centralize his authority over 
the Federation by removing the federal governors’ immunity from criminal prosecution, 
clamping down on the free press, and asserting federal control over several of the more 
independent-minded oligarchs.112  Putin filled a number of top government 
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administrative positions with the siloviki, his trusted friends and allies, many of whom 
shared a similar background in the military and intelligence services.113  Putin also 
resurrected nationalist symbols of the pre-communist era to forge a new Russian identity 
including the Russian tri-color, the Tsarist double-headed eagle, and the national anthem 
of the USSR with revised, nationalist lyrics, while simultaneously promoting the Army’s 
status as a symbol of Russian identity.114  Despite a heightened sense of nationalism, and 
promises to increase military spending, the Russian Army had been practically untrained 
from 1992 to 2000 and the force that was fighting in Chechnya at the turn of the 
millennium was a shadow of the Red Army’s former Cold War strength.115 
The Russians again employed a high level of conventional military force in 
Chechnya, often targeted randomly at civilians, but the conclusion to the Second Chechen 
War was eventually reached through aligning with and supporting a Chechen warlord, 
Akhmad Kadyrov.116  Russia gave Kadyrov, and later his son Ramzan Kadyrov, a 
relatively free hand in the local administration of the state and Kadyrov in turn 
acknowledged Chechen subordination and loyalty to the Russian Federation.117  Russia’s 
exhausting efforts to subdue a small rebellious province through conventional military 
force undoubtedly enhanced the perceived value of pursuing hybrid warfare in order to 
set conditions that would necessitate only brief military confrontation in the pursuit of 
strategic objectives in the near abroad. The lessons learned in Chechnya were: 1) that 
Russia could act with relative impunity in the former Soviet space as long as the 
international community was left with an excuse for inaction, 2) certain elements of the 
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target population would support Russian intervention and governance as an alternative to 
local ethnic subjugation and endemic corruption, 3) “contract soldiers” could overcome 
the operational shortcomings of conscript forces while insulating the government from 
immediate culpability for war crimes, 4) local conflicts could be frozen and reignited on a 
timeline that favored Moscow’s ultimate designs for the residual political situation, and 
5) that blunt application of conventional force alone was a costly way to chase uncertain 
outcomes.118  The value of the Chechen experience in shaping Russian hybrid warfare 
can be seen in the importance Russia began to place on controlling the narrative of 
emerging conflicts, the emphasis Russia places on intervention as a defensive measure to 
protect an oppressed minority, the attributional buffer gained by using “separatist” proxy 
forces, and the use of negotiations and resolutions to preserve Russian initiative in 
shaping a conflict’s culminating point. 
Western desires to perceive Russian activities such as peacekeeping as 
comparable to similar Western activities were an unfortunate byproduct of the 
assumption that Russia had adopted a liberal perspective of its role in the post-Soviet 
world.119  However, the cognitive trap of mistaking Russian practices for what the West 
would have preferred to see was not unique to the post-Soviet era.  “It is commonplace 
that society tends to project its own values when it attempts to study another society or 
culture. This value projection (or mirror-imaging) has resulted in western analysis that 
frequently fails to determine the purpose and direction of Soviet military programs 
because we have too often confused Soviet military concerns with our own.”120  The 
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problems of mirror-imaging include not only military intentions, but the cultural values 
that shape and drive military doctrine and conduct.  “Western confidence that the Soviets 
are actually interested in ‘stabilizing’ world relations is an illusion. The word … is 
simply not in their dictionary, nor … anywhere in their doctrine.”121  In the post-Soviet 
space, the ability to use diplomacy to formulate favorable ceasefires and treaties and to 
ensure terms favorable to Russian interests, as well as enforced by Russian troops, was a 
highly effective way of securing agreements that bound the international community’s 
ability to interfere with Russian regional dominance. The West wanted to see diplomatic 
efforts as the dominant framework for interstate relations, and not as the expedient means 
of consolidating Russia’s dominion of the near-abroad.  
B. THE SOVIET ROOTS OF MODERN RUSSIAN THINKING 
At [the] bottom of [the] Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is a 
traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was 
insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed 
plain in a neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as 
Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more 
competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. 
But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian 
rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that 
their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its 
psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with 
political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always 
feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world 
and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about 
[the] world without or if foreigners learned truth about [the] world within. 
And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle 
for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises 
with it.122 
Vladimir Putin might have been an unexpected choice to rise from relative 
obscurity to take the reins of the Russian Federation, but as an officer in the KGB he was 
still a product of Soviet-era military, political, and intelligence schooling. Putin’s early 
systematic education in Soviet political-military philosophy certainly shaped some degree 
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of his worldview long before fortune led him to the Russian presidency. It is therefore 
necessary to briefly examine this wide body of thought to identify the nascent 
formulations of hybrid warfare. Contrary to popular Western beliefs that tend to 
reflexively categorize Soviet military ability as either nuclear or as massed divisions of 
conventional troops, the Soviets conceptualized the employment of hybrid political and 
military means as a pragmatic tool for changing a relative power relationship. These 
thoughts were not just the Marxist-Leninist dogma for exporting popular revolution, but 
were also strategic formulations for employment of the entire Red Army.  
Long before Putin assumed the mantle of state power, his Soviet-era training 
likely created a clear understanding that the first objective of Soviet strategy had to be to 
ensure the survival of the Soviet regime. Outside the rhetoric of the spread of global 
communism, the Soviet Union had the very specific goal of “advancing the power of the 
USSR in whatever ways [were] most expedient so long as the survival of the Soviet 
power itself [was] not endangered.”123  Because of this focus, the Soviets never saw the 
deliberate provocation of war with the West as being in their interest because they 
rationally concluded that the Soviet Union, and consequently the Soviet regime, would 
not survive. So they sought to “pursue a policy of peaceful expansion of their influence 
and power.”124  Nevertheless, the Soviets remained “alert to exploit counter-deterrence of 
Western strength when they considered the risks to be low, especially in cases where 
aggression [could] be indirect.”125  These tests of deterrent resolve were designed in a 
way that Soviet military force was assembled and prepared to exploit a lack of opposition 
without having to commit to the action until the final moment, but also with off-ramps for 
escalation, which enabled the Soviets to back down without losing face if the response 
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was significant. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia provides an illustration of one 
such test.   
In 1968, the Soviets were worried about a move toward liberalization in Prague 
and needed to reverse the action lest it be successful and repeated in other Eastern Bloc 
countries. Moscow ordered large scale military exercises near the Czech border to serve 
as a coercive warning for the government in Prague to back down, and to see what 
NATO’s response would be. If Prague fell back in line, or if NATO proved to be more 
resolute than expected, the Soviets could demobilize at the end of the exercise without 
having crossed any red-lines and being forced to either fight or back down and lose face. 
When neither happened, Brezhnev ordered the Red Army to invade, confident that the 
reform movement could be crushed quickly and that NATO would not actively counter 
the move.126  The Soviets calculated that the United States was too preoccupied with the 
buildup of conventional forces in Vietnam and that U.S. practices of extended-deterrence 
were not likely to include nuclear weapons if there was not an existential threat to the 
United States itself. In other words, limited war would incur limited response. Testing 
deterrence, while maintaining options through the use of mobilizations for exercises, has 
become a hallmark of Russian military practice. For mobilizations to be effective in 
coercion, and to preserve the decision to commit force until the last possible moment, 
large exercises work best when the target has contiguous borders to the aggressor state, 
and the forces can be mobilized and massed without leaving the aggressor’s territory. As 
this practice sought to hide the specific aims of Soviet strategy, strategic deception is a 
cornerstone of this approach to international relations.     
Because hybrid warfare seeks to undermine an adversary’s ability to defend its 
sovereignty without the complete commitment of military force, the aggressor must 
obscure his strategic intent from the victim (and the victim’s sponsors) for as long as 
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possible.127  This makes deception a fundamental aspect of a hybrid warfare strategy. 
“There existed a Leninist principle and practice in which deception was embedded 
systemically in the relationships of the Party to all external entities and even in the 
relationship of the leadership to the membership.”128  The Soviets employed strategic 
deception against the West throughout the Cold War, and it is therefore reasonable to 
assume that the modern Russian state is comfortable continuing this practice.129  The 
communist view of deception was quite simply that the end did in fact justify the 
means.130 “The Marxist-Leninist system, with its belief in inevitable and predictable 
dialectical change, accepted that anything that promoted that change was desirable if not 
essential, and that deception was therefore a legitimate tool in peace and war.”131  
Effective strategic deception as part of a hybrid warfare campaign seeks to create 
ambiguity regarding the aggressor’s intent so that when decisive action is taken the 
initiative is gained through surprise. This deception may take a range of forms from 
carefully crafted disinformation meant to create doubt about objectives, to masking 
dramatic changes in the nature of the conflict behind significant international events or 
crises that compete for news coverage and audience attention.  
Despite being the victim of the surprise German invasion of Russia during 
Operation Barbarossa in 1941, Stalin was somewhat dismissive of the role of surprise as 
having any more than a “transitory, temporary significance” in the outcome of a war.132  
The post-World War II generation of Soviet military theorists, however, would 
conceptualize that “in certain cases surprise attack with the mass use of new weapons can 
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provoke the quick collapse of the state whose capability for resistance is low as a 
consequence of the basic failures of its social and economic structure, and also of an 
unfavorable geographic location.”133  This description should not be interpreted solely as 
a case for nuclear first-strike or to Marxist rantings about the decay of western 
civilization. Instead it provides several critical components for conceptualizing a hybrid 
approach to warfare. The hybrid combination of diplomatic, economic, and cyber 
weapons to augment military forms of war can be categorized as “new weapons,” and the 
effectiveness of their employment is greatly enhanced if the victim does not immediately 
recognize their employment as acts of war. Obscuring the goals or the existence of hybrid 
warfare is possible by employing the instruments of peace as weapons and the sub-state 
instruments of violence to create kinetic-like effects. Masking the existence of a hybrid 
campaign can also be facilitated by attacking the target state’s means of resistance in 
depth to overwhelm the victim’s ability to interpret the nature of the attacks and prepare 
an appropriate defense. 
One of the leading Soviet thinkers in the lead-up to World War II, General 
Mikhail Tukhachevskii, theorized that “Deep Battle,” the simultaneous employment of 
mobile strike forces through an enemy’s operational depth, could overwhelm the enemy’s 
ability to process information and would paralyze the entire defense, leading to its defeat 
in detail.134  Tukhachevskii was anticipating a clash between large conventional forces, 
but his principles have value in formulating the Russian roots of hybrid warfare. 
Simultaneity is essential to ensure the enemy is not able to respond and organize a 
defense.135  Simultaneity requires a high degree of control to achieve synergy, and hybrid 
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warfare similarly demands that its component forms are focused to maximize the 
strategic effect without forcing an unanticipated escalation and surrendering the initiative 
by the aggressor. Deep battle is dependent on the “cooperation of arms or all-arms battle” 
and each arm is interchangeable if it can accomplish the same result.136  Hybrid warfare 
expands the idea of the interchangeability of the military instruments of war to include all 
of the available means for isolating and attacking an enemy’s ability to resist, and if 
properly synchronized it overwhelms the defender’s ability to process and respond to 
what is happening. Where Tukhachevskii’s Deep Battle envisioned purely military forms 
of war attacking military targets across an adversary’s operational depth, hybrid warfare 
conceptualizes the employment of military and non-military forms of war to attack select 
political, informational, military and economic targets across an adversary’s strategic 
depth to similarly overwhelm his ability to process what is happening and respond 
effectively. The timing of a hybrid campaign would have to consider the target state’s 
unilateral capacity to resist aggression and the efforts needed to undermine that capability 
by exploiting social fissures like ethnic or religious differences within the target 
population. It would also consider undermining economic stability to shake confidence in 
the target regime and cut the raw materials needed for war. The hybrid campaign can 
only be helped if the target region also happens to be a geographic space that is somewhat 
isolated or difficult for the target government to physically project power. If access to the 
space can be limited by difficult terrain or an ethnic minority population, then the target 
state will have a difficult time in asserting its authoritative role and countering the 
aggressor’s efforts. 
Another long-standing Soviet theory of warfare is the idea of non-linear warfare. 
Where Deep Battle still envisioned a front, “non-linear warfare” assumed that tactical 
nuclear weapons would be frequently employed to create large gaps in defensive lines 
that could be exploited by follow-on ground forces.137  Nuclear strikes were later 
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replaced doctrinally with precision conventional munitions which similarly made a fixed, 
linear front obsolete, promoting the concept of Soviet battalion tactical groups who 
would use maneuver and tempo to conduct “meeting engagements” with enemy 
forces.138  The Russians continue to prefer the term “non-linear warfare” to describe their 
theory and actions that have become collectively referred to in the West as “hybrid 
warfare.”  Despite Russian preferences, geographic non-linearity does not necessarily 
apply to hybrid warfare. When an aggressor pursues a hybrid campaign, he does so with 
an understanding of the geopolitical line, the recognized international border that if 
crossed with large conventional forces will change the nature of the conflict. While there 
may be no active front within the contested area, the international border serves as a 
defensive line that restricts maneuver. A much more appropriate use of non-linearity in 
hybrid warfare is in the understanding of time. Temporal non-linearity means that hybrid 
warfare does not occur from left-to-right in a phased progression. The hybrid warfare 
aggressor may introduce certain levels of violence during a supposed time of peace, and 
may pursue diplomacy to freeze a conflict if the initiative is being lost. Temporal non-
linearity unfortunately undermines most efforts to model hybrid warfare in a concise 
manner. Political non-linearity speaks to the nature of the targets of a hybrid campaign. 
The target state’s sovereignty may be attacked away from a contested area, in the capital, 
in the international economy, or in the information domain. 
The military forms of war were also not the only means that the Soviets 
envisioned as being capable of achieving the objectives of war.  “Soviet military doctrine 
[held] necessary the coordinated use of all forms of military power, as expedient. This 
means flexibility in selection among military means, as well as selecting between military 
and political means.”139  The intent of this reminder was mainly an admonition against an 
overreliance on nuclear weapons, as a deeply “ingrained Communist precept to avoid 
gambling on any single or “easy” means to victory.”140  By looking outside of the purely 
military means, the Soviets seized on the notion of using soft power, primarily economic, 
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to help achieve what would have been traditionally military objectives. The belief in 
political warfare was central to communist philosophy. As George Kennan, the eminent 
American expert on the early Soviet Union observed, “Lenin so synthesized the teachings 
of Marx and Clausewitz that the Kremlin’s conduct of political warfare has become the 
most refined and effective of any in history.”141  Soviet military thought was highly 
critical of the Western “bourgeois” approach to military theory as too narrowly focused 
on military art in isolation from the “economic and morale potentialities of the 
country.”142  While the communists’ claims of perfecting a calculus that included these 
factors guided by Marxist principles might seem somewhat absurd over half a century 
later, it is telling that Soviet military science included a deep connection between the 
military battlefield, the economy and the force of human will as the “permanently 
operating factors” with which both sides must contend during war.143   
Even during the massive conventional clashes of entire army groups during the 
First World War, certain Russian military theorists were postulating a strategy of indirect 
warfare as a way of defeating an enemy through attrition. During the 1920s, early Soviet 
military theorist Alexander Svechin authored Strategy, “the most important work 
[written] on the subject in the Soviet Union until the 1960s.”144  Unlike the competing 
strategy of destruction which promoted a traditional vision of warfare that espoused the 
focus of mass and fires at the decisive point, Svechin’s strategy of attrition allowed for 
“any number of intermediate military, political, and economic goals.”145  By expanding 
the objectives of warfare beyond the destruction of military forces to include political and 
economic targets, Svechin created a conceptual framework for undermining a target 
state’s sources of strength before the introduction of force. The means Svechin 
envisioned for his gradual attrition of enemy power would be shaped by the “path of least 
resistance, gradually accumulating political, economic, and military advantages, which 
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would enable it eventually to deliver the final ‘knockout’ blow.”146  Despite charges of 
being too defensive minded, Svechin’s attrition strategy demonstrated “Leninist 
pragmatism” through its “advocacy of the maximum flexibility in the pursuit of 
unchanging ends.”147  This strategic end-state, envisioned as a zero-sum contest that 
would produce a clear winner and a loser, served to focus all of the elements of national 
power in the manner that preserves those instruments of power to the greatest extent 
possible, particularly the military which becomes a finishing effort to an already well 
developed political battlefield. The melding of political, economic, and military means to 
achieve strategic ends demonstrates an early theoretical formulation of the economy of 
force value of hybrid warfare. 
The synchronized efforts of diplomatic, informational, and economic attacks are 
easiest to control when they can be directed with the same authority that a head of state 
uses to employ his military. When Putin presented a series of draft anti-monopoly and 
judicial restructuring laws to the Duma in early 2001, he was initially hailed as a 
reformer. However, detailed examination of these laws reveal a consistent movement 
toward consolidating power under the President’s office; whatever power was taken away 
from the judiciary or the oligarchs was simply transferred to the chief executive.148  
Similar moves were made in the economic sector as well. On the tail end of these 
“reforms,” Putin removed the head of the Russian energy giant, Gazprom, and installed a 
loyalist who would put the company’s massive economic resources under Putin’s 
control.149   
In 1979, John Dziak argued that the long standing idea of Soviet “defensiveness” 
as the notion of the Soviets being solely concerned with surviving and resulting from 
their long history of foreign invasion, was indeed a myth.150  This myth was promulgated 
by Westerners who wanted to view the United States as the real aggressor and to those 
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who wanted to reduce military spending in order to prevent an arms race that would 
likely lead to war. Beliefs in Soviet benevolence were based entirely on Western 
perceptions of the international order, and not on the Soviets’ realist view of themselves.  
“In Soviet doctrine, war and politics are the same thing. They are not Clausewitz’s ‘other 
means,’ but two names of a single concept.”151  This Russian view of the spectrum of 
conflict is a requisite perception for hybrid warfare as it facilitates the conceptualization 
of achieving “military” victories well in advance of the outbreak of conventional warfare.  
“Soviet military doctrine and strategy are, first and foremost, offensive.”152  
Defensiveness was based on a perceived weakness in the existing balance of power, and 
all efforts were focused on carefully changing that dynamic in order to retain the 
initiative for the Soviets. In the Soviet era, “communist ideology and purely power-
political considerations place the criterion of calculated risk, cost, and gain at the 
foundation of any strategic initiative.”153  This offensive-realist perspective and a 
willingness to employ violence and violate a target state’s sovereignty during a time of 
“peace” remain fundamental attributes for the practitioner of hybrid warfare. 
C. CONTEMPORARY PUTIN 
What is most striking and most innovative about Mr. Putin’s program is 
not its unabashed expansionist intent: after all, military rulers have pointed 
their swords at neighbors since Old Testament days. Rather, it is the 
seriousness with which he has attempted to coordinate activity in a broad 
range of seemingly separate spheres so as to provide maximal tactical 
support for the realization of his national dream.154   
By 1994, the Marxist principles of international class struggle had been 
exchanged in the Russian ruling elite’s lexicon with policies espousing Russian 
nationalist interests in the near-abroad.155  By replacing “communism” with 
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“nationalism” or “Russian identity,” the Russians may have lessened their potential 
appeal to a global audience, but they had strengthened their ties to the regional population 
whose support they must have to protect the integrity of the Russian state. The existence 
of this population in the near-abroad provides a necessary element for a narrative of 
victimization, establishment of political and irregular “separatists,” and as an eventual 
pretext for Russian intervention.   
Putin is a pragmatist and the standard risk-cost-benefit analysis remains a central 
factor in Russian calculus of the feasibility of strategic objectives.  “These are not Middle 
Eastern zealots throwing caution to the winds, but managers fully alive to options, 
alternative plans, and escape hatches. Soviet warfighting is based on advantage, timing, 
and finding and exploiting enemy weaknesses, not just bulling ahead.”156  Unlike Yeltsin, 
who would rush headlong into a political fray, when Putin encounters an obstacle, he 
prefers to “retreat and wait” to see what options the situation might surface.157  “Putin is 
not a long-term planner. He lives in the here and now, just as he did in the KGB.”158  
While this tendency led to early claims that he was indecisive, when he did see an 
opportunity to break through an obstacle, such as the resistance to central authority by the 
seven regional Russian governors, Putin’s actions were carefully calculated and always 
aimed at strengthening the central authority of the state.159 
Vladimir Putin’s philosophy of the strength of the Russian State rests on three 
concepts: Orthodoxy; the power vertical; and sovereign democracy.160  “Defender of the 
Orthodox Faith” is a Tsarist-era notion that intertwined the official status of Russian 
leadership with the legitimizing mandate of the Orthodox Church, which was always a 
state-funded, state-controlled institution. After the communist period, where all religions 
were in general disfavor, Putin has again interwoven the role of Russian leadership with 
the mantle of the Church’s champion as a cornerstone of identity for his new-Russia. 
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Putin’s so-called “power vertical” signifies a return to the authoritarian, centrally 
controlled governing style that is much more closely related to the old Soviet or Imperial 
systems than it is to the European democracies.161  Oligarchs who accumulate too much 
wealth and resist Putin’s control are investigated for some impropriety before their 
companies and fortunes are seized and they are imprisoned. Those who accept the power-
vertical are allowed to continue to benefit from their positions.  “Sovereign democracy” 
is the Russian counter to Western liberal democracy. Sovereign democracy discards 
“universal” democratic concepts such as fair elections and acceptance of changes in 
power, and replaces them with the notion that the sovereign state is the guarantor of 
fairness of its electoral processes, free from international interference.162  Russian 
elections are deemed as ‘fair as they need to be’ in order that the stability of the state is 
not threatened by the rise of different political entities.   
The three ideological pillars of Orthodoxy, the “power vertical” and sovereign 
democracy, support the conceptualization and implementation of hybrid warfare. As the 
defender of the Orthodox Church, Putin provides himself with a mandate to extend 
protection not just to ethnic Russians but to all Orthodox Christians regardless of 
international borders. This can serve as a moral justification for violating sovereignty in a 
time of supposed peace, and it can also serve to rally support for Russia if Orthodox 
Christians make up a portion of the target population. Orthodoxy also provides a 
replacement for the adhesive functions that used to be a characteristic of communism; 
serving as the ideological glue that held the Soviet Empire together. Orthodoxy may even 
be a superior choice because it does not have to deliver in the material world.163  Hunger, 
repression, and endemic corruption can and did undermine confidence in the communist 
system. Orthodoxy requires only faith and an association of the practices of that faith 
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with Russian identity. The centralization of authority over the functions of the state 
provides Putin with the ability to marshal the elements of national power toward specific 
strategic goals. Sovereign democracy also serves two important functions by largely 
insulating Putin from real democratic opposition to his policies, and by preventing a new 
administration with divergent strategic objectives from rising to power and derailing an 
embryonic hybrid campaign. 
The Putin regime may have taken steps to insulate the Russian internal political 
process from external influence, but this does not mean that they also intend to withdraw 
Russia from the international body politic. On the contrary, Russian membership on the 
UN Security Council is critical to Russia’s sense of global influence. The UN Security 
Council membership gives Russia what it perceives as its rightful seat at the central table 
of world affairs, and because Russia already has the seat, they do not need to make any 
concessions to “lesser powers” in order to gain membership, as they would have to in 
order to join the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).164  The 
emphasis on legitimism is a “key principle of Putin’s leadership.”165  Putin insisted that 
he would abide by the constitution of Russia regarding term limits, and when he vacated 
office in 2008 he was true to his word and the letter of the law, even as he undermined 
the intent of the law and retained the executive power while serving as the Prime 
Minister. Russia uses its United Nations Security Council (UNSC) veto power as an 
instrument of leverage that exploits the power-liberal principles of the international 
community, but it sets aside these principles when they interfere with its power-realist 
preferences. Russian recognizes its military inferiority to the United States and relies on 
its UNSC seat and on its nuclear arsenal as its twin pillars of foreign security.166  Russia 
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is also quick to shape its challenges to fit with international sentiment as a way of 
keeping the world out of Russia’s “domestic” business.   
Prior to the attacks in the United States on September 11th, 2001, Russia had 
conflicted views of its role in the post-Cold War world. Russia wanted to be seen as a 
player in world events, a peer that the international community must consult in order to 
secure a true consensus. Economic struggles throughout the 1990s, multiple small 
conflicts in the post-Soviet space, and disagreements with the West over issues like 
confronting the Milosevic regime in Serbia, kept the Russians from completely 
integrating into European affairs when such a move might have been a possibility. When 
George Bush unilaterally declared in 2001 that the nuclear arms treaties of the Cold War 
were outdated remnants of an animosity that had ceased to exist and that Russia and the 
United States would pursue a cooperative relationship, many Russian Atlanticist-liberals 
were pleased, but the Russian Eurasianist-conservative power establishment was 
fundamentally shaken.167  Washington shifted its focus to other parts of the world and 
Russia was largely dismissed for its decreased centrality on the international stage. The 
conclusion taken from this situation by Russian power elites was that if Russia wanted to 
be treated with respect and as a peer by the United States, it could only do so by 
appearing dangerous.168   
For a brief period of time however, Russia was able to create the appearance of a 
convergence between Russian internal conflicts and international sentiment. Vladimir 
Putin immediately recognized the political implications of the American declaration of 
War on Terror immediately after September 11th.169  Putin was among the first 
international leaders to call President Bush and offer support. He had already branded the 
Chechen separatists as terrorists linked to a growing Islamist threat in Afghanistan and 
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was quick to demonstrate Russia’s existing efforts in Chechnya as commensurate with 
the broad tide of world anti-terror sentiment following the attacks in the United States.170  
The result was that Russian operations against Chechnya were in some ways equated 
with and could be narrated as supportive of the international war against Al Qaeda, and a 
common perception among many Western analysts that American and Russian relations 
had turned a corner now that the two states had a common enemy.   
Framing conflicts in a manner that minimized international resistance 
demonstrates the importance Putin places on dominating the information domain in order 
to control the narrative. In many of their “peacekeeping operations” Russian forces were 
often accused of using excessive force which undermined their ability to sustain 
legitimate international support for their efforts. For example, the Russians learned that 
the limited tactical value of bombing a rebel Chechen village might be totally reversed by 
press reports of civilian casualties or losses of Russian soldiers. Bombing the village and 
then dominating the media reporting to downplay civilian casualties or to attribute the 
bombing to the rebels on the other hand was a win-win, even when the claims for rebel 
responsibility were based on implausible “facts.”  As the Internet and speed of global 
connectivity began to catch on during this period, the Russians learned to not just disrupt 
the dissidents’ use of these platforms to communicate, but to also saturate these systems 
with Russian propaganda. These messages would have some unifying themes such as 
Russia’s defense of Russian people and values, and the unprovoked aggression attributed 
to Russia’s opponent, but they would also perform a masking function by generating a 
white-noise sea of conspiracy theories, baseless claims, and exaggerated actions meant to 
make any true accounts difficult to find and to provide excuses for appeasement-minded 
international organizations in lieu of having to take definitive action. Through the 
uncontested saturation of the entire spectrum of media, Putin is able to manufacture 
boogeymen by playing to Russian sentiment, such as the repeated association of Ukraine 
with Nazi-Germany, and to invent historical foundations that support his world view, 
regardless of the actual facts.  “The main difference between propaganda in the USSR 
and the new Russia…is that in Soviet times the concept of truth was important. Even if 
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they were lying they took care to prove what they were doing was ‘the truth.’ Now no 
one even tries proving the ‘truth.’ You can just say anything. Create realities.”171 
A cornerstone of Putin’s contemporary world view is the notion of New-Russia, a 
construct that envisions a future state that redraws existing geopolitical boundaries to 
encompass populations that are believed to be ethnically or historically more aligned with 
Moscow than with a foreign state. Putin has forged this New-Russian identity into a 
supra-nationalist rallying point.172  His methodology for promoting this identity has been 
to craft a narrative of a strong Russian state through the symbols of Russian history, not 
least of which is the resurrection of Novorossiya (New Russia), a short lived political 
entity making up the southeastern portion of modern Ukraine. Where those symbols or 
the historical narrative have needed a push, he has simply ordered the history to be 
rewritten.173  A significant political sentiment within the dominant “United Russia”  
party is the belief that Russia’s frontiers are “not eternal” and that the borders should be 
redrawn to encompass all Russians, even if this risks Russia’s “relatively peaceful 
life.”174  This sentiment, from Putin’s strongest supporters, indicates the willingness to 
use violence against Russia’s neighbors in order to reshape the physical boundaries of 
Russia without regard for the sovereign status of those states. 
Only gradually did Putin’s single-minded focus on restoring what he 
defined as the geographical integrity and honor of the Russian state 
become evident. And it took yet more time for the world at large to 
understand how far he was willing to go in pursuit of that end. The 
inability or reluctance of western and other policymakers, intelligence 
services, and independent foreign affairs experts to grasp this dedication 
                                                 
171 Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss, “The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes 
Information, Culture and Money,” The Interpreter (2014), 9. This quote is attributed to former Putin 
election campaign consultant and Kremlin political insider Gleb Pavlovsy. 
172 Van Herpen, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism, 116–117. Van Herpen 
describes poll data that indicates some degree of Russian ultranationalist sentiment is prevalent in a 
majority of the Russian population, and patriotism has a central place in Putin’s ideology. The term “supra-
national” is used here because the new-Russian identity is very deliberately not limited to the Russians who 
currently live within the borders of the Russian Federation.   
173 “Putin Orders to Amplify Textbooks with Information about Crimea’s Role.” Crimean News 
Agency (QHA), June 03, 2014. Putin ordered changes to history textbooks in Russia (and Crimea) that 
“amplify” the role of Crimea as a part of the Russian empire. See also: Van Herpen, 2014, 118; and 
Hedenskog, 2013, 77. 
174 Van Herpen, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism, 117–118. 
 65 
on Putin’s part ranks as an analytic failure of the first rank. Meanwhile, 
Putin seized the initiative in his military attack on Georgia in 2008, in his 
multi-dimensional but non-military assault on Kyrgyzstan in 2010, and 
then in his invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea and other territories 
in 2014.175 
Vladimir Putin has resurrected the Soviet perspectives of offensive-realism, 
strategic deception, and belief in political tools as weapons to shape a framework for a 
new-Russian foreign policy in the near-abroad.  
D. RUSSIAN GRAND STRATEGIC GOALS 
What cannot be so easily deduced [are] the formal and institutional 
process by which the main opportunities of Russian strategy are identified, 
and the process of decision-making that sets them in motion. Closely 
related to this are the organizations and organizational processes that 
define, organize, coordinate, and set in motion the various tactical steps in 
each concrete situation. Here, too, the reason is obvious: these are matters 
of the utmost secrecy. Indeed, the entire mechanism by which strategy is 
translated into tactics in Putin’s Russia is protected by the same shield of 
secrecy that surrounded high tactics in the U.S.S.R. The one thing that can 
be asserted beyond doubt is that the process is highly centralized in Putin’s 
own office and that he has been involved in every stage of that process. 
Putin, a product of the late Soviet KGB, simply assumes that this [is] all a 
natural and key element of his personal leadership. To compromise 
tactical secrecy would be to compromise the entire enterprise.176 
Despite this secrecy and the extent that the Russians employ deception to help 
mask their efforts, three general strategic themes can be deduced from their actual 
practices: 1) Ensure the continuity of the central government, 2) Ensure that Russia 
maintains its dominant position in the former Soviet space, and 3) Restore Russia’s status 
as a major power on the global stage. As was true during the Soviet-era, Putin’s 
immediate concern is with ensuring the continuity and stability of his government.  
“Protecting the regime” sounds much more pejorative, although it is nonetheless 
accurate. Putin believes in a strong central state and he sees competing internal political 
mechanisms as a deficiency in that strength. Any measures taken to crack down on 
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dissent are therefore justified as defending the central authority of the state and 
subsequently as necessary to the defense of the nation.   
Putin views Russia’s preeminence in the former Soviet space, or the near-abroad, 
as a Russian version of Manifest Destiny.177  His secondary general objective is to ensure 
that the states of the former USSR remain politically, economically and militarily aligned 
with (and subordinate to) Moscow, regardless of the desires of the affected populations.  
“Events between the invasion of Georgia and the armed seizure of Ukrainian territory in 
2014 forced policy makers and international affairs specialists worldwide to acknowledge 
the possibility that the Russian Republic under Vladimir Putin has reorganized its entire 
foreign and domestic policy in order to pursue a single objective, namely, the 
establishment of a new kind of union comprised of former Soviet republics and headed 
by Russia itself.”178  Whether the debate between Russian Nationalists and Imperial 
Nationalists regarding a future Russia whose boundaries have been redrawn around 
ethnic Russian populations or whose influence includes the complete domination of 
former Soviet neighbors is ever settled, the result of either disregards the sovereign 
desires of the affected countries.  “Today the invasion of Ukraine and annexation of 
Crimea confirm that the Putin regime openly believes that its’ system can only survive if 
Russia is an empire, a situation that ab initio puts the sovereignty and integrity of other 
CIS members at risk.”179 
The first two strategic themes are related to the extent that Putin fears a stable, 
liberal democracy on Russia’s border will debunk his assertions regarding Eurasians’ 
need for authoritarian governments and serve as a model for domestic opposition in 
Moscow, and that any movement toward liberalism is the result of Western meddling in 
Russia’s sphere of influence. The third theme is Russia’s renewed position of importance 
on the world stage. Russia has been the seat of a powerful empire, twice. Its preferred 
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position is to be a principle player on the international stage once again, but so far this 
desire has not been realizable due to Russia’s diminished economic and diplomatic 
capabilities. Russia will likely continue to try to promote its importance through its seat 
on the UN Security Council and by conducting just enough saber rattling to remind the 
world that it still has the world’s largest stock pile of nuclear weapons. 
Putin’s strategy hinges on maintaining internal legitimacy, advancing a 
narrative of Russian greatness, manipulating nationalism, and protecting 
sources of revenue. He seizes opportunities to improve his position by 
controlling the media and the wealth of the elite class. Additionally, he 
maintains government control of large sectors of the Russian economy and 
industry, while engaging in energy politics abroad to advance its national 
interests. Finally, Putin is determined to keep former Soviet bloc countries 
oriented politically and economically toward Russia. In this, he espouses 
distinctly anti-Western rhetoric, casting NATO and the United States as 
Russian adversaries.180  
E. RUSSIAN ELEMENTS OF POWER 
“Russian development rests on a few pillars—a strong state, strong armed forces, 
and a strong Orthodox church.”181 The strengthening of these pillars has led to the 
redefining of what it means to be Russian and is interwoven with the moral authority of 
organized religion. Putin’s shifting of power to his central control (the power vertical) 
and taking steps to minimize political opposition are his methods for shoring up the 
strength of the state. His final and most difficult challenge is to rebuild a strong Russian 
military. The conventional land forces remain the non-nuclear backbone of Russian 
power, and a general understanding of their disposition is helpful for envisioning the 
regular practices of mobilization, exercise, and redeployment that define the Russian 
system. Cyber-warfare is also an emerging Russian area of emphasis that has different 
levels of employment within and completely independent of larger campaigns.   
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The 2008 Georgian War was another reality check for Russian leadership 
regarding how badly the Russian Army had degraded since the end of the Soviet Union. 
Unlike the first venture in Chechnya, the Russians were able to claim a clear victory in 
Georgia. However, despite spending the better part of eight years preparing for an 
inevitable invasion, and employing a concerted hybrid warfare effort against the 
Georgians, the conventional invasion revealed significant shortcomings in the Russian 
conventional warfighting functions, and success was largely due only to superior 
numbers and a symmetrical response from the Georgian side. With this assessment in 
hand, Vladimir Putin and his proxy Dmitry Medvedev ordered the complete 
reorganization of the Russian Army in 2008.182  The goals for the restructure included 
one million men in uniform, an increased role for non-commissioned officers, decreased 
reliance on conscription and a change from divisional to brigade maneuver structures.183   
Russia is divided into four Military Districts (MD)—Western, Southern, Central, 
and Eastern- (similar to a U.S. Geographic Combatant Command, but regionally focused 
from within Russian territory), each commanded by a Joint Strategic Commander 
(JSC).184  The JSC has the responsibility for commanding his apportioned forces and 
mobilizing the reserves from within his MD, but he may receive strategic reinforcements 
from other MDs as the Ministry of Defense allocates resources.185  The JSC has 
command over all joint forces within his MD except for strategic nuclear forces and 
airborne forces which fall directly under the Russian General Staff.186  Overall manning 
of the Russian armed forces is chronically understrength. Average unit manning levels 
are between 40 and 60 percent, although units in the Southern MD (bordering the 
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Caucasus, Black Sea and Ukraine) are generally closer to full strength, indicating where 
Moscow’s assumption of future problems was focused in late 2012.187  
Russia relies on a system of reserve mobilization to work up to its full combat 
strength. For maintaining troop strength in the conduct of limited war, active units from 
outside of the committed MD are likely to be temporarily assigned to relieve the 
committed forces without having to force a complete, costly, mobilization. Russia’s 
overall strength is divided among the MDs based on the perceived threat. The Western 
MD has three brigades on hand and can raise three more within one month and two more 
within six months to cover the Russian border from Finland to Belarus.188  The Southern 
MD has responsibility for the Caucasus and Ukraine. It has five brigades on hand and can 
raise four more within a month, manned to 90 percent due to the perceived regional 
volatility and potential for flare-ups in the Caucasus.189  The Central MD has two 
brigades on hand and can activate two more within one month and an additional two 
within six months.190 The Eastern MD has three brigades on hand and can call up an 
additional three brigades in one month and four more brigades within six months.191    
The Russian Ministry of Defense retains operational control of the airborne forces 
(VDV).192  There are four airborne divisions (two airborne, two air assault) and one 
independent airborne brigade.193   The 45th Special Forces Regiment (the likely core of a 
newly formed Russian Special Operations Command) is also a part of the VDV as are air 
transport and helicopter units. Three divisions and one Brigade of VDV are available as 
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reinforcements all across Russia.194  Half of a VDV division (one brigade) could be 
deployed anywhere in Russia within a week, another whole division within a month, and 
two more divisions within six months.195 Russian VDV are “likely to play a key 
supporting role in limited wars, especially initially when the ability to be deployed 
comparatively swiftly would help in buying time for the mobilization and transport of 
reinforcements to the strategic direction in question.”196  
The Russians have four fleets: the Baltic Fleet based near Kaliningrad, the 
Northern Fleet based near Murmansk, the Black Sea Fleet based at Sevastopol, and the 
Pacific fleet based at Vladivostok.197 The warm-water port at Sevastopol plays an 
important role in the Russian’s ability to project power in the Mediterranean and Middle 
East. The potential loss of this port due to an inhospitable government taking power in 
Kiev may have been a driving factor in Putin’s decision to annex Crimea in early 2014.   
The Russians have also developed a renewed interest in the use of “soft power” 
and Vladimir Putin’s definition as “a set of tools and methods to achieve foreign policy 
goals without the use of weapons [but instead] through information and other levers of 
influence” confirms his emphasis is on the coercive effects of these instruments, despite 
his claims to the contrary.198  Putin’s word choice here is highly indicative of a thought 
process that supports hybrid warfare. He is not using “soft power” in the sense of inter-
state attraction theorized by Joseph Nye.199  Instead he begins with the objectives that 
would have once only been realizable through military means, and then reverse-engineers 
the achievement of those coercive ends with other instruments of national power. Putin 
then makes a case that these same instruments of soft power, particularly open 
information systems, are also “unfortunately, often…used to nurture and provoke 
extremism, separatism, nationalism, manipulation of public consciousness, [and] direct 
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interference in the internal policies of sovereign States.”200  Putin’s case is fairly clear. 
These instruments are the tools of the state, and they must be controlled in order to 
protect the state. 
The 1991 Gulf War was troubling for Russian military thinkers due to the 
devastating effect that coalition “technical warfare” had on Iraqi, Soviet-based 
communications and information infrastructure.201  Predating the west’s “Revolution in 
Military Affairs” the Russians identified the possibility of information technologies being 
used as formidable weapons that would supplant the primacy of strike systems.202  The 
Russians were also disconcerted to witness the complete cyber domination of their 
integrated anti-aircraft systems in Syria when Israeli fighters were unopposed during a 
devastating air raid that destroyed a joint Syrian-North Korean nuclear venture in 
2007.203  Russia’s concept of information warfare differs from the West’s in that there is 
little delineation between wartime and peace, other than the specificity of the targets of 
the campaign. The Russians maintain different strategic, operational, and tactical focuses 
for information warfare.204  As an example of how the Russians conceptualize 
information warfare as both an economy of force, risk mitigation and force projection 
capability, Alexandr Burutin, the Russian Deputy Chief of Staff, claimed information 
warfare capabilities “do not require specialized manufacturing facilities and a complex 
infrastructure. A small group or even one expert can develop and carry out an act of 
destruction while not having to physically cross borders and expose human lives to 
risk.”205  The shortcoming of information warfare to achieve strategic objectives without 
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complimentary activities in the physical domain was demonstrated during the 2007 
cyber-attacks on Tallinn.   
In 2007, the Estonian government voted to move a monument to Russian soldiers 
in Tallinn. This decision was condemned by Moscow and for over a week, Estonian 
government and financial institutions were subjected to a wave of distributed denial of 
service (DDoS) attacks, supposedly carried out by patriotic Russian hackers. There is 
overwhelming circumstantial evidence that these attacks were at least supported if not 
directly controlled by the Russian government, and they are indicative of the Russians’ 
efforts to experiment with coercion of a foreign government’s domestic policy through 
purely cyber means. The Estonian attack is unique in that the Russians were able to 
marshal the efforts of a number of criminal cyber enterprises and direct their collective 
efforts at a state target, while insulating official Russian institutions from culpability. 
Ultimately the “cyber-war” against Estonia failed to achieve the desired outcome as the 
Estonians moved the statue anyway.206  “Cyber power is the ability to obtain preferred 
outcomes through [the] use of the electronically interconnected resources of the cyber 
domain…These preferred outcomes can be within or outside of cyberspace.”207  The 
Russians realized the need to combine cyber-attacks with other elements of power, as 
they demonstrated during the assault on Georgia the following year. Nevertheless, the 
Russians are continuing to experiment with the evolving possibilities of cyber warfare in 
isolated and coordinated hybrid warfare efforts.  Armies are relatively easy to quantify, 
cyber is not. Cyber size and dependence may actually create vulnerabilities for the 
stronger or dominant actor.208  In normal power projection, “resources and mobility are 
costly. In the virtual world, physical distance is immaterial and an offensive can be 
almost cost free.”209  Cyber power affects many other domains from war to commerce, so 
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it is an increasingly important platform for attacks on those sectors as well a distribution 
vector for propaganda.210 
Following the 2008 military reorganization, Russian military doctrine has 
included an increased level of “importance [on] information warfare during the initial 
phase of a conflict to weaken the command and control ability of the opponent and in the 
form of an information campaign during the actual battle to create a positive view within 
the international community.”211  While the responsibility for controlling these operations 
likely lies with the FSB, the execution of attacks against Estonian government systems in 
2007 and against the Georgian command and control infrastructure in 2008 (at the outset 
of the Russian invasion) were supposedly executed by small cells of Russian civilian 
“hacktivists” through a large bot-net of infected machines, with no conclusive ties to the 
Russian government. This privateer-like organization provides the Russian government 
with a degree of deniability while still enabling the pursuit of strategic objectives.212  “By 
using information warfare methods to attack an adversary’s centers of gravity and critical 
vulnerabilities it is possible to win against an opponent, militarily as well as politically, at 
a low cost without necessarily occupying the territory of the enemy.”213   
Domestic Russian-dissident demonstrations against Putin’s regime in 2011–2012 
caused the Russian leadership to develop a heightened sense of insecurity.214  This 
anxiety enabled Putin to push through new laws in 2012 and 2014 curbing the freedom of 
speech and demonstration.215  While these laws demonstrate the potential fragility of the 
Putin regime, they also put in place a high degree of control over the information 
spectrum that enables Moscow to conduct hybrid warfare.     
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F. SUMMARY 
Russia maintains the offensive-realist perspective of national power and believes 
it is entitled to a dominant role in its’ near abroad. Russia continues to hold the Soviet-era 
perspective of there being no hard delineation between war and peace, which facilitates 
its employment of the full spectrum of national power, including certain levels of 
violence, as a means to assert its authority. Gone are the scores of standing Red Army 
divisions and the expectations of superiority through sheer numbers. Faced with this new 
reality, Russia necessarily has to look beyond the purely military forms of war to exploit 
those tools that can isolate and degrade traditionally military targets while minimizing the 
commitment and subsequent risk of the few brigades it does have. This modern evolution 
of Russian limited war draws from a long history of Russian military thinking which 
included the ideas of warfare not being confined to a fixed front but stretching through an 
adversary’s strategic depth, the instruments of warfare being completely interchangeable 
so long as they can achieve a disruptive effect on the adversary’s ability to process and 
respond to new information, and the notion of enduring attrition to wear down an 
adversary with other elements of national power in order to preserve the military for the 
decisive blow. 
Russia also continues to employ widespread deception to create uncertainty on the 
part of its adversaries and to mask its true intentions for as long as possible. Putin values 
“soft-power” as a means to achieve hard effects, and his military continues to use 
mobilizations and exercises as a means of coercion and to preserve the decision to 
commit forces for as long as possible while he measures changes in the potential cost-
benefit equation. Putin has formulated 
 A fresh approach to the tactics of union-building—[which] does not 
preclude a heavy reliance on military force. Indeed, the record to date 
suggests that it requires it. But Putin’s important insight on tactics sees the 
military as but one of more than a dozen distinct spheres in which 
pressures and incentives can and must be brought to bear to achieve the 
desired end. These tactical tools are as diverse as energy, transport routes, 
training, credit and finance, support of kindred groups abroad, information 
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and propaganda, monetary policy, research, immigration policy, labor law, 
investments, and open-ended payments that are little more than bribes.216 
Putin is an authoritarian leader who has consolidated control over the diplomatic, 
informational and economic domains of Russian power while he has simultaneously 
worked to strengthen the Russian military. Most importantly, Putin has developed a 
unitary strategic framework that facilitates a hybridization of his means of political and 
military warfare as an efficient way to 1) ensure domestic stability by eliminating any 
real opposition, controlling the national narrative, and shifting the blame for domestic 
shortcomings to external actors; 2) promote Russia’s regional dominance by forcing 
former Soviet states to accept political and military alignment with Moscow; and 3) 
demand international respect for a significant role in world affairs through its position on 
the UN security council and by creating doubt regarding the stability of the international 
order. While these strategic themes may at points be interrelated, specific strategic ends 
may satisfy one or more of these categories.  
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IV. RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR, 2008 
Apart from the novel use of coordinated cyber and physical attacks, there can be 
an unfortunate temptation to view the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 as a short, 
conventional conflict when examined from the time that Russian tanks crossed into 
Georgian territory on August 7th, 2008, and the signing of a ceasefire five days later on 
August 12th.217  This perception, again, fits the Western preference for a clear 
delineation between peace and war, and that a state of peace, however tense or fragile, 
existed on August 6th. It also assumes the liberal viewpoint of international relations and 
the underlying belief that modern conflicts are simply the result of failed diplomacy and 
not the intentional violation of national sovereignty by an aggressor. Years later, there 
remains an open debate regarding when Russia actually decided to go to war with 
Georgia; an argument that can be attributed to the clash of liberal and realist perspectives. 
The liberal side of this debate claims that Putin made the decision in 2008 when the crisis 
had deteriorated beyond the possibility of reconciliation. The realists, on the other hand, 
believe that the 2008 war was merely the overt execution phase of a “Grand Plan” that 
had been conceived as early as 1999 and was marked in the intervening years with 
deliberate actions taken to undermine Georgia’s ability to defend against Russia’s 
annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Figure 2).218  To analyze the Russo-Georgian 
War for evidence of a deliberate Russian effort at experimenting with hybrid warfare, the 
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latter view of Russian intentions provides the only logical explanation for Russian actions 
over the greater part of a decade prior to the summer of 2008.219   
Figure 2.  Map of Georgia with Breakaway Regions Abkhazia (Green) and 
South Ossetia (Purple) 
  
Created by “ChrisO” at UN Cartographic section and available in public domain at: 
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/91/Georgia_high_detail_map.png. 
Georgia has long served as the ethno-religious buffer between Eastern Orthodoxy 
and Islam. Following annexation from the Ottoman Turks by the Russian Empire in 
1810, it has developed an integral frontier status within the psyche of Russia, despite the 
limited number of ethnic Russians who actually live there. Georgia has always been a 
patchwork of various ethnicities and religions, but for a brief period of time the 
dominance of the Russian Empire and the emergence of the Russian-led Union of Soviet 
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Socialist Republics resulted in a more prominent status for citizens with Russian identity; 
enough so that Georgia’s most infamous native son, Iosif Dzhugashvili, would be known 
to history by his Russian-derived revolutionary pseudonym—Joseph Stalin.220  Despite 
the fact that 30 percent of the population of Georgia are people of ethnic groups other 
than Georgian, and that many of these groups enjoyed protected status under the Soviet 
system, all political parties voted unanimously for full independence from the emerging 
Russian Federation in October 1990.221  At the same time that Georgia gained 
independence, minority enclaves with existing levels of autonomy, most notably South 
Ossetia, made subsequent moves to declare themselves independent republics or as 
republics that were still a part of the collapsing USSR. In the case of South Ossetia, 
Georgia responded by nullifying Ossetia’s autonomous status, banning Ossetian 
separatist political organizations, and then employing the Georgian armed forces to force 
the region back under Tbilisi’s control.222   
From late 1990 until early 1992, Russia provided covert military aid to the South 
Ossetians until agreeing to allow the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) to monitor a freeze in the conflict.223  There are several factors that may 
have served to postpone Russian intervention at this time. While the First Gulf War was 
certainly the dominate international headline of the time and might have masked Russian 
activities in Georgia, Moscow had its hands full with the August 1991 putsch, as well as 
several active conflicts in former Soviet territories of Tajikistan and Moldova where 
locally based Soviet-turned-Russian forces were already party to the conflicts. 
Concurrently, Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia undermined his own credibility as 
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a unitary leader almost immediately after Georgia declared independence and the 
Georgian political landscape devolved into a number of competing entities.224  In short, 
dealing with Georgia was something the Russians could put off until later, and the 
presence of OSCE monitors and Russian peacekeepers served to maintain the status quo 
until the Russians were in a better position to deal with their impetuous Georgian 
neighbors. 
When the new Georgian President, Eduard Shevardnadze, sponsored a national 
celebration in August of 1992 to mark Georgia’s admission to the United Nations as an 
independent state, he invited the leadership of the restive Abkhazian region in order to 
promote greater Georgian unity. The Abkhazians initially accepted the offer, but then 
failed to arrive in Tbilisi for the ceremony due to strong pressure from Moscow, who 
subsequently began providing arms to a number of different Abkhazian militant 
groups.225  While Moscow might have had too many competing priorities to intervene in 
Georgia directly, the Russians had no intention of letting the newly independent 
Georgians resolve their internal dispute and coalesce into a strong, unitary entity. The 
August 1992 arming of Abkhazian militia and bandits by Russia arguably lacks the 
centralized strategic direction and cross-domain characteristics of hybrid warfare, 
however, the destabilizing effects of the ensuing clashes between Georgians and 
Abkhazians kept Georgia disaggregated until the Russians were prepared to intervene at a 
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time of their choosing. Russia’s post-Soviet political turmoil across the former empire 
initially left Moscow “reacting to events in Georgia rather than initiating them.”226 
The “Abkhaz War” of 1992–1993 was also marked by the appearance of Russian 
soldiers and military hardware, particularly aircraft, which would join an Abkhaz action 
against the Georgians and then disappear back into the Russian Federation. These 
incursions were vociferously denied by the Kremlin, even after the Georgians shot down 
several MIG 29s and recovered the pilots’ bodies, complete with Russian military 
identification.227  Not only did the Russian’s deny their involvement, but they went the 
extra step of claiming the Georgians were bombing Georgian civilians and painting 
Georgian aircraft with Russian markings. These accusations were repeated in the Russian 
media and mark a departure from former Soviet propaganda practices were some kernel 
of truth was expected to be at the core of a state-sponsored message.228  The far less 
sophisticated practice of flat denial and immediate counter accusation created just enough 
confusion regarding the facts of an action that no single event served to focus an 
international response to the Russian violation of Georgian sovereignty. 
Through Yeltsin’s policy of excluding external peacekeepers, Russia was able to 
promote Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence movements which would destabilize 
the fledgling Georgian government. As the conflicts flared up, Russia would then 
“intervene” to fashion ceasefires and interpose Russian troops between the rebels and 
Georgian forces. Russia was subsequently able to maintain its military presence on 
Georgian soil and could quickly destabilize the general situation as a means to slow 
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Georgia’s breaking from Moscow’s orbit and aligning politically or economically with 
the West.229     
As a condition for “helping” end the Abkhaz War (that they had instigated and 
sustained) and supporting Shevardnadze against a breakaway Georgian movement, the 
Russians were able to maintain four military bases in Georgia and also secured the right 
to appoint the Georgian Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Security.230  From 1995 to 
1999, Georgia endured Russian subjugation, but gradually began establishing ties with 
the United States and setting up parallel government structures to those that were 
dominated by the Russians.231  Shevardnadze also obtained U.S. backing in establishing 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline which would provide a means of bringing 
Central-Asian oil to European markets without transiting Russia, a development that 
infuriated Moscow.232  The Russians were unable to directly counter the Georgian drift 
westward during this period as the Russian army was being significantly mired in 
Moscow’s attempt to keep Georgia’s neighbor, Chechnya, from breaking away from the 
Federation during the First Chechen War from 1994–1996. The First Chechen War was 
an important factor in shaping Russia’s calculus of the cost of employing conventional 
force to assert its dominance in the post-Soviet space. The Chechen experience was a 
disaster for Moscow. Not only was the Russian Army significantly battered by the small, 
would-be independent state, but Russia also faced heavy criticism internationally for its 
indiscriminate engagement of civilians and numerous human rights abuses. 
After the September 11th, 2001 attacks in the United States, Russia was quick to 
again read the winds of international fortune and to rebrand its operations in the former 
Soviet space from peacekeeping to “counter-terrorism,” a narrative that was supported by 
the wave of apartment bombings in Russia two years earlier and the Beslan school 
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massacre in 2004. Russia regularly used the pretext of pursuing Chechen terrorists to 
bomb Georgian territory and to exceed peacekeeping force caps in South Ossetia, but this 
insistence on playing the terrorism card would backfire by drawing unwanted 
involvement in Georgia from the US. Georgia was pushed even further into the orbit of 
the West when Putin demanded that Russian soldiers be allowed to man the Georgian 
border with Chechnya at the outset of the Second Chechen War. By 2002, U.S. military 
aid under the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) comprised over 60 percent of 
Georgia’s defense budget, while Russia was simultaneously preventing Georgian 
diaspora living in Russia from sending remittances to their families.233  The impetus for 
the GTEP program was a U.S. reaction to Russia’s exaggerated claims of Al Qaeda 
affiliation with Chechen separatists and their supposed safe-haven in Georgia’s Pankisi 
Gorge. When Russia’s own claims were used by the Georgians to request U.S. counter-
terror assistance, the Russians were unable to justify opposition to the subsequent aid 
package.234 
A. HYBRID WARFARE REQUISITE CONDITIONS 
1. Russian Strategic Goals  
While Russia treats its true strategic intentions as state secrets, the concept of 
sustaining or increasing relative regional military power paints a fairly clear picture of 
Russia’s desired strategic end-state with regard to Georgia.  “Russia’s invasion of 
Georgia was not merely a response to that small country’s seeming to thumb its nose at 
the Kremlin, but an important building block in Putin’s much larger geopolitical 
edifice.”235  Russia’s ability to project power southwards through the Caucasus in the 
direction of Turkey and Iran is degraded by the extremely rugged Greater Caucasus 
Mountain Range that largely defines the Russian-Georgian border.  “The main goal of the 
military operation in Georgia and the Black Sea was…to take irreversible control of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The establishment of sizable Russian military bases in 
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Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as control over critical mountain crossings [would] 
significantly improved Russia’s strategic military position in the Caucasus region.”236 A 
permanent Russian military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia provides Russia 
with a military capability that is free of the geographical choke points of the natural 
terrain.  
Russia’s strategic view regarding Georgia is primarily based on geography. 
Georgia lies on the transit corridor between the Central Asia and Europe and is situated 
on the land bridge between the Black and Caspian Seas. Georgia also shares a border 
with NATO member Turkey. Abkhazia makes up about half of Georgia’s Black Sea 
Coast, a body of water over which Russia has always attempted to maintain a dominant 
position. Russia’s strategic goals in Georgia can be categorized as those that further 
Russia’s dominance over the former Soviet space and those that preempt external actors 
from attempting to challenge that dominion. Locally, Russia’s aims include the age-old 
practice of controlling geographic territory and taking steps to protect the Russian 
monopoly on the transit of oil and gas between Central Asia and Europe. Russia wants to 
prevent a former Soviet state in the Caucasus from joining NATO, not just because of 
that state’s location, but also because Russia wants to other states from entertaining a 
similar notion.  “The main task of the Russian invasion was to bring about state failure 
and fully destroy the Georgian army and centralized police force. A failed Georgian state, 
torn apart by political rivalry and regional warlords, cannot ever become a NATO 
member and could be easier to control from Moscow.”237 
While the existential threat that NATO expansion might present to Russian 
sovereignty is either perceived as very real or at least as a very useful pretext by the Putin 
regime, the moves toward increasing authoritarianism and the crushing of Russian 
opposition movements demonstrate the Kremlin’s very strong concern about the threat of 
Russian populist movements finding inspiration in a place where Putin had asserted they 
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were doomed to fail due to their alien “Western” nature.238  Putin’s regime has long 
viewed the so called “color revolutions,” particularly the 2003 Rose Revolution in 
Georgia and the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, as western plots to install western 
leaning regimes in the former Soviet space. Should these movements produce effective 
democratic governments, they might inspire similar movements in Moscow.239  Moscow 
therefore seeks to weaken the democratic institutions in Georgia so they don’t spread 
north and threaten Putin’s regime. A senior Russian official eventually disclosed the 
Russian strategic goals of the Georgian war as: “1) Establishing full Russian control over 
South Ossetia, 2) Assisting Abkhazia in gaining control over several Georgian villages to 
create a more desirable border, while expelling Georgian forces from the Kodori Gorge, 
3) Permanently stationing Russian troops [in Georgia] on the buffer zone between 
Abkhazia and Georgia proper, 4) Humiliating the Georgian leadership, and 5) Preventing 
Georgia from ever becoming a NATO member.”240 
In the years leading up to the 2008 invasion it was imperative for Russia to 
control the regular flare-ups of violence in order to preserve the Russian initiative for a 
military resolution. If there were to be an all-out effort by Georgia to crush the rebels 
when Russia was not expecting it, it might take months to activate and position the forces 
necessary for a response, a task whose difficulty would be compounded if Georgian 
forces were to control the Roki Tunnel and the Abkhaz rail chokepoints. Russia 
eventually appointed Russian officers to the leadership of both militias, a move that made 
all ensuing significant militia action a product of Russian direction.  “It is undeniable that 
both parties—the Russian-Abkhazian-South Ossetian coalition, on the one hand, and 
Georgia on the other—took steps toward a military solution of the crisis, or, more 
correctly the crises. Nevertheless, it appears obvious that the initiative in most, if not all, 
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of those steps lay with the Russian-Abkhazian-South Ossetian coalition.”241 Controlling 
the initiative is critical to ensure the ultimate overt confrontation happens at a time of the 
aggressor’s deliberate choosing.   
The peacekeeping operations and military exercises that Russian conducted in 
South Ossetia, Abkhazia and along the Russo-Georgian frontier also provided 
opportunities for Russia to develop the infrastructure that would ultimately support the 
conventional invasion. The Russian army was able to use the bases for these operations to 
preposition large numbers of troops and heavy weapons on Georgian soil, and they were 
able to build support facilities for future operations at the same time. The Russians build 
a field surgical hospital in Abkhazia that they then turned over to the Abkhazian’s as a 
“humanitarian” gesture. They stockpiled massive amounts of weapons and ammunition in 
the forward area as part of their “peacekeeping” footprint. Most tellingly, in April and 
June 2008, the Russian Army repaired the railway between the Southern Military Zone 
and Abkhazia.242  Russian forces, particularly armor, are heavily reliant on rail 
transportation to deploy throughout the Federation following a mobilization.243  The 
Railroad Troops finished the repairs on the Abkhazia rail line on July 30th, 2008, a week 
before the invasion. 
After establishing the local strategic goal of dismembering the Georgian state and 
placing the two breakaway regions under Russian control, Russia needed to cultivate a 
degree of receptivity toward this outcome amongst the Abkhaz and South Ossetian 
populations. Russia promoted a narrative of Georgian abuse of minorities to promote 
anti-Georgia sentiment, while selectively undermining and removing all reconciliatory 
parties who were willing to bury the hatchet with Georgia.244  Hybrid warfare is greatly 
facilitated through the promotion of a separatist movement within the target state’s 
population. A degree of indigenous local support helps legitimize the aggressor’s efforts, 
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and to mask the aggressor’s true intentions, but the actual goals of such a movement are 
subordinate to the aggressor state’s designs.  
2. Masking the Dynamic Change to the Status Quo 
As the level of violence escalated in Russia’s hybrid warfare against Georgia, the 
Russians relied on other events in the world to help mask the signs of an impending 
conventional invasion. Apart from the use of existing “peacekeeping” forces and 
exercises to attempt to hide the buildup of troops and arms in and near Georgia, the 
Russians did little to disguise the fact that an all-out invasion was about to take place. 
The United States was seemingly caught by surprise when the shooting commenced on 
August 7th, but Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had just visited Tbilisi to discuss the 
deteriorating situation, and the Bush administration had repeatedly warned the Georgians 
against responding to Russian provocations.245  If anything, Russia calculated that it 
could get away with an invasion because of other events that were taking place on the 
world stage. By the summer of 2008, the surge in Iraq was appearing to bear fruit, but it 
had required the use of five additional brigades and the tour extension of thousands of 
troops already in the combat zone, all amid continuing cries from American lawmakers 
that the Iraq War was lost and that the United States was no longer able to deal with a 
crisis elsewhere in the world.246  Georgia’s most capable fighting force, the 1st Infantry 
Division, was also serving in Iraq and subsequently not available to defend against a 
Russian attack. Moscow was also acutely aware of the impending U.S. Presidential 
election and the growing American sentiment against military involvement overseas. The 
potential election of the first black American President was focusing most American 
media coverage on domestic politics. The media coverage that was not on the pending 
U.S. election was simultaneously captivated by the implosion of the U.S. economy. In the 
summer of 2008, the financial market was in freefall as the sub-prime mortgage schemes 
were collapsing across the banking sector. What little international media coverage could 
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find a moment on this stage was almost completely devoted to the Summer Olympic 
Games in Beijing, whose opening ceremonies on August 8th coincided with the Russian 
invasion. With a pacifism-inclined Europe, an over-extended American military, and a 
U.S. public that was largely oblivious to events in the Caucasus, Putin wagered correctly 
that there would be little international appetite to directly counter his military incursion 
into Georgia. The Russians would attempt to further reduce international back lash by 
controlling the narrative of the conflict and assuming the position of the aggrieved victim 
responding to Georgian aggression. 
B. ABOVE-MILITARY FORMS OF WAR: INFORMATION DOMINANCE, 
DIPLOMATIC WARFARE  
Not only was Russia heavily involved in undermining the democratic processes in 
Georgia prior to the 2008 invasion, but the Russians used the subsequent political 
resolution of the conflict as a means to demonstrate the impotence of the European Union 
and to exploit fissures between the Europeans and the Americans, further alienating not 
just Georgia but other western leaning countries as well. The E.U., under French 
leadership, was very determined to take the lead role in negotiating the ceasefire that 
marked the end of the Russian offensive in Georgia, yet failed to take determinative 
action when the Russians violated the cease-fire.247  Russia demonstrated the value of its 
positions on both the U.N. Security Council where it could veto any determined 
international effort to counter its dominant position in the Caucasus. Conflicts that were 
“frozen” tended to lose any determined European initiatives for a final resolution, 
resulting in the conditions at the time of the freezing becoming the new status quo.248 
Russia and its Abkhaz and South Ossetian proxies made numerous 
unsubstantiated claims about Georgian oppression of ethnic minorities, military buildup 
and plans for Georgian military action against the two breakaway provinces. These 
claims included the supposed massing of Georgian forces in the Abkhazian Kodori 
Gorge, the stockpiling of large numbers of arms and materiel imported from Turkey 
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(NATO), and the alleged conduct of unannounced large-scale military rehearsals and 
exercises.249  Russia flew approximately fifty Russian reporters to Tskhinvali just days 
before the August 7th invasion.250  The presence of these reporters and the lack of 
Western war correspondents enabled Putin to control the narrative that was disseminated 
through Western news media outlets, and subsequently shape the opinions of the Western 
public and policy makers. The Russian narrative of Georgian aggression against South 
Ossetians, who were conveniently now Russian citizens due to the liberal issuance of 
Russian passports in the years prior to 2008, and Russian steps to stop “genocide” in 
progress is still the Russian version of the start of the war. This narrative, carefully 
managed by Russian reporters, and personally delivered to U.S. President George W. 
Bush by Vladimir Putin, the freshly appointed Russian Prime Minister, at the opening 
ceremony to the Beijing Olympic Games, largely succeeded in minimizing any outcry 
from the West.251  The Russian narrative dismisses claims that the Russians deliberately 
invaded Georgia, by countering that the requisite approval for military action had not 
been passed by the Duma, and that Putin was highly upset that a military clash had been 
instigated by the Georgians and the defensive response had occurred without his 
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approval.252  As late as the afternoon of August 7th, Georgian media was reporting that 
talks between the Georgian government and the South Ossetians were underway to 
diffuse the situation.253 
In 1999, Ludvig Chibirov, the leader of South Ossetia, signed a deal with 
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze that laid the ground work for a settlement 
where South Ossetia would cease armed opposition and submit to Georgian sovereignty 
in exchange for an increased degree of autonomy. While this settlement seemed the most 
likely path to peace and a lasting agreement between the Georgians and South Ossetians 
(an outcome that a legitimate mediator and peacekeeper would have supported) the 
Russians realized that it would complicate any future efforts to control South Ossetia. 
Russian operatives helped engineer the electoral defeat of Chibirov and promoted a pro-
Russian candidate, Eduard Kokoity, a former wrestling champion with ties to organized 
crime.254  As soon as Kokoity won, he began promoting South Ossetian independence 
through war with Georgia, eliminating local elites who disagreed with his militant 
position, and ultimately maneuvering the South Ossetian parliament to declare 
independence and petition the Russian Federation for membership.255  Russian 
intelligence officers quickly assumed leadership roles in a number of South Ossetia’s 
ministries under Kokoity, and Russia began providing a large part of the budget for both 
of the breakaway regions.256 
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In November of 2003, the so-called “Rose Revolution” was in full swing, and 
Eduard Shevardnadze was in danger of being ousted. The former Soviet-minister-turned-
Georgian-patriot was a far less dangerous proposition for Vladimir Putin than the sudden 
success of a populist, pro-Western democratic movement taking root outside of Western 
Europe. Moscow offered to “help” Shevardnadze again in exchange for similar demands 
imposed during the 1993 resolution of the Abkhaz War where Georgia would again have 
to “accept Russian hegemony, abandon its pro-Western orientation, forget about [joining] 
NATO and the EU, and appoint Russian nominees to key security positions.”257  
Shevardnadze was ultimately unwilling to use force to put down the opposition 
movement and he resigned on November 23rd. Following NATO’s retreat from 
extending membership to Ukraine and Georgia in early 2008, the Russians correctly 
interpreted a lack of European commitment to rush to the defense of either. The Russian 
Foreign Minister went so far as to send a telegram to his Georgian counterpart to inform 
him that Russia was dealing directly with Abkhazia to transfer Russian citizens held in 
Abkhazian prisons directly to Russian authorities, a blatant violation of international 
respect for Georgian’s sovereignty.258 
C. NON-MILITARY FORMS OF WAR: ECONOMIC, LEGAL, 
PROPAGANDA, AND MIGRATION WARFARE 
From the late 1990s through the 2008 war, Russia employed numerous hybrid 
warfare activities to undermine Georgian sovereignty and to set the conditions for Russia 
to assume control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. One of Russia’s principle instruments 
on non-military coercion was through economic warfare. In 1995, Georgian President 
Shevardnadze described increasing Russian efforts to undermine the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline what would enable central Asian oil to by-pass Russia on the way 
to European markets.259  In September 2004, Moscow closed all transportation links with 
Georgia, including Russian airspace for Georgian airlines (a violation of numerous 
international agreements). These moves were ostensibly to collect debt owed by Georgian 
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commercial businesses to Russian investors, but in reality they were punitive for 
Georgia’s independent associations with European and U.S. commercial interests.260  In 
December 2005, the Russian administration attempted to get the heads of Russian energy 
businesses to stop supplying Georgia with gas and electricity (in the dead of winter).261  
When the executives were less than cooperative, the gas and electrical transmission lines 
were physically cut by saboteurs. In December 2006, GAZPROM, Russia’s state-
controlled natural gas conglomerate, announced that Georgian gas prices would be 
doubled in 2007. Georgia was forced to agree to this drastic fee hike when GAZPROM 
threatened to cut off the supplies altogether.262  “During 2006 Moscow worked 
persistently to inflict economic pain on Georgia in retaliation for Tbilisi’s efforts to 
counteract Russian subversion on its territory.”263  Russia did not confine these efforts to 
the flow of energy into Georgia, but also through the restriction of Georgian consumer 
products entering into Russia. In the spring of 2006, Russia banned imports of Georgian 
wine and several brands of bottled mineral water.264  These bans were soon followed by a 
complete embargo on Georgian goods.265 
Once the open fighting between Russian regulars and the Georgian army started 
in August 2008, the Russian Navy blockaded the Georgian Black Sea ports and several 
critical highway junctions between the coast and the interior.266  Given that these actions 
took place after the onset of open conventional fighting, they are not outside the normal 
practices of what any conventional power would consider as legitimate military 
operations and do not constitute a substantive case for hybrid warfare by themselves. It 
should be noted, however, that the hybrid nature of a conflict is not completely discarded 
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by the beginning of open conventional warfare, nor do any of these activities have to take 
place in a particular linear order. On August 16th, three days after the cease fire, Russian 
military planes destroyed the economically vital railway bridge at Kaspi and firebombed 
the Borjomi National Park, an important destination for tourism.267 
In addition to the increasing efforts to strangle the Georgian economy, Russia also 
invoked the legal authority of international bodies to weaken Georgia’s ability to assert 
control over its breakaway territories. On the symbolic 1st anniversary of the 9/11 
attacks, Vladimir Putin made the public claim that Georgia was permitting, if not 
facilitating, Chechen terrorists operating against Russia from the sanctuary of the Pankisi 
Gorge in Georgia. Putin invoked the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 to claim 
Georgia’s violation of the counter-terrorism resolution, and he then declared that Russia 
had the internationally recognized right under Article 51 of the UN Charter to strike 
targets in Georgia as a matter of Russian self-defense.268  Putin demanded that Georgia 
demonstrate its sovereignty by securing its borders while simultaneously undermining 
that sovereignty through the arming and urging separatists in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. Shevardnadze responded by declaring Georgia’s intention to join NATO. 
Russia’s legal warfare activities extended into the realm of migration warfare 
when Russia granted citizenship to an entire population outside of Russia’s borders. As 
opposed to Colonels Liang and Xiangsui’s proposal to use waves of immigrants to 
destabilize a foreign region, Russia allowed for the opposite movement of migrants as 
one of its first acts of undermining Georgian sovereignty. In November 2000, eight years 
before the open “war,” Russia passed a law requiring all Georgian visitors to obtain visas 
before traveling to Russia.269  This action was in direct contravention of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) charter which explicitly mandates freedom 
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of travel between the member states. The Russians then made a “humanitarian” exception 
for residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This move undermined Georgian 
sovereignty and strengthened Russian influence in both breakaway regions. Russia 
followed up this action by extending Russian citizenship for the Abkhaz and Ossetian 
populations through the issuance of Russian passports to “non-Georgian” residents in 
both regions, a clear indicator that Russia was already laying the groundwork for 
subsequent annexation.270  Russia had in essence made the Abkhazians and South 
Ossetians into Russians and therefore entered them into a protected status that would 
theoretically justify their defense militarily under the Russian Yeltsin-Putin policy for 
protecting “Russians” in the post-Soviet space. Russia not only granted Russian 
citizenship to the populations of Georgia’s breakaway regions, but in 2006, Russia also 
began deporting Georgian citizens from the Russian Federation regardless of long-
standing residency.271 
D. MILITARY FORMS OF WAR 
Russia used the Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatist militias to conduct 
surrogate warfare against the Georgian military for years prior to the invasion. In 
February 2003, Russia responded to (its political surrogate) Eduard Kokoity’s request for 
military assistance and provided South Ossetia with military equipment including twelve 
T-55 tanks.272  In mid-2004, Russia provided the South Ossetians with “an additional 
seventy-five T-72 battle tanks and huge stocks of weaponry and ammunition.”273  
Russia’s additional contributions to the South Ossetian arsenal included numerous 
multiple-launch rocket systems, self-propelled artillery and eventually an active Russian 
Army Colonel to serve as the South Ossetian Minister of Defense.274  Russian 
“peacekeepers” were actively training and arming South Ossetians in 2006 and had even 
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shot down a Georgian military helicopter flying over Georgian airspace.275  Russian 
military officers served in command positions of both the South Ossetian and Abkhazian 
militias. When the August invasion was slowed by the Roki Tunnel bottleneck, South 
Ossetian militia served as infantry alongside the advancing Russian columns. As the 
fighting opened up near Gori, the Russian regular forces continued to press the Georgian 
army, while the Ossetian militia systematically cleansed the villages in surrounding 
countryside of ethnic Georgians, an effort that did not stop with the August 12th 
ceasefire.276 
Russia also conducted acts of sabotage, both unilaterally and through surrogates, 
to facilitate economic and political warfare efforts. In September and October of 2004, 
“South Ossetian” saboteurs severely damaged high-voltage transmission lines in western 
and central Georgia that served as the principle power sources for Tbilisi.277  Saboteurs 
also destroyed natural gas and electrical transmission lines in January of 2006, leaving 
much of Georgia dark and cold for several days in the middle of winter. This time the 
attack occurred inside Russian territory and involved synchronized operations in remote 
locations.278  While this attack might not seem to have an immediate impact, and Russia 
quickly helped restore the flow of oil through a rehabilitated pipeline from Azerbaijan, it 
did serve to identify infrastructure backup systems for comprehensive targeting in the 
future.   
Russia was not content to rely solely on isolated acts of sabotage to strengthen its 
advantage over Georgia. It also employed conventional Russian weapon systems under 
the thinnest veils of covert cover. On March 11th, 2007, several ethnic Georgian villages 
were shelled with GRAD rockets from Abkhaz controlled territory while Russian 
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helicopter gunships patrolled overhead in the Kodori Gorge region of Abkhazia.279  On 
May 11th, 2007, a Georgian “government-in-exile” facility for the province of Abkhazia 
was attacked by “unidentified” helicopter and ground forces. The Russians denied any 
involvement but international investigators determined that only the Russian military was 
capable of carrying out such an operation.280  On August 7th, 2007, two Russian SU-27s 
bombed a Georgian radar station on the border of South Ossetia. Russia blamed Georgia 
for staging the attack after an unexploded munition was positively verified as having 
been of Russian origin and employed by Russian aircraft.281  On April 20th, 2008, UN 
observers verified that a Georgian UAV was shot down over Abkhazia by a Russian 
MIG-29, “constituting a clear and distinct act of aggression.”282 
Russian military forms of warfare were not limited to strikes against military, 
economic or government facilities. Car bombs, improvised explosive devices, and 
targeted assassinations more commonly defined as acts of terrorism were also employed 
against the Georgians. On February 2nd, 2005, a car bomb with over 100kg of explosives 
was detonated in front of the Georgian police headquarters in Gori, killing three 
policemen and wounding 27 others.283  Georgian investigators would link this attack to 
the Russian GRU.284  The following day, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania, the 
principle negotiator for a lasting settlement with South Ossetia, died of “accidental” 
carbon monoxide poisoning from a faulty space heater; prompting speculation, but no 
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solid proof, that he was murdered by the Russians.285  A number of bombings directed at 
civilians in Abkhazia were carried out in late June and early July 2008. Six civilians were 
wounded by blasts in the Abkhaz capital, Sukhumi, and in a Black Sea resort before an 
explosive attack at a café in the town of Gali killed four and wounded eight on July 
6th.286  While Abkhaz officials were quick to blame Georgia for the attack and to close 
the defacto border between Abkhazia and Georgia proper, the fatal attack was carried out 
in a predominantly Georgian town and the only apparent political beneficiaries were the 
Abkhazians and their Russian sponsors.287  A number of explosive attacks were also 
carried out in South Ossetia in early July targeting Georgian police and government 
administrators.288  Russia quickly blamed these attacks on the Georgians as false flag 
efforts to destabilize South Ossetia and garner international support for an increased 
military presence. 
As Russia moved toward a conventional conflict with Georgia, Russian military 
forces were regularly mobilized for maneuvers near the Georgian border. This overt 
military posturing was meant to intimidate the Georgians into giving certain concessions, 
and would ultimately ensure that the forces necessary for the actual invasion was 
assembled well in advance of the actual invasion. On September 29th, 2006, Russia 
responded to the arrest of several GRU officers in Georgia by alerting the Black Sea Fleet 
and Russian Forces in the North Caucasus. The fleet began maneuvers off of Georgia’s 
coast and the army moved to the Georgian border. These forces did not just show force, 
but implemented a full embargo on Georgia, preventing all commercial traffic and 
travel.289  From April until late July 2008, Russian Airborne and Mountain forces 
conducted a series of large scale maneuvers along the Georgian border. The numbers of 
Russian “peacekeepers” in South Ossetia and Abkhazia were simultaneously increased to 
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well beyond their mandated levels as were their levels of armament; particularly artillery, 
anti-tank weapons, and anti-aircraft systems.290  In July 2008 as a small scale annual 
military exercise involving Georgian, American, Ukrainian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani 
soldiers was held outside Tbilisi, Russia started its own unannounced exercise involving 
more than 8000 Russian troops from the 58th Army, and the Black Sea Fleet under the 
auspices of a regional counter-terrorism exercise.291  The exercise, “Kavkaz 2008,” 
included hundreds of combat vehicles and aircraft in roles that were not particularly well 
suited for counter-terrorism so much as a large-scale conventional attack; that individual 
Russian soldiers were provided with training products labeled “Soldier, know your 
enemy” that included lists of Georgian units, equipment and capabilities leaves little 
doubt that the exercise was a rehearsal for the eventual invasion.292  This exercise ended 
in late July, but the Russian forces were never demobilized. The land forces remained in 
place along the border until August 7th when they advanced in to Georgia to “reinforce” 
Russian peacekeepers. 
One of the novel aspects of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War was the introduction of 
cyber warfare as a complement to a ground attack. The United States had considered a 
similar effort five years earlier during the invasion of Iraq but ultimately ruled a cyber-
offensive out over concerns for the impact on the global economy and for setting a 
precedent for which the U.S. itself might have a high degree of vulnerability. The United 
States also enjoyed a significant conventional advantage over the Iraqis and did not 
believe that widespread cyber disruption was necessary to dominate the battlefield. 
Russia, on the other hand, was aware that its ground forces had significant shortcomings. 
While the Russians significantly outnumbered the Georgians, Russia needed to ensure a 
quick victory lest a protracted campaign provide a window for external intervention. 
What Russia learned from its strategic miscalculation in attacking Estonian computer 
networks a year earlier was that “attacks” in the cyber domain can be an annoyance to the 
victim, and can exact some real price, but they are largely insufficient in and of 
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themselves to force an enemy to accept the aggressor’s political will. For several weeks 
prior to the Russian offensive in Georgia, however, non-attributable Russian “hacktivists” 
conducted a similar computer network attack (CNA) with the strategic focus of severing 
Tbilisi’s command and control of the Georgian armed forces, rallying ethnic Russian, 
Ossetians, and Abkhazians to the Russian cause, and to isolate Georgia from the rest of 
the world.293  The cyber offensive against Georgia maintained the unlikely story of 
spontaneous “patriotic hacktivists” even after the ceasefire, but the timed coordination 
with the ground assault, the selectivity of strategically disruptive targets while bypassing 
critical national infrastructure, and the introduction of cyber graffiti that was prepared 
years in advance, are all indicative of a very deliberate, synchronized Russian offensive 
in  the cyber domain alongside the physical offensives in the land, air, and sea 
domains.294 
As Russian forces poured into Georgia on August 7th, the conventional military 
became the primary effort to secure Russia’s dominion over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
supplanting Russia’s hybrid efforts with traditional warfare. Almost as soon as Moscow 
announced the completion of the railway renovation to Sukhumi, Abkhazia, numerous 
small scale engagements including mortar attacks, mine detonations, and sniping, broke 
out between Georgian forces and separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.295  When 
Russia claimed its peacekeepers had lost the ability to restrain the South Ossetian 
breakaway forces (whose Russian Army officer/Defense Minister had just petitioned 
North Ossetia for active military assistance) Russia was able to convince Georgia to 
agree to a ceasefire so that more Russian peacekeepers could be brought in to enforce 
order.296  The Georgians agreed and held their fire as Russian convoys entered South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia on the evening of August 7th. After abiding by the ceasefire for 
several hours and losing police stations and administrative buildings to increasing 
separatist artillery fire, the Georgians used artillery to block the Russian columns from 
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pushing all of the way to Tskhinvali in South Ossetia.297  This shelling is still claimed by 
Russia as the initiation of hostilities that necessitated a massive Russian response to 
protect its peacekeeping forces.298  On the morning of August 8th, Russian aircraft 
attacked Georgian government and civilian locations outside of the contested areas at 
almost the same time as Russian cyber-attacks crippled Tbilisi’s Internet, command and 
control infrastructure and news services.299 
E. CONCLUSION 
Even as the dust was settling in Moscow following the failed 1991 coup attempt, 
Russia recognized the need to prevent a stable and democratic Georgia from forming on 
the Federation’s southern border. Russia had a strategic need to be able to project military 
force south of the Caucasus, which would be increasingly difficult if Georgia solidified 
its control over its territory. Russian siding with South Ossetian and Abkhazian 
separatists was an initial way to destabilize Georgia while Moscow dealt with other 
more-pressing issues. Throughout the Yeltsin and Putin administrations, Moscow 
maintained a strategic goal of asserting direct control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
and preventing Georgia from achieving membership in the European Union and NATO. 
Russia’s way of manifesting this outcome was to conduct an extended hybrid warfare 
campaign to undermine the Georgian political and military systems, while strengthening 
Russia’s hold over the two breakaway provinces.   
Russia either created or exacerbated conditions in Georgia through hybrid warfare 
with the ultimate goal of undermining Georgian sovereignty. Russia exploited political 
fissures in Tbilisi, and even offered to prop up President Shevardnadze after the Rose 
Revolution, in exchange for Russia controlling the top ministerial positions of his 
government, a position which would have ended the nascent conflict through the defacto 
surrender of government autonomy to Moscow as it did in 1993. Russia systematically 
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removed rapprochement minded Abkhaz and South Ossetians, and replaced them with 
separatist proxies whose ministries and staffs were led by Russian officers. With the 
conditions set to prevent Georgia from peacefully resolving the conflict and Russian 
“peacekeepers” positioned between the conflicting sides, Russia then used the controlled 
application of violence, economic coercion, propaganda, and diplomatic pressure to 
isolate Georgia from the west, portray Georgia as the aggressor, and to justify Russia’s 
eventual occupation of Russian territory as a defensive and humanitarian gesture. 
The Russo-Georgian conflict is an example of hybrid warfare by a state that 
maintains an offensive-realist perspective and is predisposed to use a wide range of 
national power, including violence, to coerce an outcome from a neighbor in a time of 
peace. Russia maintained the strategic goal of maintaining a dominant position in its 
near-abroad, ending former-Soviet state’s bids for membership in non-Russian controlled 
bodies, and preventing a liberal government from succeeding on Russia’s borders. The 
Russian hybrid war against Georgian sovereignty was not solely defined by the 5-day 
conventional invasion in August 2008. That was merely a brief manifestation of a much 
longer campaign of forcing Tbilisi to accept Moscow’s will; carefully timed to 
commence when it wasn’t expected, and concluded before necessitating an international 
response. Russia used hybrid forms of warfare to effectively divide Georgia and to extend 
political control over Moscow’s objectives, but it is a mistake to assume this effort 
concluded with the ceasefire that ended the August 2008 “hot” war. The overt invasion of 
Georgia forced Tbilisi to accept the dominant presence of the Russian army on Georgian 
soil, but it was not pursued to the point of a complete national capitulation. To maintain 
its narrative of legitimacy and forgo the risk associated with a larger war, Russia stopped 
its advance near the boundaries of the contested rebel territories. From this reinforced 
military position, Russia has simply changed back to the practice of employing different 
forms of political warfare and lower levels of violence to continue to prevent a successful 
democratic government from forming in Tbilisi and frustrating ties between Georgia and 
NATO. Russia’s hybrid war against Georgia is an ongoing effort, whose more violent 
manifestation is in a frozen status, but one in which the Kremlin retains the initiative for 
reigniting when it suits Putin’s designs.   
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V. RUSSIAN ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA, 2014 
On March 18th, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an amendment to 
the Russian Constitution admitting the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of 
Sevastopol into the Russian Federation. This bold move was a watershed moment in that 
it marked the first annexation of territory by a foreign power in Europe since World War 
II. It also was striking in the manner through which it was accomplished. In less than a 
month tens of thousands of Russian soldiers swarmed onto the peninsula, and 
supplemented by militia, captured the seat of political power, orchestrated a referendum 
declaring Crimea sovereign from Ukraine, and forced the surrender of every Ukrainian 
garrison with very little loss of life, all while professing to the world that Russia was not 
involved in any way. Since that time, it has become popular to look at the events in 
Crimea and to link the actions there with the term hybrid warfare. To the extent that the 
definition of that term only involves the regular and irregular composition of the 
occupation forces, this is an easy case to make. In order to understand how Russia was 
able to accomplish this action however, it is necessary to look first at the relationship 
between Russia and Ukraine in order to see that Russia’s hybrid efforts to subvert 
Ukraine’s sovereignty had been underway for years. The annexation of Crimea 
represented only one strategic objective in this war; an objective that was well defined, 
could be consolidated in a relatively short period of time, and where the dynamic shift in 
the political status quo could be temporarily masked by other  world events.  
A. BACKGROUND 
Unlike Georgia, which may be situated on a historical cross-roads, but is 
nevertheless in a peripheral position from a Western perspective, Ukraine (Figure 3) is a 
keystone of Eastern Europe and has the size and population to make it comparable to the 
strongest Western European nations.300  Ukraine was an industrial and agricultural center 
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within the Soviet Union, and with a highly educated, technologically advanced 
population, has the necessary components to potentially emerge as an economic peer to 
Germany, France, and the UK.301  Despite a shared ethnic ancestry, tensions between 
Russia and Ukraine have long existed due to differences in language, religious identity 
and alignment during conflicts, most significantly World War II.   
Figure 3.  Map of Ukraine 
Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html. 
The largest single factor in Ukraine’s struggle to develop a sense of national 
identity has been, like so many other former Soviet states, a question of ethnicity.302  
“Ukraina means borderland,” and for a thousand years it has been the frontier between 
Russian and European empires, Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and Islam, and Slavic, Turkic 
and European ethnicities.303  “Approximately 73 percent of Ukraine’s 52 million people 
are identified as Ukrainian and almost 22 percent as Russian,” a distinction that is largely 
defined by language.304  The line between Ukrainians and Russians has been blurred over 
the last century with large numbers from both groups who speak both languages, and 
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high rates of intermarriage; nearly one quarter of ethnic Ukrainians are married to a 
person with a different ethnic or national background.305   
Another significant national division is religion. Just over half of Ukrainians are 
Ukrainian Orthodox of the Kiev Patriarchate, and over a quarter are Ukrainian Orthodox 
under the Moscow Patriarchate; the latter more closely overlapping with the population 
that identifies as Russian. The remaining quarter of the population is a mix of Catholics, 
Protestants, Muslims and Jews.306  “Uniate Catholicism has served as the main prop for 
Ukrainian national identity in western Ukraine” while the Russian Orthodox Church 
subsumed the Kievan Patriarchate during the Soviet era and was more involved with 
“Russifying” the Eastern Ukrainians.307  A third division that plays an increasing role in 
the ongoing Russia-Ukraine identity narrative is Ukraine’s status and wartime actions of 
Ukrainians as the country traded hands between the Nazis and the Soviets during World 
War II. In an early example of using non-military means to crush Ukrainian nationalist 
aspirations, Joseph Stalin used intentional famine to starve millions of Ukrainians to 
death during the 1932–1933 Holodomor.308  From 1942 until 1950 Western Ukraine was 
the operational area of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian 
Insurgent Army (OUN-UPA).309  These groups waged guerrilla warfare against the 
Soviets, and initially welcomed and fought alongside the invading Nazi Army. The OUN-
UPA’s nationalist intentions did not welcome Berlin’s domination any more than 
Moscow’s and they fought against the Nazis and then again against the Soviets as 
305 Bohdan Harasymiw, Post-Communist Ukraine (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian 
Studies Press, 2002), 17–18. 
306 Motyl, Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism, 8. It should be noted that the 
religious divide does not fall exactly on the same line as ethno-national identity. Not all Russo-Ukrainians 
are Russian Orthodox, and not all western Ukrainians are Kievan Orthodox or Catholic. Intermarriage 
between Russians and Ukrainians plays a role in this blend. There are also divisions within Orthodoxy 
between the Russian Orthodox Church and several branches of Ukrainian Orthodoxy with varying degrees 
of independence from the Moscow Patriarchate, see Harasymiw, 2002, 211. Ukraine is also the home of 
sizeable Jewish and Muslim populations.  
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308 Paul R. Magocsi, A History of Ukraine (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 
1996), 557–564. Magosci claims that 4.8 million dead is a conservative estimate for the 1933 famine. 
Famine would be used against Ukraine multiple times during the 1930’s resulting in as many as 10 million 
deaths, 557.  
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Ukraine 3 (1993). 
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Ukraine was alternately dominated by the two powers. The OUN-UPA continued to resist 
the implementation of communism until they were eventually undermined by KGB 
infiltration and the mass deportations of Ukrainians to Siberia.310  The most well-known 
of these movements, Stepan Bandera’s “Banderites,” were a favorite Soviet propaganda 
device as an example of “pro-Nazi” Ukrainian nationalism. The linkage in the Russian 
psyche between Banderites, Nazism, and Ukrainian nationalist movements has not lost its 
appeal, and the Soviet-era messaging has been resurrected as a favorite refrain of the 
Russian propagandists since early 2014. Unsurprisingly, the post-WWII Ukrainian 
resistance against the Soviets found little popular support in the predominately Russian 
eastern Ukrainian oblasts. Further complicating the ethno-linguistic divisions within 
Ukraine, were the post-World War II Soviet ethnic and administrative shifts regarding the 
Black Sea peninsula of Crimea. 
Crimea is the historic homeland of the Crimean Tatars, a Muslim Turkic people, 
whose numbers were reduced from 83 percent of the peninsula’s population to around 25 
percent during the Tsarist-Russian conquest and occupation from 1793 to the early 20th 
century.311  “In 1944, the entire Tatar population was forcibly resettled to Central Asia 
for allegedly collaborating with the Nazis.”312  In 1954, Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev gifted Crimea to the Ukraine for administrative control, but Tartar efforts to 
be repatriated to the peninsula were repeatedly stymied despite similar ethnic 
resettlement in other Soviet oblasts.313  The principle reasons for this refusal were the 
Tatar’s ethnic ties to NATO member Turkey, Crimea’s status as a vacation destination 
for Russian elites, and the peninsula’s strategic position as the Soviet’s warm water port 
for the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol.314  Whatever the reasons for Khrushchev’s transfer 
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of political control of Crimea to Ukraine, when Ukraine broke away from the Soviet 
Union in 1991, its internationally recognized borders included the entirety of the Crimean 
peninsula. This, however, does not mean that the Crimean population was wholly ready 
to embrace a new Ukrainian national identity.    
Even before Ukraine’s departure from the USSR, the dominant Russian political 
entities in Crimea made a push for everything from autonomy to full independence, along 
with similar movements in the Donetsk Basin, (Donbas) and other Russian majority 
oblasts in Ukraine’s south and east.315  Crimea was granted a protected autonomous 
status by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet in 1991, and the secessionist movement largely 
dissipated.316  A survey of the 1994 elections in Ukraine and Crimea revealed a society 
sharply divided along ethno-linguistic lines; Crimea even more so due to the sizeable 
minority of ethnic Tatars who were slowly returning to their historic homeland.317  The 
theme of rejoining Crimea with Russia was always a popular rhetorical position for post-
Soviet Russian nationalists in both Moscow and Simferopol, but was flatly rejected by 
the Tatars. National identity preferences of the population aside, post-Soviet Crimea 
remained a point of contention between Russia and Ukraine as arrangements were made 
for the distribution of former Soviet military forces, equipment, and bases throughout the 
newly formed Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The most significant of the 
issues with respect to Crimea was the ownership of the Sevastopol-based Black Sea 
Fleet.318   
When Ukraine separated from the Soviet Union, it inherited a vast military 
arsenal estimated to include 750,000 men, 6,500 tanks, 1,494 combat aircraft, 833 ships 
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and as many as 1,850 nuclear weapons.319  It emerged from the Cold War with the 
second largest military in Europe (behind Russia) and the third largest nuclear arsenal in 
the world. Ukraine also inherited a broken economy, massive debt, and no ready means 
for maintaining this extremely expensive military force. From 1992 to 1998, Ukraine 
outpaced CIS and Conventional Force in Europe (CFE) treaty requirements by reducing 
the size of the army to around 300,000 men, and scrapping thousands of tanks, armored 
vehicles and combat aircraft.320  In 1994, the leaders of Great Britain, the United States, 
Russia and Ukraine signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, where 
Ukraine’s relinquishing of nuclear weapons was reciprocated with pledges of respect for 
territorial sovereignty and political independence.321  Russia’s annexation of Crimea and 
invasion of Donbas was in direct violation of paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of the agreement. 
This violation is a clear example of Moscow’s willingness to set aside legal obligations 
out of pure pragmatism, despite Putin’s preferences for wrapping his actions with the airs 
of legalism. In 1993, renowned strategist John Mearsheimer advocated keeping a nuclear 
capability in Ukraine in order to deter future Russian incursions, but the Clinton 
administration firmly asserted that a world where fewer countries had nuclear weapons 
was inherently more desirable.322  The Ukrainians were also initially reluctant to give up 
this arsenal because they realized the amount of deterrence it provided them if the 
Russian federation were to reverse its permissiveness regarding the autonomy of former 
Soviet republics. The failure to enforce the Budapest Memorandum may have serious 
consequences for future non-proliferation efforts elsewhere. 
The most contentious subject in Ukraine and Russia’s post-Soviet distribution of 
forces remained the disposition of the Black Sea Fleet.323  Ownership of the fleet itself 
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was not so much the problem, as its simple maintenance was too costly for either Russia 
or Ukraine and its Cold War configuration did not meet Russian or Ukrainian security 
needs.324  The real issue was what the Sevastopol-based force represented with respect to 
Ukrainian sovereignty. The continued basing of a significant “foreign” naval power, 
including thousands of sailors, naval infantry and intelligence personnel, at a Ukrainian 
port, coupled with Russia’s promotion of Russian-aligned Crimean political entities was 
an untenable position for Kiev. Even more pressing however, were Ukraine’s extreme 
financial shortcomings. In May of 1997, the Russian and Ukrainian Prime Ministers 
signed an agreement that split the fleet roughly in half; Ukraine then gave the Russians 
117 of Ukraine’s allotment of 254 ships in exchange for over $500 million in debt 
forgiveness, and Russia signed a $100 million per year lease for basing the fleet at 
Sevastopol for 20 years.325   
Russia’s ability to force a definitive resolution to the Crimean situation in the 
early 1990s was limited due to turmoil in Moscow and the outbreak of violence in several 
other former Soviet states, but the idea that Crimea should never have been given to 
Ukraine and that the peninsula should be reunited with Russia was often promoted by 
Russian leaders during the Yeltsin administration.326  The Russian Supreme Soviet even 
declared Russian ownership of Sevastopol in 1993, but lacked the resources to give this 
claim any real substance.327  When the Black Sea Fleet issue was resolved in 1997, the 
calls for annexation of all or part of Crimea lost some of their vigor in the Kremlin, but 
remained a popular nationalist theme. Even without a focused effort to annex Crimea, the 
post-Soviet Russians were determined that Ukraine as a whole would remain subordinate 
to Moscow’s wishes. Years before Putin came to power, the Clinton administration 
324 Harasymiw, Post-Communist Ukraine, 412. 
325 Harasymiw, Post-Communist Ukraine, 413. The expiration of the 20-year lease in 2017 would 
become a significant factor in Russia’s support for President Yanukovych prior to his ouster in the 
Euromaidan uprising. The lease was also never paid for in cash from Moscow to Kiev, but was covered 
with $100 million dollars of annual debt forgiveness. All values are expressed in U.S. dollars. 
326 Ibid., 24. 
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documented a determined Russian effort to “undermine, subvert or control the 
governments” of several former Soviet states, including Ukraine.328   
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Ukraine remained an associate-member of 
the CIS, but refused full membership out of opposition to Russia’s dominate role in 
setting and enforcing the organization’s economic and defense policies. Ukraine was 
suspicious of any agreement that might undermine its sovereignty, so it was reluctant to 
enter into any binding associations, including the CIS that might, ironically, have 
strengthened its ability to resist Moscow by bringing other members of the charter into 
any disagreement.329  Instead, the Ukrainians opted to pursue a bilateral relationship with 
Russia, which the more powerful Russians were able to dominate without having to 
violate even the modest constraints of the CIS charter.330   
To practice hybrid warfare as theorized in Chapter II, an aggressor must be 
willing to violate and undermine another state’s sovereignty during a time of peace. 
Despite international recognition and guarantees of respect for sovereignty, the Russians 
never adjusted their view of Ukraine as anything other than a Soviet Republic, 
subordinate to the wishes of the Moscow. This view was summarized by Vladimir Putin 
very succinctly during the Russia-NATO Summit in Bucharest in April of 2008 when he 
shocked U.S. President George W. Bush with a dismissive, “you have to understand, 
George. Ukraine is not even a county.”331  It was also in 2008 (the same year that Russia 
removed any doubt about its views on Georgian sovereignty as described in Chapter IV) 
that Putin approached the Polish Prime Minister and proposed a partition of Ukraine 
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between Russia and Poland.332  Given these statements, and Russia’s success in derailing 
Georgia’s efforts toward NATO and European inclusion, 2008 can serve as a general 
marker for a Russian pivot away from merely dominating Ukraine to a general 
exploration of how conflicts could be created to sabotage the potential for Ukraine’s 
admission to NATO and how the more strategically valuable parts of Ukraine might be 
carved off and added to Russia proper.333   
Russian military thinking further evolved in tandem with proposed military 
reforms after 2008. Already concerned by the so-called “color revolutions” in the post-
Soviet space, the authoritarian regime in Moscow became increasingly alarmed as the 
Arab Spring caught momentum around the Mediterranean in early 2011 and a number of 
long-standing dictatorships were overthrown or severely challenged.  While some of 
these actions had overt U.S. governmental involvement in their later stages, and others 
involved Western Non-Governmental Organizations, corporations, or private citizens, the 
Russians attributed all of the movements, from inception to conclusion, to a deliberate 
U.S. strategic intention to reshape the political landscape.334  Russian military leaders 
began resurrecting and updating the Soviet idea of subversive “active measures” to form 
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a Russian perspective for limited warfare in the 21st Century.335  In February 2013, a 
Russian military forum featured an article attributed to the Russian Chief of the General 
Staff, Valery Gerasimov, describing the Russian thinking and a model (Figure 4) for the 
conduct of “New Generation Warfare.”336  In the article, Gerasimov describes the 
necessary perspective for conducting military actions in peacetime, the use of non-
military means to achieve military effects, and the importance of cultivating a supportive 
population in the target area. Gerasimov’s model was meant to describe the factors and 
sequence of activities that he believed were behind the Western created Color 
Revolutions and the Arab Spring, and then to prompt the Russian military establishment 
to pursue a comparable capability.337  When Gerasimov’s model was compared to the 
subsequent annexation of Crimea it was interpreted to be the blueprint for a new type of 
Russian warfare that looked remarkably different from the blunt use of force observed in 
other Russian “interventions” in Chechnya and Georgia. Despite being a Russian attempt 
to explain Western actions, Gerasimov’s model contains some projections of Russian 
perspectives that are helpful in understanding their general approach to what has been 
generically labeled in the West as “hybrid warfare.”  Gerasimov’s description points to 
certain characteristics of the aggressor and the nature of the forms of war: 
The trend in the 21st century is to erase the line between war and peace … 
the “rules of war” have changed dramatically. The role of non-military 
methods of achieving political and strategic goals, in some cases, has far 
exceeded the force of arms in terms of effectiveness. The emphasis of the 
methods of confrontation has shifted towards widespread use of political, 
economic, information, humanitarian and other non-military measures, 
implemented by taking advantage of the protest potential of the 
population. All this is complemented by covert military measures 
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including information warfare and activities conducted by special 
operations forces.338 
Gerasimov specifically identified the ability of the state to obtain the objectives of 
traditional warfare during what the target-state believes to be a time of peace, and that the 
non-military means of warfare are not only the weaponized instruments of soft power, but 
that they will be the primary effort in a hybrid campaign. The Gerasimov article was 
accompanied by a diagram that depicts the synergistic relationship between the military 
and non-military means of warfare and the importance of information warfare to both.  
Figure 4.   Gerasimov’s New-Generation Warfare Model 
Source: Jeffrey V. Dickey et al., “Russian Political Warfare: Origin, Evolution, and 
Application” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015): 221. 
338 Jefferey V. Dickey et al., “Russian Political Warfare: Origin, Evolution, and Application” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015): 220. 
 114 
While highly illuminating as to how senior Russian officers were conceptualizing 
limited warfare campaigns with hybrid forms, the Gerasimov “doctrine” depicts a left-to-
right spectrum of linearly intensifying conflict that is deceptive in its sequencing of 
events. Following this model might lead to the belief that the sequenced phases would 
only intensify in violence as time progressed; until “peacekeepers” were ultimately 
employed to stabilize the “crisis.”  As theorized in Chapter II, hybrid warfare is not 
bound to this temporal linearity. Any of the forms of war may be presented in any order 
that a particular situation warrants, so long as they serve to realize the ultimate objective 
and are synchronized to achieve the desired effects. For example, if the necessary 
conditions were still being created, the hybrid aggressor might employ terrorists to 
foment a political division or the aggressor might sign an international agreement in order 
to freeze a particular crisis until the conditions for pursuing more deliberate actions 
became more favorable.339  If the target state were to begin to successfully counter some 
of these efforts, the aggressor could reverse course and search for other means to achieve 
the desired effect. The freezing-thawing cycle keeps the initiative with the aggressor who 
must simultaneously take efforts to deceive the target state as to his true intentions. 
Creating uncertainty, or increasing the “friction in war” in Clausewitz’ terms, through 
information operations, diplomacy, or economic interaction while masking efforts in 
those same domains to subvert the integrity of the target state permits the aggressor to 
dramatically change the political dynamic when he judges the timing and conditions to be 
right.340  This also confirms that the aggressor must maintain a realists’ perspective of the 
enduring qualities of these relationships. The moment of this dynamic change is also 
most effective if it does not occur at the end of a linear increase in tensions between the 
two states but during “peace” while the world’s attention is elsewhere. 
Gerasimov’s model also plays to a western desire for closure by depicting a 
resolution and peaceful settlement to the crisis. In reality, a hybrid warfare aggressor is 
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no more bound to cease his consolidation of political control over a contested space by 
the cessation of hostilities than he was by the lack of hostilities at the crisis’ beginning. 
Overt violence should visibly decrease to reduce the stimulus for international 
intervention. Less visible use of force however, such as the detention or killing of 
potential political opponents, population control measures including checkpoints, bans on 
public rallies, control over the Internet and other media, demographic shifts through 
expulsion, deportation, and ethnic cleansing, and resource controls over electricity, 
heating oil, food, gasoline, banking services, and control of pensions are all still 
instruments used by the aggressor to ensure the longevity of the new status quo.    
Gerasimov does not use the term “hybrid” but his model depicts the two 
necessary components: non-military means of political warfare and the use of military 
force. Gerasimov even supplies a ratio of 4:1 (non-military to military) to ensure the 
lesser role of force is clearly established. The nature of the aggressor state can be 
determined both in the model and in Gerasimov’s description, and is notable for its 
ability to synchronize diplomacy, economic activity, and information operations with the 
covert creation of surrogate political and military organizations well in advance of any 
direct hostilities. It is somewhat ironic that Gerasimov assigns these attributes to the 
West, when the necessary degree of control over information and economic instruments 
of power are much better directed in a centralized, authoritarian political system. 
Interestingly, Gerasimov’s model specifically lists “opposition forces” (proxy forces or 
surrogates) as a non-military means, so his division is not based on use of violence, but 
apparently on the organic, attributable nature of the aggressor state’s military power. 
Because Gerasimov ties increased military force to the same temporal linearity, this 
model creates the impression that changes in phases will be necessarily preceded or 
accompanied by requisite increases in forces. What the model fails to illustrate is the 
cyclic application of hybrid political and military efforts to wear down local and 
international deterrence, as Alexander Svechin theorized in the Strategy of Attrition, 
which would be followed by the sudden, calculated, dynamic change to the status quo.341 
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Besides describing the blurring of distinctions between war and peace, and the 
achievement of military-like effects through non-military means, Gerasimov identifies a 
critical component that does not receive enough weight in most discussions of hybrid 
warfare; the “protest potential of the population.”  Discussions of surrogates, irregulars, 
political proxies and other elements derived from the target area’s native population often 
presuppose that some disaffected population is already in place and waiting for a sponsor 
to mobilize them. The absence of such sentiment might not completely remove the 
possibility of conducting hybrid warfare as economic, diplomatic and informational 
activities could still be employed, but a sympathetic population provides the aggressor 
with a degree of political and military power within the target’s territory, as well as the 
potential to frame aggression as intervention. 
B. HYBRID WARFARE REQUISITE CONDITIONS 
1. Russian Strategic Goals  
The importance Vladimir Putin places on the power vertical—the enduring central 
authority of the state, and his unique role at the apex of that structure—is a reminder that 
Putin’s most pressing priority is to ensure the continuity of his government. Following his 
2008 political-theater hiatus as Prime Minister, Putin reassumed the title of Russian 
President in 2012. Despite his suppression of political opposition and his self-promotion 
through the state’s media, Putin narrowly won the popular vote based on his ability to 
exclude any viable opposition candidate and his supporters’ employment of widespread 
fraud.342  By mid-2013, Putin’s domestic popularity had dropped to under 45 percent and 
was trending down.343  With a personal stake in the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, the 
preparations for which were the source of much domestic discontent due to widespread 
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corruption, nepotism, and the graft of tens of billions of dollars of state funds, Putin had 
to exercise some restraint in handling the Russian opposition in order to preserve the 
power-building prestige afforded to the games’ host. Highly sensitive to the importance 
of timing, Putin’s first strategic goal with respect to Ukraine was to manufacture an 
external “threat” that would enable him to rally nationalist support and then use that 
threat as a pretext for crushing any remaining domestic opposition.344  When his 
unreliable proxy in Kiev, Victor Yanukovych, was unseated during the Euromaidan, 
Putin was afforded a pretext for intervention by claiming the Euromaidan was a Western 
plot. 
Annexing Crimea prior to the Euromaidan was not likely a specific Russian goal 
due to the limited efforts that were taken to develop a significant political mechanism or 
to build significant local support for the action. It is much more probable that the 
Russians had contingency plans for occupying Crimea as annexes to their ongoing efforts 
to subvert Ukrainian sovereignty. Seizing Crimea after Yanukovych’s ouster, however, 
did serve Putin’s international political purposes.  “Putin perceives the European Union 
as a genuine strategic threat. The threat comes from the EU’s potential to reform 
associated countries in ways that pull them away from Russia.”345  Russia has always 
maintained that it has a vested interest in maintaining a strong (dominant) relationship 
with the other former-Soviet states, and Russia relies on these relationships to ensure 
reliable markets for Russian resources, namely oil and gas. Since the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, Russian Eurasianists have been alarmed at the number of former eastern 
bloc and former Soviet states that have been accepted into these organizations.   
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decision. However, Crimea was not just about domestic diversion. Putin was definitely aware that his move 
would shock the EU and NATO and he expected to further his international strategic aims as well as fix his 
flagging domestic popularity.  
345 Fiona Hill and Steven Pifer, “Putin’s Russia Goes Rogue,” Big Bets & Black Swans, Memorandum 
to the President (January 23, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/putin-russia-rogue-
hill-pifer. 
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Putin views Ukraine’s delayed, but still possible, signature of an EU 
Association Agreement as the greatest threat to his Eurasian Union. If 
Ukraine adopts EU legislation and regulations, restructures its economy 
and systems of governance, and enacts European standards in all areas, 
Ukraine will become more European and, implicitly, less ‘Eurasian.’  Its 
vulnerability to Russian economic and political pressure will decrease.346   
Putin also observed how effectively he was able to derail Georgia’s bid for NATO 
membership by creating a disqualifying ‘unresolved territorial dispute,’ and there is no 
reason he would not look to duplicate that successful template in Ukraine.     
Outside of domestic and international political dynamics, Russia places a high 
degree of strategic value on the control of the Crimean Peninsula due to the basing of the 
Black Sea Fleet and several thousand Russian naval personnel at Sevastopol. There are 
no strategic nuclear submarines at Sevastopol, so the Black Sea Fleet is not a part of 
Russia’s nuclear deterrent capability.347  Instead, the fleet is a critical instrument for 
Moscow’s ability to project conventional power from the Sea of Azov to the Persian 
Gulf. This capability and the lack of an alternative warm water port make the continued 
basing at Sevastopol a strategic imperative that is vulnerable to the political forces of a 
foreign government in Kiev. With a pro-Russian regime in Kiev a long-term lease might 
be acceptable, but the Kremlin’s offensive-realist perspective has long chaffed at the 
necessity of having to pay rent to a foreign entity for the privilege. In the wake of the 
Russo-Georgian War in 2008, Ukrainian resolve to join NATO seemed to stiffen, and the 
continued basing of the Black Sea Fleet at a Ukrainian port became a more contentious 
issue.348  The situation became more unsettling for the Kremlin in 2009 when Western-
leaning Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko declared that the fleet’s lease of 
Sevastopol would not be extended past 2017.349  A year later, this decision was reversed 
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348 “Russian Gunboat Diplomacy in Crimea?” BBC News, September 18, 2008, 
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when the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych became the President of Ukraine and 
subsequently extended Russia’s lease of Sevastopol through 2042.   
Depending on foreign sources for naval production also runs counter to Russia’s 
realist belief that only organic, domestic capabilities can guarantee the defense of the 
state. This point was undoubtedly confirmed when the delivery of French made Mistral 
heli-carriers was halted in late 2014 due to military embargoes for Russia’s actions in 
Ukraine.350  Permanent possession of Sevastopol’s shipyards would also rectify this 
problem as Putin noted in 2014.351  Following the Euromaidan revolution in Kiev, and 
the rise of a Ukrainian nationalist government, the Kremlin undoubtedly realized that the 
Russian position in Sevastopol would again become a contentious issue.   
There is an energy dimension to the Russian position in Crimea as well. Despite 
Victor Yanukovych’s subordinate relationship to Moscow, other political forces within 
Ukraine had been forcing him to reduce Ukraine’s dependency on Russian gas.352  A part 
of this Ukrainian effort included developing the expansive natural gas and oil reserves in 
the Black Sea and Donbas. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the Russian nationalization of 
Crimean petroleum resources, and the anticipated claims that Russia will make to 
Ukraine’s Black Sea Exclusive Economic Zone, undermines not only Ukraine’s energy 
development but also development by Romania and gas transmission to Europe from 
Turkey.353  From an energy standpoint, taking Crimea opens up a potentially profitable 
resource for Gazprom that may eventually offset the fiscal liability that the peninsula 
currently represents to Moscow. At the same time it greatly reduces Ukraine’s ability to 
break free from Russian energy dependence and the associated Russian political leverage. 
350 Jess McHugh, “France and Russia Mistral Deal: $1.3 Billion Settlement Reached Over Aircraft 
Carriers,” International Business Times, July 10, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/france-russia-mistral-deal-
13-billion-settlement-reached-over-aircraft-carriers-2003044. 
351 Kremlin.ru, “Direct Line with Vladimir Putin,” Kremlin Sponsored Newscast, April 17, 2014, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796. In Putin’s own words, “Crimea has good shipbuilding 
and ship-repairing potential…The Russian Defense Ministry has already placed an order worth 5 billion 
rubles with one of the shipyards.” 




However, “the Ukrainian conflict and Russia’s annexation of Crimea is ultimately not 
about energy, but about [political] power.”354    
By February 2014, the Euromaidan protests in Kiev had deteriorated into chaos. 
With Ukrainian central authority in disarray, Putin saw an opportunity to resolve the 
Black Sea Fleet situation once and for all, reduce Ukraine’s ability to break free from 
Russia’s orbit, and to play to popular Russian sentiment in a manner that could bolster his 
flagging domestic popularity.  “More than in the conflicts of the early 1990s or even in 
Georgia in 2008, the Kremlin conceived of the invasion and annexation of Crimea as a 
deliberate strike against the West, as well as Ukraine. Putin apparently believes that he 
and Russia have more to gain from open confrontation with the United States and 
Europe—consolidating his political position at home and boosting Moscow’s 
international stature—than from cooperation.”355 
2. Masking the Dynamic Change to the Status Quo 
Just as Russia used the world’s focus on the Beijing Olympics, the crash of the 
world’s stock markets and American domestic politics to mask its 2008 invasion of 
Georgia, Putin again calculated that international attention was held elsewhere in 
February 2014 when he ordered the Russian military to change the political relationship 
with Crimea.   After almost two and a half years of bloody fighting, the Syrian civil war 
had taken a dramatic turn in the fall of 2013 when ISIS seized the city of Raqqa and 
began a highly publicized campaign of murder that both outraged the West and created 
doubts about efforts to overthrow the Assad Regime. Putin undoubtedly drew further 
conclusions about American willingness to intervene militarily overseas when U.S. 
President Obama walked back his so-called “redline” against Bashar Al Assad in 
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September of 2013.356  Not only was the American willingness to project military force 
in doubt, but the ability to do so was increasingly questionable following the U.S. 
government shutdown and subsequent fiscal sequestration in October 2013. With 
American uncertainty over how best to deal with ongoing post-Arab Spring conflicts in 
the Middle East and North Africa, Putin correctly identified little U.S. or European 
willingness to become significantly involved in Ukraine when Victor Yanukovych’s 
rejection of European Union association touched off the Euromaidan protests in 
November 2013.357  At the end of January 2014, the Euromaidan protests against 
Yanukovych had grown dramatically in size and in violence, but Putin was still meeting 
with EU leaders and stating his overt policy of non-interference in Ukraine.358  The 
Europeans took him at his word, but Putin was not likely to do anything that would 
jeopardize international participation in his Winter Olympics at Sochi.   
The Sochi Olympics represented a $50 billion dollar investment for Russia, and 
Putin was determined to capitalize on the goodwill, significant press coverage, and 
grandeur of the event to promote Russian identity and his leadership on the world stage. 
Sochi’s location on the Black Sea (between Abkhazia and Crimea) near the restive 
Caucasus did raise questions about security, especially in the wake of a dual suicide 
bombing carried out by Chechen terrorists in Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad) only 
356 Glenn Kessler, “President Obama and the ‘Red Line’ on Syria’s Chemical Weapons,” Washington 
Post, September 06, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2013/09/06/president-
obama-and-the-red-line-on-syrias-chemical-weapons/. Further bolstering Putin’s belief in Russian 
ascendance was Putin’s ability to intervene in the chemical weapons/ redline debacle to offer Obama a 
compromise. Russia would destroy Syria’s chemical weapon stockpiles in exchange for no Western 
military action against Assad.   
357 Georgi Gotev, “EU Seeks ‘Time for Reflection’ After Vilnius Summit Failure,” EurActiv.com, 
November 29, 2013, http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/vilnius-summit-time-reflection-news-532048. 
Moscow of course claimed that the protests were all a carefully orchestrated U.S. plot to foment division 
between Russia and Ukraine. While they saw the hidden hand of U.S. influence behind the Euromaidan, the 
Russians did not anticipate an overt military response to the annexation of Crimea as long as the process of 
seizing the peninsula was not a bloodbath. 
358 Georgi Gotev, “Spirit of ‘Detente’ Prevails at EU-Russia Summit,” EurActiv.Com, January 29, 
2014, http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/spirit-detente-prevails-eu-russi-news-533090.   See also: 
http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20113 for a Russian transcript of the speeches at the Vilnius 
summit and Putin’s affirmation of Ukrainian sovereignty, even as his surrogates were already beginning to 
organize for the seizure of Crimea. 
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weeks before the opening ceremony.359  When the games opened on February 7th, tens of 
thousands of Russian security forces were manning active rings of security around the 
Black Sea resort while Russian intelligence carried out widespread monitoring of Internet 
and telephone activity.360  The Sochi Olympic Games officially closed on 23 Feb 2014, 
the day Putin would later claim he gave the order to execute the Crimean operation. 
C. ABOVE-MILITARY FORMS OF WAR: DIPLOMATIC, CULTURAL, 
LEGAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND NETWORK WARFARE 
Seizing Crimea militarily was likely not Vladimir Putin’s specific goal before the 
Euromaidan.361  Putin would have accepted Ukraine as a unified client-state, dependent 
on Russia for trade and defense, yet just independent enough to serve as a resurrected 
Cold War buffer between Russian territory and NATO. That acceptance however, would 
remain contingent upon a reliable pro-Russian leader in Kiev. When that surrogate was 
suddenly faced with expulsion from office, Putin recognized the fleeting opportunity to 
resolve the Crimean issue while bolstering his domestic popularity and he seized it. As 
early as February 4th 2014, two weeks before Yanukovych’s hasty departure from Kiev, 
Putin’s inner circle determined that salvaging the pro-Russian regime in Kiev was a lost 
cause but the general chaos presented an opportunity to manipulate existing legal 
procedures to setup several Ukrainian territories for absorption into the Russian 
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Federation.362  When he finally acknowledged giving the invasion order (after a full year 
of evolving denial) Putin’s revisionist time line placed the decision on the morning of 
February 23nd. Putin may have deliberated giving the execute order through the night of 
the 22nd, but Russian intelligence operatives and surrogates were clandestinely 
organizing across Crimea for at least several weeks prior to that date. If the specific 
annexation of Crimea was only a Kremlin contingency plan before the beginning of 2014, 
the continuous subversion of Ukraine in an effort to force Ukraine to accept Russian 
dominance was an ongoing strategic effort since the mid-2000s.363  Even as early as the 
mid-1990s the Russian policy regarding Ukraine appeared to be to “keep Kiev so 
weakened that it is unable to move away from Russia, but not so unstable that it becomes 
a massive security problem on Russia’s western borders.”364 The constant effort to 
undermine Kiev’s independence through political warfare ultimately created the 
362 Andrei Lipsky, “It was Right to Initiate Accession of Eastern Regions of Ukraine to Russia,” 
Novaya Gazeta, February 25, 2015, http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/67389.html. This memo was 
allegedly drafted by Russian Oligarch, Konstantin Malofeev, and sent to Putin as an internal “pragmatic” 
outline for the post-Euromaidan dissection of Ukraine. This outline cannot be ascribed to Putin directly, but 
given Putin’s exclusion of divergent points of view from his circle of political advisors it is likely that this 
outline is a confirmation of sentiments generally held by Putin. The Russian government denies the 
authenticity of this memorandum, but it provides a pragmatic assessment of the Russian opportunities in 
Ukraine following the Euromaidan, particularly in establishing control over Crimea, absorbing the military-
industrial capabilities of Ukraine’s eastern oblasts (specifically Kharkiv and Donetsk and not Luhansk 
indicating it was created before the events in eastern Ukraine began to unfold), and opening the door for 
Slavic immigration into the Russian Federation. It contains specific guidance for the shaping of a pro-
Russian narrative and an emphasis on using “legal” processes of referendums to promote first self-
determination and then Russian integration by the inhabitants of the desired oblasts. This document also 
warns of the need to manipulate the international perception of the referendums by publishing videos of the 
voting process on the Internet. 
363 Blank and Hussey, The Truth about Ukraine. Subversive measures to undermine Ukraine’s 
general sovereignty were well underway by 2006, but if the steps toward annexation were initiated some 
eight years before the invasion, it would be expected that a more developed pro-Russian insurgent network 
would have been in place than what actually existed in early February 2014. With so little existing political 
support in the Crimean parliament, and the ad-hoc nature of the actual “self-defense forces” (not the 
Russian Army forces masquerading under the same name) at the time the occupation commenced, there 
was a significant potential for the effort to fail, particularly if the Ukrainian Army had started resisting with 
force. Ultimately the level of development was adequate, but a deliberate effort at moving toward 
annexation would have likely reduced some of the residual risk by developing more robust pro-Russian 
political and surrogate movements. 
364 Ra’anan and Martin, Russia: A Return to Imperialism?, 192. Ra’anan and Martin assert that 
despite the clear indication of subversion, it was the practice of the Clinton administration to try to give 
Russia the benefit of the doubt and to offer explanations for Russian military action in several of the post-
Soviet states as the work of rogue Russian military units, Russian soldiers acting as freelance mercenaries, 
and any number of other reasons despite clear indications that Yeltsin was directing the destabilizing 
actions, particularly in Abkhazia. 
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conditions for the rapid, relatively bloodless use of military force to seize and occupy the 
Crimean peninsula in early 2014. 
Putin’s first determined efforts to bring Ukraine under his direct influence began 
with the failed 2004 presidential election of Victor Yanukovych, the sitting Ukrainian 
Prime Minister and convicted felon from Donetsk. The 2004 election was a deliberate 
effort by Putin to “export ‘managed democracy’ next door.”365  Through Russia’s 
ambassador to Ukraine, Victor Chernomyrdin, “who clearly acted as if he was sent to be 
Moscow’s proconsul in Kyiv like his tsarist and Soviet predecessors … Moscow spent 
$300 million to manipulate the outcome of the Ukrainian presidential election in 2004, 
showing again how little actual regard Moscow has for the sovereignty and independence 
of Ukraine.”366  Yanukovych briefly won as the Party of Regions candidate with 
overwhelming support from the ethnically Russian dominated eastern regions of Ukraine. 
Charges of vote rigging and a possible attempted assassination-by-poisoning of 
opposition candidate Victor Yushchenko, led to widespread demonstrations which 
became the so-called “Orange Revolution,” against the pro-Russian Yanukovych. The 
Ukrainian Supreme Court eventually annulled the election results following extensive 
allegations of voter fraud from numerous international observers and Yanukovych lost in 
a second run-off election.   
In 2005, Yanukovych’s Party of Regions created a political alliance with United 
Russia, the dominant Russian political party of Vladimir Putin.367  Despite Moscow’s 
denial that Putin ever suggested the idea of dividing Ukraine between Russia and Poland 
to the Polish Prime Minister in 2008, that same year Russia blatantly violated Ukrainian 
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sovereignty and international law when it took a page from the Georgia playbook and 
began issuing Russian passports to Russians in Crimea.368   When asked specifically if 
Crimea was Russia’s next target after the invasion of Georgia, Putin demurred and stated 
that Russia recognized Ukraine’s sovereignty and that Crimea was different because there 
was no ethnic conflict that required Russian intervention.369 
Despite reports of voting irregularities yet again, the Russian-backed Yanukovych 
was elected and confirmed as President of Ukraine in 2010. Putin’s support for 
Yanukovych might be easy to view as the patronage of a political ally, but Yanukovych’s 
presidency marked a significant change in Ukraine’s pro-Russian orientation which 
ultimately culminated with the Euromaidan protests in 2013. Shortly after being elected, 
Yanukovych reversed his predecessor’s policies regarding the Black Sea Fleet and 
extended the Russian lease for an additional 25 years in exchange for subsidized Russian 
gas. He also filled the Ukrainian government with appointees from the eastern (Russian) 
oblasts who in turn helped him pass sweeping legislation which increased his power to 
quell political opposition. While Yanukovych publicly promised to seek an association 
with the EU, he was secretly signing a wide-reaching agreement for deeper economic ties 
with Russia. On November 21, 2014 Yanukovych’s submission to Moscow’s will 
became public when he announced that the EU association deal had been withdrawn.370  
This sudden reversal touched off the Euromaidan protests that ultimately led to 
Yanukovych’s ouster. In the wake of the killings of dozens of Euromaidan protestors, 
Putin’s inner circle realized Yanukovych’s grip on power was unrecoverable, and that 
there was little chance of a party emerging from the post-Euromaidan process who would 
be an acceptable “negotiating partner” for Russia.371  The Russians also assessed that the 
368 Adrian Blomfield, “Russia ‘Distributing Passports in the Crimea,’” The Telegraph, August 17, 
2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/2575421/Russia-distributing-passports-
in-the-Crimea.html. 
369 “Putin’s 2008 Comments on Crimea, before a Sharp Change of Tack.” Radio Free Europe Radio 
Liberty (Original Interview from ARD Television), April 07, 2015, http://www.rferl.org/media/video/putin-
crimea-ukraine/26942862.html. 
370 Katya Gorchinskaya and James Marson, “Ukrainians Protest Snubbing of EU Trade Deal,” Wall 
Street Journal, November 24, 2013, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304465604579217952059663052. 
371 Lipsky, It was Right to Initiate Accession of Eastern Regions of Ukraine to Russia. 
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Ukrainian defense establishment was paralyzed as the entire status of the country’s 
leadership became questionable.   
A key to the successful Crimean operation would be the lack of effective 
resistance on the part of Ukrainian defense forces based there. If any had fought back, 
Russia’s narrative of a bloodless, popular transfer of administrative control would have 
been lost. Well in advance of the annexation, Russia exploited the culture of endemic 
corruption and divergent sense of ethnic and national loyalties throughout Ukraine to buy 
the allegiance of those in the position to resist. Ukrainian army generals, intelligence 
officers, and police officers were recruited by the Russian intelligence service and at the 
critical moment either defected to the invading Russian side or chose to keep their units 
out of direct confrontation.372  A significant psychological blow for the emerging 
Ukrainian government and its strained relationship with the military was the public 
defection of Ukrainian Navy Admiral Denis Berezovsky to the self-proclaimed 
government of Crimea.373  Russia also enjoyed a significant advantage in situational 
awareness as well as a commensurate ability to keep the new Ukrainian government in 
the dark due to the extensive penetration of the Ukrainian Intelligence Service (SBU) by 
the Russian FSB.374  As Russian forces and surrogates began occupying Crimean 
administrative centers and surrounding Ukrainian military bases, Moscow unleased a 
                                                 
372 Nemtsov, Putin. War, 5. The level of Ukrainian defections is disputed. Some Ukrainian leadership 
was without question compromised by Russian intelligence. However, without clear orders from Kiev or a 
clear understanding of the situation, most of the officers in charge of Ukrainian garrisons on Crimea 
probably acted prudently in attempting to reduce the potential for violence. FSB COL Igor (Strelkov) 
Girkin claimed that there were very few defections from the Army. The Ukrainian Berkut on the other 
hand, defected almost en masse, which is indicative of the level of Russian control that existed in the 
organization prior to the Euromaidan. See also: Howard and Pukhov, 2014, for an assessment of the 
numbers of defections at different points of the occupation. Ultimately Putin signed an order that allowed 
any Ukrainian military member to maintain his rank, housing and family benefits in the Russian military if 
they agreed to switch sides. Howard and Pukhov estimate that around 9000 Ukrainian service men 
ultimately took Putin up on the offer and changed sides. 
 
373 Colby Howard and Ruslan Pukhov, eds., Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in 
Ukraine (Minneapolis, MN: East View Press, 2014), 167. Berezovsky attempted to encourage other 
Ukrainian sailors and vessels to defect and was largely ignored. He was instrumental in getting several of 
the blockaded Ukrainian vessels to eventually surrender to the Russians and after the annexation, Putin 
appointed Berezovsky as the deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet. 
374 Mark Galeotti, “Moscow’s Spy Game: Why Russia is Winning the Intelligence War in Ukraine,” 
Foreign Affairs (October 30, 2014). 
127 
wave of disinformation and propaganda that denied any Russian military involvement in 
Crimea, and portrayed the Euromaidan as a Neo-Nazi junta that would persecute ethnic 
Russians, resurrecting cultural fears from World War II. These messages were coupled 
with propaganda promoting Russian identity, Crimea’s historic position as a Russian 
province, and the perception that Russian citizens were supportive of Crimea breaking 
away from Ukraine.  
Putin himself was part of the disinformation campaign. His outright denial that 
Russia was involved in the ongoing occupation was eventually replaced with an 
admission that Russia had in fact conduct the operation, but only out of concern that the 
people on Crimea were in need of protection. 
No. [The seizing of Crimea] had not been pre-planned or prepared. It was 
done on the spot, and we had to play it by ear based on the situation and 
the demands at hand. But it was all performed promptly and 
professionally, I have to give you that.   
Our task was not to conduct a full-fledged military operation there, but it 
was to ensure people’s safety and security and a comfortable environment 
to express their will. We did that. But it would not have been possible 
without the Crimeans’ own strong resolution.   
Also, I must say that I didn’t add the concluding line to my Kremlin 
speech about initiating a draft law on the inclusion of Crimea in the 
Russian Federation- until the very last day, last moment, because I was 
waiting for the referendum results. Polls and surveys are one thing, along 
with certain groups’ sentiments, but a referendum is the expression of the 
will of all the residents of an area. It was very important for me to know 
what their will was.   
So when the voter turnout reached 83 percent and more than 96 percent 
supported Crimea’s inclusion in the Russian Federation, it became obvious 
that this decision was made by the majority, if not unanimously. In this 
situation, we couldn’t have done otherwise.375 
The appearance of legitimacy through democratic processes is an important part 
of Putin’s effort to present his hybrid campaign as self-determination and not overt 
subjugation. The Russians frequently cite the referendum for Kosovo’s independence as 
375 Kremlin.ru, Direct Line with Vladimir Putin 
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the Western precedent for the process, despite Kosovo’s breakaway from Serbia coming 
on the heels of genocide and no comparable conditions existing in Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, Crimea or Eastern Ukraine, let alone the fact that the Kosovo referendum was 
widely monitored by impartial observers and established independence, not annexation 
by a foreign sponsor. Legitimacy through “popular referendum” was so central to the 
Russian plan that the Crimean Parliament building was among the first targets captured 
by Russian Spetsnaz, where those same forces were able to quickly orchestrate a quorum 
and install a proxy civilian leader who would then petition Russia for further military 
intervention.376  In addition to the appearance of legitimacy through managed 
democracy, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu attempted to portray the 
intervention as a legitimate defensive measure, necessary to protect Russian military 
personnel and property in Crimea from attack by undefined extremist organizations.377 
Russia also employed a variety of state and non-attributable entities to conduct 
different degrees of cyber-warfare against Ukraine. As early as 2010, Ukrainian cyber 
security personnel identified malicious code named “Uroburos” on Ukrainian 
government computer systems that appeared to be part of a widespread Russian cyber 
campaign known as “Snake.”378  Instances of this infection were reported in several other 
countries over the next four years but Ukraine was by far the most heavily targeted.379  
Uroburos appears to have been used primarily to spy on Ukrainian government 
communications, but it also had the capability to take control of computers and shut 
down information systems.380  In at least one instance, Russian Special Forces were used 
to facilitate cellular network monitoring and disruption. On February 28, 2014, after 
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Russian forces seized key Crimean facilities, the mobile service provider Ukrtelecom 
confirmed that its facilities in Crimea had been raided and that the intruders had tampered 
with fiber optic cables and disrupted local communications. The Crimean Ukrtelecom 
facility was then identified as the point of origin for denial of service attacks directed at 
the cellular telephones of members of the Ukrainian parliament in Kiev.381  
Using a now familiar mix of non-attributable government cyber security 
organizations and independent hackers, Russia conducted botnet and DDoS attacks 
against Ukraine in March 2014, peaking in late March in the run-up to the referendum.382  
The scale and impact of cyber-attacks remained relatively low during the Crimean 
annexation however, considering Russia’s known cyber-warfare capabilities. One 
possible explanation for the low-level of cyber-attacks is the high level of network 
interdependence between Russia and Ukraine. Widespread viral contamination and denial 
of service attacks would have heavily affected Russia’s own network services. The 
attacks that were carried out achieved some level of disruption, but they were limited in 
scope because the Russians simply didn’t need to create a more destructive effect to 
achieve their objectives, preferring instead to keep the cyber infrastructure open in order 
to deliver their propaganda.383  
D. NON-MILITARY FORMS OF WAR: TRADE AND 
MEDIA/PROPAGANDA WARFARE 
When Western leaders prepared to meet with Eastern European leaders in Vilnius, 
Lithuania in late 2013, the economic cooperation summit was subsumed by 
Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the EU partnership deal and the protests in Kiev. Moscow 
ensured that Yanukovych and the Ukrainian parliament understood that Russia would 
inflict hardship if Ukraine backed out of its new agreement for economic cooperation 
381 “Ukraine Suspects Russia as Source of Cyber Attack on MPs.” Channel4.com, March 05, 2014, 
http://www.channel4.com/news/russia-ukraine-cyber-attacks-crimea-mps-phones-Internet. 
382 Russell Brandom, “Cyberattacks Spiked as Russia Annexed Crimea,” The Verge, May 29, 2014, 
http://www.theverge.com/2014/5/29/5759138/malware-activity-spiked-as-russia-annexed-crimea. 




with Russia.  “As the Vilnius summit neared, Moscow imposed trade embargoes on 
various Ukrainian exports to Russia.”384  Ukraine is heavily dependent on Russian natural 
gas for heat. This gas is delivered through the same pipelines that supply almost 80 
percent of Russian gas exports to Europe.  “Russia wants control over this infrastructure 
because it can’t use gas as a lever against Ukraine without affecting the other downstream 
customers in Europe. The European mediated resolution to the first gas war of 2006 was 
extremely unpopular in Ukraine, and within a week of its signing, the Ukrainian 
government collapsed following heavy domestic criticism.”385  The repeated actions of 
threatening and actually shutting off gas supplies by the Russian state-controlled 
Gazprom were not wholly about price or payment disagreements. These actions were 
leverage for Moscow’s control over political activity in Kiev.386  The fact that threats 
about the gas supply are only made in the middle of winter, when people will start 
freezing to death and will quickly rally to whatever government turns the heat on, is an 
example of the weaponization of economic interdependence. 
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has continued to offer loans and to 
subsidize Ukrainian gas prices at rates that were too good for the Ukrainians to pass up. 
This fostering of dependency kept Ukraine from aggressively developing alternative 
forms of energy and made the political establishment subject to Moscow’s dictates as 
Gazprom demanded payments, raised rates, or shut off services in the coldest parts of the 
year. This process continued through the election of Victor Yanukovych whose pro-
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Russian orientation was hoped would bring more considerate treatment from Russia.387  
Through Yanukovych, Putin was able to secure an extension for the Black Sea Fleet at 
Sevastopol through 2042 and a promise that Ukraine would not join NATO in exchange 
for a 30 percent subsidy of Ukrainian gas prices.388  While not specified on Callard and 
Faber’s matrix of the forms of war, “dependency warfare” might be a useful distinction 
for the amount of leverage gained by subsidizing a target state as opposed to more direct 
methods of financial warfare. 
Russian propaganda efforts since the beginning of the Euromaidan represent one 
of the more remarkable manifestations of Russian hybrid warfare. Instead of merely 
trying to curb free-speech domestically (although that practice has also been widely 
resurrected), Russia has “weaponized” the instruments of free speech to “confuse, 
blackmail, demoralize, subvert, and paralyze” its immediate Ukrainian victims and the 
international community.389  Russia’s practices turn the fundamental institutions of 
liberal societies, namely the free-press, into vectors for propaganda attack in the form of 
government sponsored press, publication of “academic” articles and editorials and the 
mass use of social media from official sources and an army of “trolls” who flood 
discussion forums with a pro-Moscow message. On September 11, 2013, Putin used an 
American public relations firm to craft a full page opinion-editorial in the New York 
Times to call for the American people to challenge President Obama’s plan to attack 
Syria, citing instead all of the international standards for conflict resolution, illegitimacy 
for the use of force against a sovereign nation, and specifically casting doubt about the 
Syrian origin of the chemical attack that had demanded a response in the first place.390  
387 Nygrin, Russian Resource Policies Towards the CIS Countries, 227. See also: Vladislav 
Inozemtsev, “Moscow’s New Best Friend,” Moscow Times, May 05, 2010. 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/moscows-new-best-friend/405389.html.; Andrew E. 
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To Obama’s detractors and peace-activists alike, Putin suddenly became a reasonable 
voice of restraint, a “moderate” who could be a useful ally in ending the use of chemical 
weapons in Syria. This same moderate would complete the invasion and annexation of 
Crimea less than six months later. During the Soviet era, KGB propaganda efforts like the 
intentional American design of the AIDS virus or the CIA’s involvement with the 
Kennedy assassination were carefully planted in foreign news outlets to conceal their 
origin. In 2014, the Kremlin had an English-language Russian government sponsored 
news channel, Russia Today (RT), carried as part of many basic cable packages and 
available in the living rooms of millions of Western households, as well as a related 
Internet “news” channel that bills itself as an alternative to the Western mainstream 
media.  “The effect is not to persuade (as in classic public diplomacy) or earn credibility 
but to sow confusion via conspiracy theories and proliferate falsehoods.”391  The 
Euromaidan protests in Kiev in late 2013 were also accompanied by a dramatic change in 
the nature of the Russian propaganda. The anti-Yanukovych protestors demanding 
European integration and market reforms were suddenly cast as fascists, neo-Nazis, 
“Banderites” and puppets of Western intelligence manipulation.392  
E. MILITARY FORMS OF WAR 
Following the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia and the suspension of the NATO 
membership process for Georgia and Ukraine, Ukraine had to consider the possibility of 
having to unilaterally resist a Russian incursion on Ukrainian territory. Unfortunately, 
with funds just barely adequate for keeping its soldiers paid, there was no possibility of 
paying to move the garrisons from their former westward Soviet-era orientation, to 
positions closer to the Russian border. A 2008 readiness inspection revealed that “only 31 
of Ukraine’s 112 fighter jets, 10 of its bombers, and eight of its 36 attack aircraft were 
operational.”393  When the 2008 world financial crisis dragged down government budgets 
                                                 
391 Pomerantsev and Weiss, The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, 
Culture and Money, 6. 
392 Associated Press, “Russian Propaganda War in Full Swing Over Ukraine,” Haaretz, March 15, 
2014, http://www.haaretz.com/world-news/1.579964. 
393 Howard and Pukhov, Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine, 63. 
133 
around the globe, Ukraine was no exception; the already marginal Ukrainian defense 
budget shrank even further. Despite modest increases in defense spending in 2012–2013, 
Victor Yanukovych undermined national confidence in the Army when he attempted to 
deploy soldiers to Kiev to end the Euromaidan protest.394  The friction between civilians 
and the Army, and the Army’s slowness to act on behalf of the new government when 
Yanukovych was overthrown, contributed to the lack of clear orders for the defense of 
Crimea when the Ukrainians still had a numerical advantage and might have resisted the 
occupation.395   
In Crimea, Russia accomplished the traditional military objectives of seizing key 
objectives, encircling enemy forces, and controlling the population, through a non-
traditional mixture of intelligence officers, Spetsnaz, elite airborne and marine forces, 
irregular militia, private security organizations, volunteers, and criminal groups as the 
vanguard for a follow-on conventional occupation force. The nature and composition of 
these elements has been the object of most of the Western speculation regarding hybrid 
warfare that developed in the wake of the occupation. These combinations are interesting 
from the perspective of organization, coordination, and non-attribution, but they are not 
without precedent in the chronicles of military history. To focus too narrowly on the 
nature of the forces involved in the occupation is to miss the fact that the annexation of 
Crimea was only a single dramatic moment in a larger Russian hybrid war against 
Ukraine.   Without this context, the Crimea operation is remarkable only for its lack of 
violence and for the length of time that Russia continued to deny any and all 
involvement. Because the annexation was the product of a larger hybrid effort however, it 
is valuable to examine the nature of the military forms of war that were employed there. 
For more than a year prior to the Crimean annexation, Russia executed a series of 
large scale military exercises in the Black Sea region to “test the readiness” of the 
Russian fleet and other regional forces.396  Larger and larger exercises were also held 
394 Ibid., 69. 
395 Ibid., 69. 
396 “Russia Military Exercises 2013: Large-Scale, Surprise Drills in Black Sea Region Announced,” 
World Post, 28 March, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/28/russia-military-exercises-
2013_n_2970184.html. 
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throughout Russia during 2013.397  Major security exercises and troop deployments to 
the Black Sea region were attributed to the security precautions being taken for the Sochi 
Olympics until the first suspected Russian soldiers and vehicles were reported in Crimea. 
These exercises served to desensitize observers to the potential danger, and to provide a 
plausible excuse for the Russians to activate their reserve units and undertake the lengthy 
process of moving men and equipment via rail to different locations in the Federation. 
Weeks before the culmination of the Euromaidan and before Putin’s 
acknowledged timeline for his decision to take Crimea, critical actions for the annexation 
were already taking place in Crimea. In early February 2014, Putin’s former Deputy 
Prime Minister, Vladislav Surkov,398 suddenly appeared in Simferopol to speak with 
Crimean leaders about autonomy and to propose a bridge across the Kerch Strait that 
would link Crimea directly to the Russian mainland.399  Surkov, also a former KGB 
officer, meant for the bridge project to serve as a cover for an influx of Russians and 
equipment, and to serve as an investment that would need to be protected with additional 
military assets if the Ukrainian security situation were to become questionable.400  
Throughout February, thousands of Russian soldiers and “volunteers” were secretly 
staged on Russia’s existing Crimean military bases.401  Not only did the use of these 
bases for combat staging violate Russia’s treaties with Ukraine, but they very likely 
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provided the Spetsnaz and FSB with an opportunity to move among the civilian 
population and conduct close reconnaissance of certain objectives as well as to coordinate 
with local separatists during the invasion’s final planning stages.   
In mid-February 2014, Crimean observers were still discounting the possibility of 
a popular movement paving the way for Russian military deployment on the peninsula 
based on the lack of significant pro-Russian sentiment.402  There had been “anti-
Euromaidan” protests in the heavily Russian cities of Simferopol and Sevastopol, but the 
majority of the population was largely apathetic to the events in Kiev. While there were 
neo-Soviets, Cossacks, Russian biker gangs, and other Russian fringe elements who 
could be used as Russian proxies, the lack of underlying ethnic tensions and the weak 
representation of pro-Russian unification political groups in the Crimean parliament 
created doubt that an adequate pretext for Russian intervention was possible in the near 
future.403  This observation demonstrates the lack of home-grown Crimean separatist 
sentiment that existed just days before the occupation began, and it is indicative of the 
limited surrogate mobilization in the direction of annexation that had been done prior to 
the beginning of 2014.   
As the Euromaidan protests in Kiev approached their climax in late January, a 
little known, pro-Russian politician in Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov, began organizing 
hundreds of ethnic Russians in Crimea to form a pro-Russian militia.404  Prior to his 
obscure role in politics, Aksyonov had an extensive network of criminal associates from 
his time as a mid-level enforcer in the Crimean mafia and his network of less than 
completely legitimate businesses.405  These connections enabled him to draw upon the 
402 Mat Babiak, “Is Russia opening a ‘Crimean Front’?” Ukrainian Policy (February 21, 2014), 
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pro-Russian criminal element to fill out the ranks of his so-called “self-defense forces.”  
By the time Yanukovych abandoned the Ukrainian presidency, Aksyonov’s militia 
numbered several thousand.406   
On February 22, Victor Yanukovych fled Kiev.407  Four days later, Russian 
“separatists” and “volunteers” established checkpoints to restrict access to the Crimean 
capital of Simferopol as Putin ordered a large-scale military drill along the Ukrainian 
border.408  This force of 150,000 Russian troops were supposedly ordered to conduct a 
“snap” readiness exercise,409 but the time needed to muster and transport that many 
troops means that the actual order was likely given weeks earlier. The presence and 
uncertain intentions of such a large force caused the three-day-old interim government in 
Kiev to have to consider a Russian move against the Ukrainian capital, further degrading 
Kiev’s ability to respond to the unclear reports of armed “little green men” appearing in 
Crimea. Amid the uncertainty about Russian intentions and what the appropriate 
Ukrainian and international positions should be, non-attributable Russian Special Forces 
slipped off of the Russian bases in Crimea and began to capture key objectives while 
Russian intelligence officers employed the “self-defense forces” to present the 
appearance that a popular local movement was undermining Kiev’s control of the 
peninsula.410 
On Feb 27, 2014, several dozen heavily armed self-described “Crimean self-
defense forces” seized the Crimean parliament and several government administrative 
buildings, while taking care not to harm the security guards. These troops, obviously 
better trained and equipped than a month-old militia and eventually confirmed as the first 
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wave of Putin’s “polite people” (Russian Spetsnaz), secured the Parliament while 
Aksyonov began rounding up enough parliament members to reach a quorum.411  
Aksyonov’s assembly then voted under the watchful eyes of the pro-Russian forces and 
elected Aksyonov as the Prime Minister of Crimea, before voting to hold a referendum 
on secession from Ukraine. Aksyonov immediately appealed to Vladimir Putin for 
Russian intervention in Crimea, providing “legitimacy” for the introduction of large 
numbers of Russian forces.   
The organization of the “self-defense forces” was also not left solely to locals like 
Aksyonov. In an interview almost a year later, Russian FSB Colonel Igor “Strelkov” 
Girkin claimed he was in Crimea on 21 Feb 2014 (before the date of Putin’s decision) 
organizing the militia.412  While he maintained the narrative of “siding with the 
population” to imply that unification with Russia had popular support, Strelkov claimed 
that the Berkut was the only Ukrainian force that openly sided with the pro-Russian 
movement. Contrary to propaganda reports of massive Ukrainian defections, Strelkov 
insists that the Ukrainian police and army never broke faith with Kiev. Strelkov also 
confirmed that the referendum was carefully orchestrated by the pro-Russian militants, 
under the command of FSB officers, who gathered members of parliament and forced 
them to vote for the Russian Unity Party and for the pro-Russian referendum. 
Guaranteeing Russia’s preferred outcome from the vote was still only possible due to the 
411 Shuster, Putin’s Man in Crimea is Ukraine’s Worst Nightmare. There are several surveillance 
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threatened with violence if they did not vote for Aksyonov and the referendum, and one MP claimed a vote 
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Strelkov vs. N. Starikov “CENTRSILY/ SILACENTRA”], aired originally on the Russian program: 
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visible presence of Russian armored vehicles on the streets of Simferopol.413  By 28 
February the pro-Russians had sealed off the Armyansk and Chongar roads that connect 
Crimea to the Ukrainian mainland and were carefully preventing foreign press and 
Ukrainian militia from reaching the peninsula.414 
In addition to Cossacks from Russia-proper and local Russian biker gangs, the 
Crimean “self-defense forces” also incorporated Russo-Ukrainian security professionals. 
Russian private security companies and members of the Ukrainian Berkut (the Special 
Police and “titushky” who were dissolved after the bloodshed in Kiev during the 
Euromaidan) were absorbed into the ranks of the Crimean separatist forces to provide 
manpower to the core of GRU, FSB and Spetsnaz operators.415  By March 11th, 
conventional Russian artillery units were reported to be positioned on Crimea while 
Russian MI-8 and MI-24 helicopters delivered reinforcements to Russian controlled 
airfields.416  Two weeks after the seizing of the Crimean parliament, over 20,000 Russian 
soldiers were occupying Crimea, supported by an unknown number of local militia.417 
Through the manipulated referendum process, Crimea declared independence and 
petitioned Russia for accession on March 16th. The Russian Duma amended the Russian 
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Constitution to accept Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol as part of the Russian 
Federation two days later.  Russia publicly claims the referendum saw an 83 percent 
voter turnout of whom 97 percent voted for joining Russia.418  An official Russian 
finding on the referendum later confirmed that the actual results were closer to 15–25 
percent voting to join Russia with less than half of voters turning out to the polls.419  
Remaining a part of Ukraine was not a ballot option. 
For the next two weeks the remaining Ukrainian garrisons were forced to 
surrender while thousands of Russian reinforcements were ferried across the Kerch 
Straight or airlifted into the airports.420  Signaling the end of the self-defense forces’ 
usefulness and leaving little doubt regarding who was now in charge of Crimea, “Putin 
ordered the Crimean “self-defense forces” to integrate into the Russian military and 
security forces on March 25th.”421  The publicized images of the operation, particularly 
of the “polite-people/ little green men,” are also part of a deliberate Russian effort to 
shape the perceptions of Russian military capability. The Russian forces’ image was 
carefully crafted to imply that all of the occupation forces were outfitted with the latest 
AK-74 rifles, electronic sites, communications gear, night vision equipment, and body 
armor while riding into action in the latest generation of tanks, armored personnel carriers 
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and helicopters.422  Videos of disciplined soldiers marching in formation and reports of 
generally respectful demeanor toward civilians and Ukrainian military personnel were 
also part of this carefully manufactured image. On March 26th, General Gerasimov 
issued a press release claiming that Russian flags were flying over all 193 Ukrainian 
military facilities in Crimea and that all Ukrainian servicemen wishing to remain in the 
service of Ukraine were in the process of being repatriated to the mainland.423 
Hybrid warfare does not end with the establishment of “peace” following the 
dynamic change in the political status quo. The most damaging thing for Russia’s new 
hold over Crimea would be a challenge to its “will of the people” narrative in the form of 
an emerging resistance to the Russian occupation. To prevent this, Russian forces had to 
enforce population control measures to restrict civilian movement on the peninsula while 
the state security services arrested political dissidents and restrict online sources of 
information. Well after the annexation, Russian Special Forces were still being used to 
exert control over potentially divisive elements on the peninsula. On January 26th, 2015, 
Russian security forces seized the Crimean Tatar language television station, demanding 
archived footage of an anti-annexation demonstration held in Simferopol on February 
26th.424  On March 31st, 2015, the Tatar language ATR and several Tatar radio and 
children’s programming stations were taken off air for failing to meet new Russian 
licensing requirements.425  Several leading Tatar community leaders have been expelled 
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from Crimea while rank-and-file Tatar activists have been assaulted or have simply 
“disappeared.”426  By mid-February 2015, there were 29,400 Russian troops in 
Crimea.427 
F. CONCLUSION 
The annexation of Crimea was a shock to the Western sense of international order 
and forced NATO members and non-members alike to evaluate their organic and mutual 
preparations for defense as well as their respective vulnerabilities to a surrogate 
“uprising” being used to mask an invasion. As clever as the operation was, it was neither 
inevitable nor guaranteed to succeed. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has 
not tried to hide its efforts to maintain a dominant relationship with Ukraine. The 
annexation of Crimea only represents a single, tangible manifestation of the decades-long 
hybrid campaign to force Kiev to accept Moscow’s domination. Through subversion of 
the political process to play king-maker, subsidizing energy resources to foster 
dependence, and the exploitation of divisive propaganda to attempt to keep Ukraine’s 
Russian population oriented toward Moscow, Russia has engaged in political warfare to 
weaken Ukraine’s ability to resist aggression unilaterally or by joining other economic or 
defensive associations. Political warfare efforts became hybrid when Russia employed a 
variety of the military forms of war to manufacture the appearance of a popular 
movement and to give Putin the slightest degree of legitimacy during the façade of a 
democratic change of government and the subsequent referendum on Crimea. Through 
layers of deception and a concerted effort to increase the Ukrainian military’s level of 
uncertainty, Russia was able to present the world with a fait accompli after three weeks of 
relatively bloodless effort. What is most remarkable, given how effortless the capture of 
Crimea seemed, was how poorly prepared the peninsula actually was when the operation 
began.    
At the time Aksyonov and the FSB manufactured his quorum, his Russia Unity 
Party had only 3 percent of the seats in the Crimean parliament. The Party of Regions, 
426 Shevchenko, “Crimean Tatar Media ‘Silenced by Russia.’” 
427 Reuben F. Johnson, “Update: Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine ‘is Working,’” IHS Jane’s Defence 
Weekly (February 26, 2015). 
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Yanukovych’s party with strong ties to Putin’s United Russia, held 80 percent of the seats 
in Crimea, but there was very little momentum to vote for succession from Ukraine. The 
vote still had to be held under armed guard and in secret with some very dubious ballots 
cast. If the annexation of Crimea had been a deliberate objective prior to 2014, it would 
be expected that political support for that end would have been more thoroughly 
prepared. Similarly, the degree to which Aksyonov and others would have been allowed 
to draw manpower from their criminal associates and the titushky would have also been 
minimized in order to ensure the application of violence could be closely controlled. 
Ultimately, the process worked well, and Moscow may have drawn some erroneous 
conclusions regarding the level of pro-Russian sentiment there actually was in Ukraine or 
how easily the process might be replicated elsewhere. Russia’s initial military infiltration 
and easy coordination with its proxy forces was also only possible due to the shared 
language and ethnicity of the occupation force with the “separatists.” 
The annexation of Crimea was possible because Moscow had already spent years 
undermining Kiev’s ability to defend its sovereignty. When the Euromaidan removed 
Russia’s proxy from power, Putin was faced with a very narrow window to carry out an 
operation that would meet his domestic political needs, his strategic goals for domination 
in the near abroad, and to shock the sources he perceived to be Russia’s greatest threat, 
the neo-liberal West. To reduce the chances of Western interference, Putin hid an 
invasion behind other world events and maintained the guise of local unrest while 
minimizing violence to play down the significance of what was happening. With a 
corresponding assault of disinformation, Putin was able to create doubt about the nature 
of the invasion until he was signing the annexation of Crimea into the Russian 
Constitution.   
Crimea also possesses some unique attributes that helped Russia overcome 
potential Ukrainian resistance. Crimea was already home to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. 
The existing Russian military bases and thousands of resident Russian sailors and 
marines served as a Trojan horse for the invading force. Crimea is a peninsula that is 
connected to the mainland by a narrow strip of land. Once the seizure of Ukrainian 
installations had begun, it was not difficult to block all movement between the two 
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entities. This chokepoint helped Russia limit the sources of information covering the 
takeover. It also ensured that any military response from Kiev, who had just lost most of 
its maritime capability, would be bottlenecked on a narrow land bridge and extremely 
vulnerable to aerial interdiction and artillery fire. The lack of similar favorable 
circumstances and the attempt to immediately replicate the success of Crimea when the 
world’s attention was now directly on Russia’s action in Ukraine led to a much different 
outcome in Donbas.  
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VI. RUSSIA IN DONBAS, UKRAINE, 2014–2015 
Following the annexation of Crimea, it has become the habit of observers to look 
narrowly at Russia’s actions on the peninsula from late February through late March of 
2014 to formulate theories about Russia’s “new way of war” and speculate as to where 
this mixture of non-attributable forces and local separatists might be used in the future. 
That narrow frame of reference fixates on the military forms of war as they were used to 
consolidate control over a strategic objective, but frequently misses the larger campaign 
of political warfare that Russia had carried out to subvert Ukraine’s sovereignty for years. 
Even as the Russians were finishing the capture of the last Ukrainian garrisons on 
Crimea, they seemed to answer the question about their next objective when small groups 
of pro-Russian “separatists” began demonstrating near and threatening to seize 
government buildings in cities across Ukraine’s south and east, beginning a series of 
actions that would result in bitter conventional warfare and cost thousands of lives. Given 
the same aggressor and victim it is valuable to examine the differences in conditions that 
resulted in completely opposite outcomes between the mostly bloodless annexation of 
Crimea and the very bloody war in eastern Ukraine. 
Heady from their “bloodless” success in annexing Crimea, the Russians rushed to 
duplicate this process in eastern Ukraine and, thus far, have failed. The Russian effort in 
the Donetsk Basin (Donbas) is an example of an attempt to force a dynamic change in the 
status quo when the necessary conditions for successful hybrid warfare were no longer 
present. While the central Ukrainian government was too disorganized to orchestrate an 
effective resistance against the occupation of Crimea, by the time the first Russian 
proxies began seizing government buildings and declaring independence in Eastern 
Ukraine, the Ukrainian government and the international community were paying close 
attention. The annexation of Crimea had a psychological effect on the Putin regime; its 
masterful execution and the lack of consequences silenced any remaining skeptics and 
engendered a sense of invincibility.428  The annexation was also wildly popular in Russia 
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Dictatorship,” Politico, October 19, 2014. 
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and Putin’s domestic approval ratings soared from 54 percent in 2013 to 83 percent in 
2014.429  This renewed domestic support satisfied Putin’s primary objective of stabilizing 
his political control in Russia; not only did the annexation satisfy a popular sentiment 
among his nationalist base, but the employment of the military to meet an external threat, 
real or imagined, enabled Putin to reframe his domestic opponents from being merely 
voices of internal dissent into agents of the foreign enemy. He must have also realized 
that the popularity of the moment was fleeting; eventually the costs from the sanctions 
that the annexation incurred would have a negative effect on the average Russian, and he 
would risk a domestic political backlash. Putin’s circle of advisors had shrunk to a 
handful of the siloviki, and with the popularity of the success in Crimea, any remaining 
voices of caution had been largely silenced.430  On the heels of Crimea, Putin and his 
advisors made one of two calculations. Either they misjudged the level of actual popular 
support among Ukraine’s ethnic Russians for joining with the Federation, or they wanted 
a more violent confrontation that they could control as a bargaining chip to secure 
Western acceptance of Crimea’s new Russian ownership.431  Either way, the ensuing 
“separatist movement” was purely a product of the Kremlin’s deliberate creation, even if 
its objectives were uncertain.  “Russian propaganda frames the Ukraine crisis as a civil 
war. In reality, the conflict in Ukraine’s east is a Kremlin manufactured war—fueled by 
Russian-made military equipment, fought by Russian soldiers, and supported by Mr. 
Putin.”432  Putin may have also become a victim of his own propaganda toward Ukraine. 
By insisting the Crimean annexation was a defensive operation to protect ethnic Russians 
from a neo-Nazi junta in Kiev, he changed the issue from a territorial dispute into an 
ideological conflict, forcing Moscow to become further involved to “defend” ethnic 
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Russians from the same supposed threat, or risk undermining the support of the domestic 
Russian nationalists.   
The lack of Ukrainian military resistance to the Russian invasion of Crimea 
forced the interim government in Kiev to evaluate the true status of the Ukrainian 
military and to deal with some hard truths. For years the various governments had paid 
lip service to modernizing the military, but the regular national fiscal shortcomings and 
vastly overestimated revenues from the sales of old military equipment and facilities 
resulted in an Army that could barely pay salaries and facility operational costs, let alone 
upgrade equipment and training.433  As the occupation was unfolding, and with uncertain 
Russian intentions on Ukraine’s eastern border, the Ukrainian armed forces were placed 
on their highest state of alert and their actual numbers were made known to the interim 
government; of 41,000 soldiers in the active Army, only 6,000 were combat ready.434  
When Putin decided to annex Crimea, the Ukrainian was projecting military weakness. 
When Ukraine struggled to mobilize its reserves to counter the first FSB organized 
separatists in eastern Ukraine, his assessment had not been altered.   
Given the Russian military’s demonstrated competence in pulling off the Crimea 
occupation, and Ukraine’s lack of ability to deter aggression, Putin may have been 
tempted to exploit the situation and seize eastern Ukraine outright.435  Such a move 
however, would have inevitably met resistance and turned bloody. Without a veil of 
deniability or a clear objective (taking eastern Ukraine up to the Dnepr River would put 
Russian forces in areas that are not ethnic Russian majorities which would hurt the 
narrative of defending Russians in the near-abroad), Putin also had to worry about the 
reaction from the West. So far, the smoke screen of propaganda and manufactured 
excuses for international inaction had prevented physical reprisals. With no impending 
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Western military response likely, Putin did not want to provide an excuse for an 
intervention in eastern Ukraine that might dislodge him from Crimea as well. While the 
Russians weighed a full invasion, the Ukrainians “conducted the largest counter-
mobilization of any European army since World War Two and deployed fifteen Brigades 
east of the Dnepr … Putin blinked, and ,for whatever reason, instead opted for a less 
overt hybrid-surrogate campaign in Donbass.”436  In keeping with Gerasimov’s advice to 
not underestimate the “protest potential” of the people, Putin recognized the value in 
framing his offensive action as a popular civilian uprising as he had in Crimea. Putin was 
also aware of the Western preference for action to stop violence perpetrated by a state, 
while regularly “permitting or ‘excusing’ sub-state violence carried out by activists, 
community organizations or ‘the people.’”437  Putin decided to continue his dismantling 
of Ukraine, but in a manner that played to this Western preference, despite the now 
acknowledged Russian military presence in Crimea. Unfortunately for Putin and his 
advisors, they had grossly miscalculated the level of popular support for an uprising in 
eastern Ukraine. Not only would “leadership, money and weapons not be enough to spark 
a local rebellion against Kiev in the Donbas,” but Moscow would also have to fill the 
rebel ranks with “volunteers” from Russia proper.438 
During the crisis in eastern Ukraine, a number of Western analysts attempted to 
catalogue and create models for Russia’s action. One of the more detailed studies drew 
from the Gerasimov model as a framework for direct observations of the conflict in 
Donbas, and listed five core elements of Russia’s “New Generation Warfare”: 
1) POLITICAL SUBVERSION: Insertion of agents; classic “agi-prop” 
information operations employing modern mass media to exploit ethnic-
linguistic-class differences; corruption, compromise and intimidation of 
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local officials; backed up with kidnapping, assassination and terrorism; 
recruiting discontented elements into a cellular cadre enforced with 
murderous discipline. 
2) PROXY SANCTUARY: Seizing local governmental centers, police 
stations, airports and military depots; arming and training insurgents; 
creating checkpoints and destroying ingress transportation infrastructure; 
cyberattacks compromising victim communications; phony referendum 
with single party representation; establishment of a “People’s Republic” 
under Russian tutelage. 
3) INTERVENTION: Deploying of the Russian forces to the border with 
sudden large-scale exercises involving ground, naval, air and airborne 
troops; surreptitious introduction of heavy weapons to insurgents; creation 
of training and logistics camps adjacent to the border; commitment of so-
called “volunteer” combined-arms Battalion Tactical Groups; integrating 
proxy troops into Russian equipped, supported and led higher-level 
formations. 
4) COERCIVE DETERRENCE: Secret strategic force alerts and snap 
checks — forward deployment of tactical nuclear delivery systems; theater 
and intercontinental “in your face” maneuvers; aggressive air patrolling of 
neighboring areas to inhibit their involvement. 
5) NEGOTIATED MANIPULATION: The use and abuse of Western 
negotiated ceasefires to rearm their proxies; using violations to bleed the 
opponent’s Army while inhibiting other states from helping under the fear 
of escalation — divide the Western alliance by playing economic 
incentives, selective and repetitive phone negotiations infatuating a 
favorite security partner.439 
This study has subsequently been used to graph a linear correlation between an 
increase in intensity and an increase in state responsibility (or attribution to the aggressor 
state).440  These elements of “New Generation Warfare” are a helpful depiction of 
Russian tactics employed in east Ukraine, and they were also used in different 
proportions in Crimea. They cannot however, be assumed to represent a phased 
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methodology for how Russia will pursue hybrid warfare in the future, nor can they be 
divorced from the larger strategy to force a target state (and the international order) to 
accept Russia’s will. Russia’s efforts to foment separatism in Donbas may have begun in 
earnest in March 2014, but they were only conceptually possible because of the 
concerted, years-long, effort to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty through political 
proxies, economic warfare, and information operations.   
A. HYBRID WARFARE REQUISITE CONDITIONS 
1. Russian Strategic Goals 
Putin’s strategic goals before the annexation of Crimea were to strengthen his 
domestic popular support, prevent a unified Ukraine from joining the EU and NATO, and 
challenge the spread of western neo-liberalism into Russia. Additionally, he wanted to 
maintain his ability to project power throughout the Black Sea, and challenge Ukraine’s 
ability to move away from Russian energy dependence. Where the annexation of Crimea 
clearly moved the Russian position toward those ends, the strategic objectives associated 
with Russian actions in Donbass are far less certain. In the spring of 2014, Russia may 
have found that it had assumed a course of action almost reflexively in eastern Ukraine 
based on the success of the Crimea operation, before reformulating a strategy that 
accounted for how the annexation of Crimea may have altered the geopolitical 
environment. As FSB officers began organizing “self-defense forces” and seizing police 
stations, city halls and other symbols of Ukrainian power, Moscow was forced to 
consider the fiscal impact of the new Crimean related sanctions, as well as the cost of 
supporting the population of the highly dependent peninsula, and the levels of troops 
needed to perform occupation duties to ensure the population did not begin to challenge 
Russian rule. Moscow also had to examine the value of Donbas and what means of future 
influence the Kremlin would have over Kiev. Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine had so 
far resulted in a significant victory, but in continuing to strike while the iron was hot 
Russia risked being drawn deeper into a conflict with less clear objectives and greater 
potential for external intervention.   
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Just as the large untapped gas fields surrounding Crimea affected Putin’s cost-
benefit calculation for following through with annexation of the peninsula, the Donetsk 
and Kharkiv regions have energy reserves which would facilitate Kiev’s desire to achieve 
energy independence. Eastern Ukraine has several large shale oil reserves and an 
established coal industry which are central to Ukraine’s plan to shift away from Russian 
dependence to domestic sources of energy.441  Given the loss of potential resources due 
to the loss of Crimea however, it is unlikely that the energy potential of eastern Ukraine 
are sufficient to wean Ukraine off of Russian energy, nor are they significant enough for 
Russia to go to war to obtain. Russia is in the process of rebuilding its military capability 
and eastern Ukraine has some industrial facilities that could be useful in this effort, but 
the fighting would quickly damage much of the infrastructure and displace a large portion 
of the potential work force. Any hypothetical future benefit would have to be attained at a 
real cost of existing Russian military inventory.   
Outright annexation of the Donbas would also work against Moscow’s future 
ability to influence the political situation in Kiev. The seizure of Crimea had already 
removed one significant pro-Russian voting block from Ukrainian national politics. The 
annexation of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts would virtually ensure that no pro-
Russian position would ever gain any significant support in the Ukrainian government. It 
would therefore be in Russia’s interest for eastern Ukraine to remain under Kiev, but in a 
federated status with as much autonomy as possible. The idea of a “special” status and 
federation with the freedom to pursue independent trade relations with Russia would later 
become a regular talking point for the rebels during ceasefire negotiations.442 
Support for military operations in Donbas would also require the commitment of 
Russian soldiers, over 20,000 of whom were now needed to secure Russia’s hold over 
Crimea. The only thing more damaging to Russia than the Western sanctions would be a 
Tatar or Ukrainian insurgency taking shape on the newly acquired peninsula. Not only 
would such a movement be costly to suppress, but it would crack the carefully 
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constructed façade of unanimous popular support for joining Russia and undermine the 
propaganda campaign of Russian protectionism. With so many troops needed to enforce 
Russian governance on Crimea, the personnel and equipment available to support 
military action in the Donbas would be limited despite the large numbers assembled on 
Ukraine’s eastern border.   
These realizations may have been slow to set in. Following early “separatist” 
successes in storming police garrisons and seizing weapons, and the Kiev government 
facilitating Moscow’s information campaign by passing some ill-conceived anti-Russian 
language laws, Moscow’s propaganda machine began to turn the conflict from a question 
of self-determination, into a clash of incompatible ideologies with a moral imperative for 
Russians to obliterate an emerging “fascist” threat in its infancy. With Putin’s grip on 
power rising on the tide of this same nationalist sentiment, there was no effort on 
Moscow’s part to tone down the rhetoric. Initially, the strategic objectives of the Donbas 
campaign may not have mattered as the gains were coming at little cost to Moscow. Well 
over a year later, with thousands of dead on both sides, Russia was still stuck in a cycle of 
conducting tactical maneuvers to preserve Putin’s power, with little discernable strategic 
end for the conflict with Ukraine let alone a policy for Russia’s relationship with the rest 
of the world.443  Despite the lack of strategic value in Donbas, Russia perpetuated the 
conflict there as a sequel to the Crimean operation, as part of a greater strategy of hybrid 
warfare against Ukraine.   
2. Masking the Dynamic Change to the Status Quo 
Russia’s offensive-realist world perspective and years-long strategy of 
destabilizing Ukraine had apparently paid off with the annexation of the strategically 
important Crimean peninsula in March of 2014. Given the relative ease of that operation 
and its popularity with the Russian population, similar efforts by the Russian intelligence 
services to initiate separatist movements in other Russian enclaves seemed to gain a burst 
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of momentum in April of 2014.444  Russian FSB and GRU officers organized “separatist” 
groups and began to challenge Ukrainian governance. Small pro-Russian rallies were 
inflated to give the appearance of wide-spread popularity. The separatist militias rapidly 
grew more effective as they received new volunteers from the Russian federation, and for 
a short period of time they held some degree of momentum in claiming Ukrainian 
territory under the banner of Novorossiya. In the wake of Crimea however, the world’s 
attention was not on Olympic Games or even protests in Kiev. There were some alarming 
developments in Iraq and Syria, but the attention of Europe and Kiev was directly on 
Russian activity in Ukraine. The Ukrainian government was painfully aware of the de 
facto loss of Crimea and had no more pressing concern than preventing the succession of 
even more territory. Russia’s well publicized use of unmarked soldiers pretending to be 
local militia in Crimea only increased the suspicion of the true origin of the masked 
“local separatists” who began appearing in a number of southern and eastern Ukrainian 
cities. Several small pro-Russian movements were also crushed in their infancy.445  
Russia failed to adequately disguise the opening moves of its proxy campaign in southern 
and eastern Ukraine and even drew more attention to small elements that may have 
actually included local separatists.   
While there was little effort to hide the intended change in the political dynamic, 
it is possible that the actions in southern and eastern Ukraine were themselves used to 
mask Russia’s consolidation of power in Crimea. With rapidly escalating levels of 
violence and reports of atrocities, media attention and independent reporting tended to 
center on the line of overt conflict in eastern Ukraine. It was not on the implementation of 
laws and the population control measures including disappearances of opposition 
members in Crimea. Given Russia’s vehement denial of involvement in Crimea well past 
                                                 
444 Russian domestic support for the annexation was not universal. In September 2014 thousands of 
Russians demonstrated in Moscow against the ongoing “undeclared” war in Ukraine.   
445 Sergei L. Loiko and Carol J. Williams, “Police Say 42 Killed in Odessa in Worst Violence of 
Ukraine Crisis,” LA Times, May 02, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-wn-ukraine-russia-
odessa-clash-20140502-story.html. In the Odessa case, several hundred pro-Russian agitators got into a 
physical altercation with several thousand pro-Ukraine marchers. In the ensuing melee, the more hardline 
Russians were forced to retreat into a trade union building. There are different accounts of the point of 
origin, but the building was set on fire and the separatists died. While this loss of life was labeled a 
“tragedy” at the time, no significant separatist movement took place in Odessa after that, even as the 
situation in the eastern oblasts deteriorated into open war. 
 154 
the point of plausibility, it is not surprising that Russia continued to deny any 
involvement in the eastern Ukrainian conflict despite overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary. Even with the world’s attention on Ukraine following the Crimea annexation 
and the materialization of a “separatist movement” composed mostly of non-natives, 
Russia continued to use the same tools it had employed in Crimea to create uncertainty 
and provide appeasers with excuses for inaction. 
B. ABOVE-MILITARY FORMS OF WAR: DIPLOMATIC WARFARE  
One aspect of information operations that blossomed with the advent of the war in 
eastern Ukraine was Russia’s domination and manipulation of the social sentiment 
sections of news source and shared media forums. These “troll” armies, operating on very 
specific guidance from their Russian government handlers, made efforts to appear to be a 
variety of private citizens with distinct online personas in order to create the appearance 
of popular sentiment.446  They then saturated the blog sections of any story involving 
Russia, the Ukraine, or other Western political policy with pro-Putin, anti U.S. messages, 
often providing links to sources of disinformation, conspiracy theories, and real but 
derogatory news. Troll farms served to sow doubt and disinformation among other 
readers, manipulate any attempts at analyzing public sentiment, and to compliment other 
narrative-shaping efforts through Russia’s more well-known mechanisms like RT. More 
insidiously, Russia used an instrument of a free society, the unrestricted sharing of ideas 
through new media, as a weapon to undermine the value of open discourse. Taken 
together with Russia’s efforts to promote the Kremlin’s version of “facts” through official 
statements, press-releases, documentaries, select video clips, and carefully orchestrated 
“interviews” with President Putin, the efforts of the blog trolls are only one part of a 
massive effort to fabricate and sustain an alternative reality for anyone inclined to believe 
the West is the source of all of the world’s woes. 
The troll farms represent only one line of effort in the Kremlin’s massive 
information warfare campaign. Since early 2014, Moscow’s operatives have registered 
                                                 




dozens of domain names for a network of pro-Kremlin websites with names like: 
“Donetsk-news.com, newsmariupol.com, news-odessa.com” as well as other sites for 
promoting different propaganda efforts like “materiel-evidence.com.”447  The nodes of 
this network have been linked through digital forensics to central points of origin and 
control to the so-called “Internet Research Agency” in St. Petersburg.448  The “Material 
Evidence” domain has also been linked to propaganda promotion in the physical world.  
“Businessmen” from Material Evidence procured the services of western journalists and 
paid for a touring photographic exhibition in the U.S. and Europe that highlighted the 
violence and right-wing aspects of the Euromaidan.449  
Moscow never intended to be content with Crimea. Even as Russia was 
consolidating its control over Crimea, Putin made another attempt to use czarist era 
diplomacy to end the Ukraine as an entity. The slightly eccentric Russian deputy speaker 
of the Duma, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, sent letters to the governments of Poland, Romania 
and Hungary, proposing a joint division of the remainder of Ukraine along the lines of the 
infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939.450  As soon as Putin decided to take a full-
scale invasion of Ukraine off the table, he immediately reached out to the OSCE to craft a 
“road map” to peace that would require Kiev to cease offensive operations against the 
rebels and agree to constitutional reforms that would protect the rights of Ukraine’s 
ethnic Russians.451  This diplomatic outreach played on the Western preference for 
negotiated agreements to the point of blindness in believing that Russia was acting in 
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good faith. Russia proposing a diplomatic resolution to an armed conflict that was 
entirely a product of Russian invention is illustrative of the hybrid employment of limited 
force and diplomatic warfare against Ukraine. Once the Ukrainian anti-terrorist operation 
(ATO) against the rebels started, Moscow continued to push for an immediate cessation 
of offensive action by Kiev as part of its diplomatic narrative. The sudden change to 
diplomacy is reflective of the interchangeability of any of the forms of war provided they 
achieve the desired effect. To get the tanks and artillery needed for the rebels to block the 
Ukrainian advances, the Russians would have to transport those items across the border 
along a network of questionably controlled roads to a patchwork of rebel positions. 
Instead, Russia attempted to achieve the physical military effect of stopping the 
Ukrainian advances against the rebels with non-military means.452 
When questioned about Russian sponsorship of “separatists in Eastern Ukraine in 
April 2014, Putin flatly denied Russian involvement: “Nonsense. There are no Russian 
units in eastern Ukraine—no special services, no tactical advisors. All this is being done 
by the local residents, and the proof of that is the fact that those people have literally 
removed their masks. So I told my Western partners, [these people] have nowhere to go, 
and they won’t leave. This is their land and you need to negotiate with them.”453  This 
statement followed Putin’s assertion that diplomacy was the appropriate vehicle for 
resolving the eastern Ukrainian crisis, a refrain that was meant to play to the preferences 
of Western powers for crisis resolution, and not based on any genuine effort to want to 
end a process that he had intentionally instigated.  “Order in the country can only be 
restored through dialogue and democratic procedures, rather than with the use of armed 
force, tanks and aircraft.”454 
Putin’s regular injection of the so-called “Donetsk and Luhansk People’s 
Republics” (DPR/ LPR) into the negotiation process also provided de facto legitimacy to 
Moscow’s proxy as a separate political entity, and his subsequent “appeal” for the 
separatists to delay their referendum on sovereignty, provided the possibility of a 
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mediated solution as cover for his recalculation of the region’s value as a pro-Russian 
voting bloc in whatever government emerged in Kiev.455  Russia’s diplomatic efforts 
were closely supported by their broader information operation efforts to portray the post-
Euromaidan government as a “junta” and the FSB led rebellion in the east as a popular 
movement of resistance.   
Incredibly, some Russian hybrid warfare participants took it as a forgone 
conclusion that Russia was actually losing the information war.456  None other than FSB 
Colonel Igor “Strelkov” Girkin, now the military leader of the pro-Russian “separatists” 
near Sloviansk, expressed his belief that the lack of popular local support for the Donbas 
separatists was only due to a lack of an effective information campaign to mobilize 
popular sentiment. Strelkov claimed the Russians in Ukraine couldn’t see war coming 
because they had known peace for too long and could not see why it was needed.457  So 
Strelkov, the Russian FSB Colonel who helped fabricate the farcical Crimea referendum 
in March 2014, had been in Donbas for a month and could not understand why the people 
were not mobilized to resist Ukraine. He could see that the new “junta” in Kiev was 
obviously planning to oppress the ethnic Russians, but those same Russians somehow did 
not share this opinion. Only after he was forced to flee Sloviansk by advancing Ukrainian 
forces and he could blame the shelling of Russian areas on the Ukrainian Army, could he 
point at the Russian civilians and explain that this was the oppression he had warned 
them about. 
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C. NON-MILITARY FORMS OF WAR: ECONOMIC, LEGAL, AND 
PROPAGANDA WARFARE 
On 1 April, 2014, Moscow raised the price of Russian gas to Ukraine for the 
second time in two days.458  A week later, Moscow threatened to cut off Ukraine’s gas 
supply citing $16 billion in unpaid bills. Prime Minister Medvedev suggested that Russia 
might require pre-payment for gas in the future and Putin agreed in principle but then 
interceded and asked that Gazprom “delay such a move given the difficult situation in 
Ukraine.”459  Through this bit of theater, not only was Russia demonstrating that the 
heavy amount of economic leverage that it held over Kiev had not changed following the 
annexation of Crimea, but Putin directly linked the intensity of Russian demands with the 
Kiev’s response to the crisis that Moscow was deliberately perpetuating. 
On 7 April 2014, a former Soviet submariner and a handful of Russian speaking 
separatists armed with clubs seized an 11-story Ukrainian government building in 
Donetsk and declared the existence of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR).460  This 
was the origin of the “separatist” myth and was representative of the very low percentage 
of the Russian speaking population that wanted to break away from Ukraine or join 
formally with Russia. It may have also presented Putin with a dilemma. Russia was still 
consolidating its forces in Crimea and was not positioned for an armed intervention in 
Ukraine, but Moscow could also not allow a potentially useful popular movement to be 
crushed in its infancy. As the Kremlin considered options, agents like Strelkov were 
dispatched to organize the rebels and make sure they were responsive to Moscow’s 
direction. Within weeks, the DPR leadership position of “President” would be filled by a 
political consultant from Moscow, Aleksander Borodai, and the Minister of Defense 
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would be assumed by Strelkov.461  As the Ukrainian ATO continued to reverse the 
rebels’ early gains through July 2014, Moscow took an even greater role in the upper 
management of the DPR. The few remaining Ukrainian-born separatists were eased out 
of key leadership positions and replaced with political advisors and military commanders 
from Moscow who had experience in Transdniestria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and more 
recently in Crimea.462 
Russian propagandists made every effort to stoke the sentiment of local rage 
against the Ukrainian forces. One of the more egregious claims aired on Russia’s Channel 
1 TV was a story about Ukrainian soldiers crucifying a 3-year old boy after capturing an 
ethnic Russian village.463  The story was a complete fabrication and the woman who 
made the claims was identified making other unsubstantiated claims in different places 
along the front. Nevertheless, the story was repeated over and over in the Russian media 
until it became widely accepted as a fact among Russian viewers. Even this fabricated 
story would seem mild when compared to the propagandists’ efforts to spin the shooting 
down of MH17. 
D. MILITARY FORMS OF WAR 
NATO estimated that Russia had 40,000 troops on the Ukrainian border in early 
April 2014 when pro-Russian “separatists” began seizing government buildings in 
Ukraine’s southern and eastern oblasts.464 With the Crimean takeover still ongoing, Kiev 
was quick to identify the presence of insignia-less “little green men” as likely Russian 
Spetsnaz following the same pattern that Russia had used at the outset of Russia’s 
surprise occupation of the peninsula. Not only were the methods the same, but some of 
the individual Russian operatives were the same as well, including GRU Colonel Igor 
                                                 
461 Czuperski et al., Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin’s War in Ukraine, 3. 
462 Gabriela Baczynska and Aleksandar Vasovic, “Pushing Locals Aside, Russians Take Top Rebel 
Posts in East Ukraine,” Reuters, July 27, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/27/us-ukraine-
crisis-reb-els-insight-idUSKBN0FW07020140727. 
463 “Russian TV Sparks Outrage with Ukraine Child ‘Crucifixion’ Claim,” AFP, July 14, 2014, 
http://news.yahoo.com/russian-tv-sparks-outrage-ukraine-child-crucifixion-claim-114839196.html. 
464 Adrian Croft, “Russia could Achieve Ukraine Incursion in 3–5 Days,” Reuters, April 02, 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/03/us-ukraine-crisis-breedlove-idUSBREA310PP20140403. 
 160 
“Strelkov” Girkin.465  Seeing what was happening and being able to do something about 
it, however, were two different things. While the undertrained, underequipped, poorly led 
Ukrainian Army struggled to shake off years of neglect, the “rebels” were consolidating 
their control over a number of population centers in the Donbas and were beginning to 
expand to the west. This expansion was halted when the rebels ran into an unexpected 
irregular force of Ukrainians, organized, equipped and funded by a powerful Ukrainian 
oligarch and acting governor of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Igor Kolomoisky.466   Through a 
combination of concessions for moderates and bounties for the capture of hardline 
separatists, Kolomoisky was able to quell any separatist sentiment in Dnipropetrovsk 
while his “Dnipro Battalion” locked down pro-Russian agitators’ access to the city and 
began conducting counter separatist raids in rebel held areas.467  Another, more 
controversial, Ukrainian defense battalion also began conducting offensive action against 
the Russian militia. Pravii Sektor (Right Sector) is one of these units. Right Sector has 
political ties, as its name implies, to Ukrainian right-wing nationalists. Its relatively small 
presence during Euromaidan was a point of focus for RT and other Russian propagandists 
who wanted to portray the entire movement as a neo-Nazi coup. Some members of the 
militia have also not done themselves any favors by incorporating Nazi SS or swastikas 
into their motley battle dress, adding visual “verification” of Russian claims of fascist 
orientation.   Political motivations aside, Right Sector, the Dnipro Battalion, and other 
irregular Ukrainian forces were able to mobilize as a significant enough defense force to 
halt the expansion of the pro-Russian movement while the Ukrainian Army was in a state 
of confusion. These militia bought the Ukrainian government time. The Ukrainian Army 
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conducted a massive mobilization of national manpower and, in late May 2014, launched 
a highly effective Anti-Terror Operation (ATO) that rapidly pushed the rebels back 
toward the Russian border. By mid-July 2014, the Ukrainian’s ATO had severely 
degraded the Russian militia and the movement was in danger of being completely 
crushed. This momentum was halted and dramatically reversed by the introduction of 
Russian artillery and rocket fire from the Russian side of the border followed by a 
dramatic increase in Russian regular Army soldiers and heavy equipment in Ukraine.   
Unlike the 2008 invasion of Georgia, where declared Russian forces crossed 
overtly into Georgian territory, Moscow was determined to continue to mask Russia’s 
direct role in the fighting in eastern Ukraine. This continued subterfuge was maintained 
largely to minimize the potential political impact resulting from Russian soldiers being 
killed while fighting an undeclared war against a neighbor who had not attacked Russia. 
The extent to which the Russians went to promote this implausible deniability was 
incredible, but their deception plan was only thinly based on repetitive denial and not any 
sophisticated ruse. The evidence of active involvement of Russian soldiers and equipment 
in the fighting quickly became “overwhelming and indisputable.”468  When some of the 
actual local separatists began looting and following their own directions, Moscow sent in 
the Vostok Battalion to clear them out of government buildings and assert Russian 
control.469  The Russian Vostok Battalion was made up of Chechen special operations 
troops, led by Russian officers, and had a history of operations in the Caucasus including 
participation in the invasion of Georgia in 2008.470  Outside of Chechen militia, 
Cossacks, and other Russian “patriotic volunteers” the widespread presence of regular 
Russian soldiers was dismissed by Moscow as “volunteers” who had taken their personal 
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leave to go fight for a noble cause. As more and more Russian soldiers were ordered to 
go to Ukraine, often after signing a phony separation from the Army, they were placed in 
composite units to prevent a large number of casualties from affecting any one parent 
organization. The mix of units helped to mask the complete numbers of active forces that 
had actually been committed to the Ukrainian fight, but it also degraded their operational 
effectiveness, resulting in higher casualties.   
One of the foremost of the Russian operatives posing as a separatist leader was 
GRU Colonel Igor “Strelkov” Girkin.471  Strelkov described his “separatist” forces in 
eastern Ukraine as being at a 3:1, 7:1, and even 10:1 disadvantage against Ukrainian 
forces as the Ukrainian ATO began to gain momentum.472  He also claimed there were 
300 men in his force near Slavyansk in April 2014. This claim indicates two things: 1) 
the “popular” uprising was not so popular and 2) “non-linear warfare” was not conducted 
by choice but out of necessity. Strelkov didn’t have the forces to sustain a front or 
surround a town, both of which he was inclined to do. His scarce manpower meant that 
he could only conduct small localized engagements and man a few checkpoints. Strelkov 
also claimed he could not properly organize and equip his militia due to a lack of 
resources.473  This could lead to speculation that Russia was not actively promoting the 
“separatist” uprising if it were not for the presence of Russian intelligence officers like 
Strelkov. What it does indicate is that as little infrastructure development as there was in 
Crimea before the invasion, there was even less in Donbas. Not only were there very few 
local “separatists” in the ranks of the DPR and LPR, but the provision of military 
equipment and other supplies to the rebels was insufficient to sustain their early 
momentum. Russia had forces massed on the border, but they had not planned for the 
logistical sustainment of the separatist force they were trying to raise.   
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In early July 2014, Strelkov was forced to abandon Sloviansk by the rapid 
advance of the Ukrainian ATO and he became increasingly concerned the entire rebel 
movement was at risk of being wiped out.474  Immediate Russian reinforcements were 
delayed in mid-July as Moscow was forced to weigh the impact of Russian involvement 
and a possible international response following the MH17 incident. On July 17, 2014 a 
Russian-made BUK anti-aircraft missile was fired from the area controlled by Strelkov’s 
forces, at what the Russian commander believed to be a Ukrainian transport aircraft. 
Malaysian Air flight MH17 with 298 civilians aboard crashed in a field outside of 
Torez.475  Russian propagandists quickly churned out various conflicting theories 
regarding the shoot-down which alternatively suggested that the Ukrainians themselves 
had shot down the airliner with a fighter jet, then with surface to air missiles, and that the 
shoot-down was an attempt to assassinate Vladimir Putin,  all while separatists blocked 
access to the crash site and removed physical evidence from the scene.476  Despite 
overwhelming evidence of Russian responsibility, these alternative theories provided 
Western leaders with excuses for inaction and reinforced Russia’s ability to deny 
involvement in the ongoing war on the ground.   
By late July, Strelkov and his advisors were stating publicly that Putin needed to 
increase Russian efforts in eastern Ukraine or the campaign would be lost and Putin’s 
legitimacy in Russia would come into question.477  Strelkov claimed that out of 4.6 
million people in the Donetsk region only about 1000 men had joined his separatist forces 
by mid-Summer. He acknowledged receiving irregular volunteers from Russia, but few 
had combat experience. Russia provided modern weapons such as tanks and anti-aircraft 
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systems, which Strelkov claimed he had to raise funds to purchase, but he had very few 
soldiers within the separatist ranks who knew how to operate the advanced equipment.478 
By mid-August, the Ukrainian ATO had divided the LPR and DPR and was close 
to encircling both. Unfortunately for Ukraine, the breakthrough put Ukrainian forces 
within range of artillery from the Russian side of the border. Following widespread 
indirect fire engagement, during which entire Ukrainian battalions were completely 
wiped out, as many as 4000 Russian soldiers supported by the newest generation of T-72s 
crossed into Ukraine and directly engaged the Ukrainian army.479  On August 19, 2014, a 
convoy of Russian military vehicles crossed the Russian border and entered the Lugansk 
Oblast (now the self-proclaimed Lugansk People’s Republic), followed by an 
ammunition resupply convoy disguised as “humanitarian aid” vehicles three days later.480  
On 30 August 2014, pro-Russian soldiers speaking the Chechen language to each other 
were filmed in Ukraine manning Russian tanks and marked with the white arm-bands 
used as a simple form of recognition by other pro-Russian forces in eastern Ukraine and 
Crimea.481  On 31 August 2014, Russian officials announced that six schools would be 
opened in Lugansk city the following day.482 This action might have been an attempt to 
perform a civil affairs type of activity to promote a positive response from the residents 
of the city that the Russians had just occupied, but the schools were very near the active 
front and it is just as possible that the Russians’ intent was to put children in a position 
where they might be harmed in the ongoing combat in order to create a useful storyline 
for anti-Ukrainian propaganda. 
Despite the post-2008 military reforms, which ostensibly moved Russia away 
from the Soviet-era mobilization model, the Russians quickly found themselves stretched 
too thin to maintain a suitable effort in Ukraine. During the Ukrainian ATO, Putin may 
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have started to realize that the military aspect of the conflict was going to be a costly 
protracted effort that would likely draw increasing levels of Western support for Kiev if 
Russia’s involvement was acknowledged as it had been in Georgia and Crimea. Without 
clear, achievable goals or any hope of a quick change to the political dynamic, Putin 
needed to keep the door open for a face-saving withdrawal while continuing to prop up 
the rebellion he had started. Whatever the reason for maintaining a modicum of 
deniability, Russia committed significant conventional forces on several occasions to 
keep the rebel front from collapsing.483  Providing these forces, as many as 10,000 in 
Donbas, over 40,000 postured on the Russian side of the border, and nearly 30,000 
committed to the occupation of Crimea, has severely strained the capabilities of the 
Russian Army.484   Part of the effort to hide the overt commitment of Russian units and 
to mask the level to which forces from other Military Districts were drawn on to meet the 
need for troops in Ukraine was through the ad-hoc cobbling together of combat 
formations from multiple parent brigades and divisions.485   
For the offensive in the summer of 2014, the Western and Southern Military 
Districts were able to commit enough fairly complete Battalion Tactical Groups for the 
operation, but by the winter they could barely piece together the same number of 
companies.486  Another indicator of personnel shortages were the reports of fraudulent 
conversion of Russian conscripts into contract soldiers for the purpose of filling the 
ranks.487  Problems with morale among the Russian troops and among their Donbas 
surrogates even necessitated the placement of the Russian Interior Ministry’s 
Dzerzhinsky Division as “punitive action, anti-retreat troops behind the lines of rebels 
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and Russian regulars.”488  The Kremlin continued to maintain that the only Russian 
soldiers fighting in Ukraine were volunteers on leave, despite evidence that composite 
units of conventional soldiers were being created and shipped along with their tanks and 
other heavy equipment to Ukraine from across the breadth of the Federation on 
Moscow’s orders.489   
As Russia struggled to maintain the flow of weapons and soldiers into Ukraine, 
Moscow used the ploy of a diplomatic resolution to the conflict to cover the improvement 
of its military position. On September 5th, 2014, Russia singed the Minsk Protocol with 
representatives of Ukraine and the OSCE, agreeing to a ceasefire and a number of steps 
to reduce the military activity along the front.490  Russia used the unsteady ceasefire to 
rearm the rebel lines. Under Western pressure, Ukraine was forced to withdraw heavy 
weapons from the front, which enabled the rebels to launch an offensive to capture the 
hotly contested Donetsk airport. By January 2015, any pretense at abiding by the 
ceasefire was given up as the rebel forces launched attacks across the front, backed by 
Russian tanks troops and artillery which had been “pouring into the region.”491 A second 
ceasefire, the February 12 Minsk II agreement, barely slowed the fighting as the rebels 
launched an all-out assault on a surrounded Ukrainian force at Debaltseve, forcing the 
defenders to abandon the strategic city and fight their way back to Ukrainian lines.492   
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In mid-February of 2015 there were an estimated 14,400 Russian soldiers in 
eastern Ukraine supporting 29,300 “separatists” with the newest generation of Russian 
tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and indirect fire weapon systems, while another 55,800 
Russian soldiers remained massed on the Russian side of Ukraine’s border.493  The war 
has given the Russian military the opportunity to field-test military systems that were not 
fully integrated into the capture of Crimea. One of the main Russian “firsts” in eastern 
Ukraine is the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as forward observers for Russian 
artillery and multiple launch rocket systems.494  Russia also heavily employed electronic 
warfare systems in Ukraine to both jam Ukrainian military communications and to 
disable UAVs employed by international monitors.495  Ukrainian communications were 
highly vulnerable to Russian direction finding equipment, which made the Ukrainian 
forces vulnerable to quick acquisition and bombardment with heavy artillery and rocket 
fire.496  This rather conventional application of fire at the decisive point is only unique in 
the degree to which Moscow continued to deny any responsibility for it despite 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Russia, while maintaining its non-involvement in 
the conflict, was still afforded a seat at the ceasefire discussions and continued to press 
for conditions beyond the scope of the immediate conflict.    
E. CONCLUSION 
Following two major Russian incursions into eastern Ukraine, first in August 
2014 and then again in February 2015, the conflict settled along a fairly fixed front with 
numerous localized clashes but no major effort by either side to take new ground. Russia 
continued to maintain the narrative of “separatists” and “volunteers” despite 
overwhelming evidence of Russian regular forces and equipment present in Donbas. It is 
this combination of surrogates and regulars that has become the focal point for many 
hybrid warfare proponents and detractors. These combinations of force are interesting in 
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the study of tactical maneuver, but they blur the distinctions of hybrid warfare with 
unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, combination warfare and other more 
established concepts. More importantly, they miss the strategic implications of hybrid 
warfare. As a matter of subordination, a hybrid warfare campaign may include 
unconventional warfare, irregular warfare or the use of terrorists, but only to the extent 
needed to support or finish the political warfare efforts toward the sponsor’s strategic 
objectives. The discussion of resistance, insurgent or terrorist movements too often 
focuses on the narrative of local grievances and methods used in the immediate struggle. 
This is an exercise of limited value when the narrative, instruments of force, and the 
existence of the movement itself are the products of an external sponsor’s creation. As 
the military forms of war became the dominant effort in Donbas, Russia’s effort evolved 
into more traditional warfare waged with an interesting mix of proxies and regular 
soldiers under an uninterrupted campaign of denial. 
The war in eastern Ukraine is demonstrative of the limits of hybrid warfare when 
the dynamic change of the political relationship is not masked, and when the objectives 
are unclear. When Russia decided to press its advantage following the Crimean 
annexation, and began organizing separatist elements across Ukraine’s south and east, it 
did so under the complete awareness of the government in Kiev and of those in the 
international community who were not looking for alternative realities. Russia continued 
to employ political warfare against the Kiev and to discourage any third party 
involvement, but the line of contest was quickly reduced to the front in Donbas. Moscow 
certainly wanted to continue to exert financial and economic pressure on Ukraine, but 
“not losing” in Donbas became the most significant priority due to the effect this would 
have on Putin’s domestic support. What Donbas revealed is that Russia was not 
conducting hybrid warfare from a position of overwhelming strength. The Russians need 
the kinetic aspect of a conflict to be over quickly in order to preserve troop strength and 
material inventory and to reduce the motivation for foreign intervention. A drawn out 
conventional engagement quickly taxes the Russians’ ability to sustain combat forces and 
lacking a clear existential threat, Russian casualties represent a significant domestic 
political risk. Without a quick victory, Russia needed to find an acceptable point that 
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would preserve the idea of the rebellion and then used diplomacy to freeze the conflict 
for resolution at a more advantageous time. 
More than a year-and-a-half after the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s 
offensive in eastern Ukraine, the conflict largely disappeared from international 
headlines. With Russia’s new “intervention” in Syria, the urgency for arming Ukraine 
largely abated, but without a definitive resolution the conflict has only entered a frozen 
status.497  This unresolved status is in keeping with Russia’s method for retaining or 
regaining the initiative in its violations of its neighbors’ sovereignty.498  The Russian 
hybrid war against Ukraine is far from over; it will just shift to political means for a time. 
The vitriol of Moscow’s propaganda efforts to portray the Kiev government as a Nazi 
junta and Kiev’s designation of all separatists as “terrorists” will make Ukrainian 
reassertion of governance over the rebel held region problematic. Reuniting with the 
entirety of Donbas is already a political issue in Kiev that will affect voter sentiment and 
drive politics, while taking priority away from other issues like properly addressing 
corruption and diversifying the national energy resources. These vulnerabilities will leave 
space for Russia to continue to exert coercive influence. Future regional and national 
elections will also undoubtedly be contested as so many of the Donbas region’s residents 
are displaced. Ukraine has to take control over its border with Russia if it is to reassume a 
semblance of sovereignty, which Russia has demonstrably proven it is determined to 
undermine. Russia will continue to interfere with Kiev’s ability to govern in the east, only 
now, Russia’s means include a heavily armed population that has been forced to pick a 
side in an manufactured conflict, an unknown number of displaced Russo-Ukrainians in 
Russia with claims to property and political participation in Ukraine, and a border 
between the two entities that Russia will not relinquish to Kiev. 
497 Tom Burridge, “Ukraine Conflict: Guns Fall Silent but Crisis Remains,” BBC News, October 23, 
2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34606598. 
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Crimea was the exception in the list of frozen conflicts that includes: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-
Karabakh, Transnistria, and now Donbas. Through outright annexation, Russia stepped away from the 
regular playbook and forced a definitive solution (which Ukraine is not likely to ever accept). Mankoff 
believes that all of these efforts have pushed the target states into stronger relationships outside of the 
Russian sphere and have hurt Russia’s relational power. 
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VII. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY—THE UTILITY OF HYBRID WARFARE 
We can now see that in war many roads lead to success, and that they 
do not all involve the opponent’s outright defeat. They range from the 
destruction of the enemy’s forces, the conquest of his territory, to a 
temporary occupation or invasion, to projects with an immediate 
political purpose, and finally to passively awaiting the enemy’s 
attacks. 
—Carl von Clausewitz499 
 
The continued study of hybrid warfare, as a general theory for describing the 
behavior of states that pursue aggressive action below the threshold of conventional 
warfare, is important for promoting the continued stability of the modern state system. To 
date, explanations for this behavior have been limited to observations of the military 
forms of “internal” conflict and have been largely lacking examinations of the nature of 
the sponsoring state systems that enable the violation of other state’s sovereignty in a 
time of peace. It is not sufficient to claim that the nature of hybrid warfare is limited to 
the use of terrorists, criminal networks, irregular forces, or non-attributable conventional 
military forms of war, but even in this limited scope conclusions can be made about the 
nature of an aggressor state. In order to condone the forceful violations of foreign 
sovereignty during a time of peace, the aggressor must have an offensive-realist 
perception of inter-state power relations. An aggressor must also have the ability to direct 
a significant portion of the elements of national power toward achieving a specific goal in 
order to achieve synergy. It can also be surmised that the aggressor must have strategic 
objectives that violate another state’s sovereignty and a desire to at least partially achieve 
those objectives without a full-scale conventional invasion. The aggressor must then be 
able to sustain the strategic direction through any changes in his domestic government. 
After establishing that an aggressor state has these characteristics, hybrid warfare then 
involves the selective combination of a wide range of political and military instruments to 
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achieve the desired objectives while reducing the risk associated with a predominately 
military confrontation. Hybrid warfare involves various degrees of violence to augment 
and shape political warfare, but overt military force is usually employed to quickly 
consolidate the activity and present a fait accompli. Hybrid warfare is more successful 
when the dynamic change of the political relationship, marked by the introduction of 
conventional forces, is masked behind other world events and not declared by the 
aggressor country. 
B. SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES 
After examining Russia’s war with Georgia and the actions against Ukraine in 
Crimea and Donbas it is apparent that the focus on the military aspect of the operations 
has marginalized the importance of the long term deliberate political warfare that Russia 
waged against both countries. For these actions to be considered warfare, it must be 
concluded that Russia held strategic goals of forcing both countries to accept Russia’s 
will. Russia’s methodology for subverting Georgian and Ukrainian sovereignty included 
political coercion, economic warfare, information warfare, and select applications of 
violence all aimed at undermining governance, fracturing the territorial integrity of both 
states, and paving the way for the introduction of Russian armed forces to dynamically 
change the status quo in Russia’s favor. Both Georgia and Ukraine were subject to 
different hybrid combinations of political and military warfare for years prior to the 
commonly accepted period of “war.”   
Putin’s strategic themes of strengthening his domestic power, dominating the near 
abroad, and promoting Russian strength while frustrating the West, were all supported to 
some degree during the hybrid campaigns in Georgia and Ukraine. Following the color 
revolutions in the early 2000s, Russia risked losing both Georgia and Ukraine to 
blossoming democratic movements and deepening ties with the EU and NATO. Not only 
did these movements threaten Russia’s sense of entitled interest in the affairs of the 
former Soviet states, but they represented the spread of Western ideology closer to 
Moscow, which the increasingly revanchist Russians interpret as a deliberate, Western 
plot to undermine Russia’s governing system. To derail Georgian and Ukrainian efforts 
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to pull away from Russia’s orbit, the Russians made multiple efforts to take control of the 
political systems in both countries through manufactured crisis, economic coercion, 
selective violence and political manipulation, before the ultimate use of overt force to 
consolidate Moscow’s objectives. 
In Georgia, Russia promoted the separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
providing both groups with heavy weapons and Russian officers to serve in leadership 
roles, while systematically removing any local leaders who were inclined to mend the 
relationship with Tbilisi. Moscow extended Russian citizenship to Abkhaz and Ossetian 
Georgians through the issuance of Russian passports, effectively creating a population of 
‘Russians’ abroad to whom Moscow would be inclined to extend protection in the event 
they were to be threatened. Russia then used the ensuing acts of violence, both the 
interethnic and direct military confrontations, enabled by the equipment Russia provided 
and directed by Russian officers, to manufacture a ‘threat’ and justify the presence of 
large garrisons of Russian “peacekeepers” in Georgian territory. Moscow made its 
strategic objectives clear in 2004 when they offered to help support the Georgian 
President put down a pro-democracy uprising in exchange for Moscow’s future ability to 
appoint the Georgian Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Security, which would have 
effectively relinquished Georgia’s most powerful political offices to a foreign state. 
When the Georgian president refused Moscow’s offer, Russia doubled its efforts to 
undermine Georgia’s control over its territory. 
In Ukraine, Russia already maintained a large military presence at the Black Sea 
Fleet’s base in Sevastopol, Crimea. Years before the onset of wider military operations, 
Russia again offered passports to ethnic Russian citizens of Ukraine. Instead of initially 
trying to create an ethnic conflict however, Russia used the large population of Russians 
in Ukraine to attempt to take control of the Ukrainian government through political 
proxies. In 2004, Russian political operatives funneled over $300 million dollars to a pro-
Russian presidential candidate and Russian security services helped orchestrate massive 
electoral fraud to manipulate the outcome of the election. When the vote was overturned 
and the new Ukrainian administration began building closer ties to the EU, Putin used 
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economic warfare, primarily through Gazprom’s monopoly of Ukrainian heating oil and 
natural gas, to pressure the population into turning on the government.   
In both Georgia and Ukraine, Russia placed embargoes on goods produced in 
those countries in order to warn against or punish other movements in the Western 
direction. Dependency on Russian gas supplies was fostered through subsidies and then 
followed with demands for payments and threats of shutoffs during the height of winter. 
In Georgia, Russia regularly used violence, in the form of sabotage against critical 
infrastructure, terror attacks against security forces and civilians, and air support for 
separatist actions in order to stymie Tbilisi’s efforts to reestablish control over the restive 
regions. Russia initially used lower levels of violence in Ukraine but the Russian 
dominated Berkut Special Police were regularly heavy handed when putting down pro-
democracy protests, including the killing of dozens of protesters during the Euromaidan. 
In both instances, Russia used cyber-warfare to disrupt command and control systems 
and to help spread propaganda and disinformation to minimize local and international 
resistance. Despite all of these efforts, Georgia and Ukraine continued to resist Russian 
domination and Russia ultimately had to use military force to dynamically change the 
nature of the relationship, albeit at significantly lower levels than an all-out conventional 
invasion would have required. 
During the five-day war in Georgia and during the occupation of Crimea, Russia 
masked the outset of the military action behind other significant events. Both actions 
began while world leaders were expressing goodwill at Olympic Games, and while other 
significant crises and political events indicated a minimal chance of a military reaction 
from the West. Both actions had limited military objectives that were able to be quickly 
reached, which minimized the level of ongoing violence and reduced the impetus for 
Western intervention. The war in Donbas lacked all of these things. It was started while 
international attention was directly on Russian action in Ukraine. It had unclear 
objectives, and became increasingly violent as “volunteers” and heavy equipment were 
introduced piecemeal. Russia attempted to dominate the information domain during all 
three conflicts to characterize each as an internal ethnic struggle, and Russia’s actions as 
necessary to prevent genocide, while simultaneously denying the level of Russia’s 
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involvement and providing disinformation that would further confuse a Western 
response. In Georgia and Donbas, Russia used diplomatic processes to freeze the 
conflicts without definitive resolution so that Russia was justified in keeping intervention 
or “peacekeeping” forces in the region and so that the open nature of the conflict could be 
used to derail future efforts for either state to join the EU or NATO. Crimea was annexed 
outright to eliminate the threat to the long-term basing of the Black Sea Fleet, and 
because the annexation provided a much needed boost to Putin’s domestic popularity.   
Hybrid warfare is the combination of political and military forms of war to 
achieve strategic objectives while minimizing the cost and risk associated with a 
conventional military campaign. Hybrid warfare by definition does not imply the absence 
of military force or the use of violence, it requires it. The projection of offensive power is 
expensive and politically risky, more so when it comes at the end of a linear increase in 
hostilities and the victim has time to accurately interpret the aggressor’s intent and 
prepare to resist. By weakening the Georgian and Ukrainian states’ ability to control the 
entirety of their territories, undermining political, economic and defense development in 
both countries, and fomenting ethnic divisions, Russia was able to undermine the will and 
ability of each state to counter Russian aggression before Russia presented a “resolution” 
of its own design. When Russia continued to pursue the military aspect of hybrid warfare 
in eastern Ukraine, Kiev was finally able to mount an effective response. The result was a 
bloody contest of attrition where Russia’s attempts to maintain some level of deniability 
constrained its ability to introduce a decisive amount of force.   
C. A THEORY OF RUSSIAN HYBRID WAR 
This research involved a heuristic analysis of the nature of Russian hybrid warfare 
and its relationship to strategy and interstate power. Because of the focus of study on 
cases involving a single aggressor, it can claim to be a theory that applies only to Russia, 
but was crafted with expectations of generalizability. Further testing is needed to make a 
more universal claim of applicability. 
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1. Preliminary Theoretical Framework Development 
This study began with an examination of the different literature that framed the 
ongoing questions regarding the nature of hybrid warfare. To bridge the gap between 
common uses of the term and the theoretical foundations of strategy and state power, 
further study was conducted in these areas to produce a preliminary theoretical 
framework regarding the nature of hybrid warfare and the actor capable of practicing it 
effectively. As the term “hybrid warfare” is frequently associated with Russian actions, 
Russia was selected to limit independent variables across the cases. Russian political and 
military thinking in the contemporary and Soviet-eras was then examined for the 
conceptual roots and disposition necessary to employ political and military warfare 
against a neighbor during times of supposed peace in pursuit of strategic objectives. 
This research concluded that Russia has a longstanding view of all foreign entities 
as a potential threat, and therefore desires relative superiority with its neighbors. Russia 
does not limit this perspective to military force alone. Vladimir Putin believes Western-
liberalism is an alien concept that represents a threat to a strong Russian state that must 
not be allowed to take root on Russia’s borders. Russians do not share a Western 
perspective of the difference between peace and war. To Russians, war is not the 
continuation of politics by other means. In the anarchic space between states, war and 
politics are part of the same continuum. Putin’s emphasis on the “power vertical” as the 
strong centralized direction of state power, and his increasingly authoritarian control over 
the economic and informational domains provides him with the necessary level of control 
to synchronize their efforts toward strategic objectives. Through “managed democracy” 
Putin has a firm grasp on power and is able to maintain a stable trajectory for his strategic 
initiatives. 
It was also determined that Russian strategic thought was built on the foundations 
Soviet-era political-military philosophy. Russians have long examined strategies for 
attrition of an adversary’s defenses through combinations of political and military means, 
the interchangeability of the means of war based on effects in a deep battle, and non-
linear warfare conducted throughout an adversary’s geopolitical space. Russian strategic 
objectives are state secrets, but Russia’s actions indicate three principle themes: 1) 
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solidify and maintain the Putin’s hold on power, 2) ensure Russian dominion over the 
near-abroad, and 3) restore Russia’s status as a global power.   
2. Framework Applied to Three Cases  
This framework was then partnered with a model of Chinese Unrestricted Warfare 
as presented by Callard and Faber and applied to three cases of Russian aggression—the 
2008 Russo-Georgian War, the 2014 Occupation of Crimea, and the 2014–2015 war in 
east Ukraine—in the post-Soviet space to test the theory. The two operations against 
Ukraine were closely related in time and by the shared target government, but appeared 
to have very different outcomes and were therefore examined as separate cases. Through 
the examination of a wide range of state means as instruments of warfare it was possible 
to confirm the nature of the Russian regime and conclude that Russia pursues strategic 
objectives through hybrid political and military means during times of supposed peace.  
All of the cases included a phase of conventional military primacy, but these efforts were 
most effective when they were limited to quickly consolidating clear objectives. 
3. The New Russian Way of War 
The findings from these case studies resulted in a mezzo-level theory of Russian 
hybrid warfare which will set the stage for general theory development. Russia has 
characteristics that facilitate the practice of hybrid warfare.  
1. Offensive-realist 
2. Willing to employ violence and violate sovereignty during “peace” 
3. Centralized/ authoritarian government 
4. Other-then-military means of national power  
Russia also recognizes its own military shortcomings. Putin desires to be 
perceived as a military power and he is taking steps to rebuild some of Russia’s 
diminished military capability. Even in their present state, Russia could militarily force 
the governments of Ukraine or Georgia to capitulate outright, but such efforts would 
incur a significant cost to existing military capability. Those efforts would also be drawn-
out and bloody, which would increase the possibility of international intervention and a 
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humiliating punishment to Putin’s conventional power. Russia uses hybrid warfare to 
pursue its strategic objectives at reduced levels of risk. This implies two things: 
1. Strategic ends that were the traditional objectives of military warfare   
2. The practice of deception to mask the offensive nature of political actions  
Russia has long theorized and practiced the combination of political and military 
warfare. Russia employs any number of non-military and above military forms of 
political warfare to undermine a target states sovereign ability to administer its territory 
and govern its population. During this process, Russia employs limited levels of violence 
toward the same ends while remaining below the threshold of state-on-state warfare. 
These activities include terrorism, assassination, sabotage, arming of proxy forces, and 
the use of deniable state military forces. Russia uses diplomacy to freeze conflicts and 
delay overt warfare to a time of Moscow’s choosing. When Putin determines the timing 
is right, Russia uses deception to mask the dynamic change in the level of force, and 
quickly consolidates the limited objectives before freezing the conflict and presenting a 
new status quo. It is a characteristic of Russian hybrid warfare that no conflict examined 
has yielded a complete discernable “victory.”  Each case has the potential to flare up 
again in the future and Russia may very well use this to make further gains against the 
target states or as leverage against the international community. 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY REGARDING RUSSIA 
One of the worst reactions to hybrid warfare may be to perpetuate its 
effectiveness by being “diplomatic” in addressing it. Fear of provoking an aggressor who 
is already conducting offensive actions, regardless of the domain, and not calling out that 
aggression does not aid the immediate victim or help deter similar action elsewhere. 
Allowing the aggressor to define the terms used to describe the conflict and thus maintain 
control of the narrative will also frustrate any effort to counter the aggressor’s actions. 
There was no “separatist” movement in east Ukraine and the fighting there was not a civil 
conflict or an internal dispute. The war in eastern Ukraine was entirely a product of the 
Kremlin’s design, as were the armaments and Russian troops who made up the bulk of 
the pro-Russian forces. This was an invasion of Ukraine by Russia as was the Crimean 
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operation by Vladimir Putin’s own admission after months of public claims to the 
contrary. The West must “counter, not abet, Russia’s hybrid war by speaking clearly, 
consistently, and publicly about Russia’s war against Ukraine.”500 
The weaponization of information, culture and money is a vital part of the 
Kremlin’s hybrid, or non-linear, war, which combines the above elements 
with covert and small-scale military operations. The conflict in Ukraine 
saw non-linear war in action. Other rising authoritarian states will look to 
copy Moscow’s model of hybrid war—and the West has no institutional or 
analytical tools to deal with it.501 
“Hybrid warfare” has become a widely used and widely interpreted term for 
describing Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Some analysts have used the narrow focus of 
irregular combinations of forces and tactics to suggest tactical counter-measures based on 
the scenarios that played out in Ukraine. Others have used the lack of solid meaning of 
“hybridity” to attempt to downplay the impact of the second half of the term; that the 
actions are in fact an act of war.502  Only by widening the aperture to consider the 
combined application of political and military means toward a strategic end is it possible 
to understand the nature of a hybrid conflict at the time of its inception; well in advance 
of the outbreak of open hostilities. Hybrid warfare is increasingly enabled by the 
interdependencies of globalization and the instruments of liberal societies. The nature of 
these interactions must be kept as open and free as possible, but they cannot be allowed 
to become platforms that jeopardize the existence of the very societies they are supposed 
to serve.   
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Hybrid warfare is a whole-of-government approach to waging a subversive, 
limited war and it requires a whole-of-government effort to assess the nature of the 
aggressor, identify signs of a strategic design in motion, and to take steps to counter the 
potential impact of the instruments of political warfare while bolstering the forces of 
deterrence. Potential victims of hybrid warfare must identify and mitigate vulnerabilities 
to an aggressor’s forms of political warfare to include diversifying economic sectors that 
are solely reliant on one actor. Laws must be passed and enforced that prohibit certain 
relationships with a threatening state to include political party affiliation, board 
membership or “consulting” relationships with aggressor state’s businesses, and media 
platforms used to promote the aggressor’s propaganda. Treating foreign government 
platforms like RT as equal members of the free press is absurd; allowing them to 
purchase access directly into the living rooms of millions of Western households is 
suicidal. Target states must invest in thorough counterintelligence activities to identify, 
isolate, and remove aggressor agents from their political, military, and intelligence 
organs. International organizations must also introduce severe punitive measures aimed at 
modifying behavior and then at isolating and undermining the regimes of aggressor 
states. 
Economic sanctions against Russia have not yet been sufficient to modify 
Moscow’s behavior and should probably be seen as ineffective as a deterrent against 
future hybrid aggression.503  There is a role for conventional force in countering hybrid 
warfare, but it will not be found in traditional defensive alliances like NATO. Potential 
targets of hybrid warfare must adopt a realist-like understanding that they alone can 
ensure a timely response to military incursions. Projecting military weakness will only 
add to an aggressor’s expectations of success. Conventional forces must actively war 
game and plan for the most dangerous courses of action and continuously conduct 
assessments of vulnerabilities in both the political and military spheres. Georgian military 
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planners, for example, should have long realized the importance that the Roki tunnel 
would play to any large scale Russian incursion into South Ossetia. That choke point 
should have had redundant plans for its closure in the event of a conflict. The West’s 
preferred response to the overt forms of Russian hybrid warfare appears to be rooted in 
economic sanctions, which “may make threats of force more credible, but they do not 
substitute for them.”504  George Kennan’s observations of the Soviet Union and his early 
formulation of a policy of containment still apply to contemporary Russia. 
Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor 
adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary 
risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of 
force. For this reason it can easily withdraw-and usually does when strong 
resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient 
force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If 
situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging 
showdowns.505 
Russia and other potential aggressors must be watched for indicators of an 
offensive strategy not just against near/ regional targets but also against far/ international 
bodies. Russia’s actions in Syria in late 2015 for example, should not be assessed merely 
for their impact in the Middle East. It is no coincidence that Russia’s entry into the war 
came at a time when refugees from that conflict were flooding into Europe and straining 
the inter-state relationships of members of Russia’s principle adversaries; the EU and 
NATO. In lieu of an immediate military confrontation in Europe, Russia has exacerbated 
the conflict in Syria and is helping to drive more refugee’s into Europe as indirect 
weapons aimed at undermining the cohesion of its geopolitical rivals. Other actors have 
subsequently realized the potential of using immigrants as weapons against the West and 
have proclaimed their intention to promote further migration if their demands are not 
met.506  Putin and his inner circle are increasingly worried about how long they can 
distract the Russian public while inflation is rising, the ruble is falling, and from the fact 
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that they have no strategy for actual growth.507  To preserve his inflated popularity and 
maintain power, Putin may strike out in an unexpected direction. The potential for the 
wave of Muslim immigrants to reignite sectarian conflict in places like the former 
Yugoslavia, where Russia maintains strong ties to the Serbian state, should not be 
underestimated.  
Putin’s actions in Ukraine and subsequent saber rattling in Scandinavia, the Baltic 
and elsewhere have forced a number of states and alliances to examine the nature of their 
defenses.  “Nobody knows where Putin will stop. But there is fear in Poland and the 
Baltic states that sooner or later he will try and conquer the rest of what he claims of what 
he calls ‘Novorossiya,’ or New Russia: a huge territory stretching from Donetsk all the 
way to the borders of Moldova.”508  Even Russia’s allies like Belarus are considering 
what Moscow might be planning regarding their sovereignty.509  For the states that look 
only at the appearance of “little green men,” proxy forces, terrorists, and other military 
forms of war, the risk is high that they will not effectively resist Russia’s efforts in the 
non-military domains. Ukrainian political scientist, Georgi Pocheptsov, described 
Russia’s hybrid warfare theory as being based on concealment of the campaign’s military 
nature and participation [manipulation] in the structures of the target State.510  
Pocheptsov has correctly identified the two necessary components of hybrid warfare, the 
political and the military, and the importance of information warfare to both.511   
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the 1939 Soviet-Finnish, progressing through the “bloodless” annexation of the Baltic States, the 2008 
Georgian war and now with the operations in Crimea and Donbas. Denisenko attributes the best description 
of the Russian perspective of hybrid warfare to Ukrainian political scientist, Georgi Pocheptsov. Denisenko 
theorizes that Russia could have two different hybrid warfare plans for Belorussia, one that includes 




Some NATO members have already begun to take steps toward countering hybrid 
warfare from Russia. Diversification and reducing dependence on Russian sources of 
energy (and anything else) removes significant levers of influence.512  Lithuania has built 
a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal to import gas from non-Russian sources; the 
result is independence from Gazprom and a 24 percent reduction in LNG cost.513  The 
defense aspect to steps like Lithuania’s should be the understanding of the strategic 
importance of such a site and the necessity to take steps to ensure it is hardened against, 
sabotage, cyber and other forms of attack.   Countering hybrid warfare must not rely 
solely on defensive measures. Russia employs hybrid warfare as a risk mitigation practice 
that preserves its military element of power and in doing so maintains the initiative for 
the introduction of violence. A comprehensive approach to countering hybrid warfare 
must consider the application of violence to adjust the aggressor’s cost/ benefit 
calculation. Major defensive alliances like NATO are ill structured for this task, but 
individual states and smaller coalitions need to consider the possibilities for deniable 
hybrid responses that allow an off-ramp for escalation while simultaneously sending clear 
signals and inflicting real costs for violations of sovereignty.   
Hybrid warfare is likely already being practiced against near/regional and 
far/Western targets by Russia and other offensive-realist, authoritarian states that desire 
to reach strategic ends without directly confronting the West militarily. It must be the 
objective of Western policy to identify these actors and to minimize the potential effects 
of their political means of warfare while military planners examine the defense 
vulnerabilities that begin in the political sphere. This means that first and foremost, the 
512 “NATO to Counter ‘Hybrid Warfare’ from Russia.” BBC News, May 14, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32741688. NATO Chief Jens Stoltenberg identifies ‘hybrid 
warfare’ as a combination of convention threats, subversion, and cyber warfare. This is indicative of the 
evolving understanding of hybrid warfare in Europe, and while it could be interpreted as combining 
military (conventional) and political (subversion) forms of war, it can only be assumed that the cyber 
domain gets unique consideration because of its emerging potential for disruption and its ties across so 
many other domains. Cyber is an important aspect of hybrid warfare, but it needs to be considered for the 
effects in the financial, economic, military, informational and political domains, and not solely as a unique 
cyber-sphere. 
513 Kenneth Rapoza, “How Lithuania is Kicking Russia to the Curb,” Forbes.Com, October 18, 2015, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2015/10/18/how-lithuania-is-kicking-russia-to-the-curb/. 
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sponsors of hybrid warfare have to be called out without equivocation. If hybrid warfare 
is to be deterred, its practice must invite a direct threat to the regime that sponsored it.     
E. TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF HYBRID WARFARE 
The results of this research indicate that hybrid warfare is a way of synchronizing 
the range of possible means toward achieving a desired end, while minimizing the risks 
associated with direct military confrontation. Hybrid warfare is the combination of 
political (above military and non-military) forms of war with select levels of violent, 
military warfare. It is conducted by actors with a wide range of means at their disposal 
and the ability to marshal and synchronize these means to achieve military like objectives 
during peace. The sudden introduction of overt military forces is masked through 
deception and denial to confuse a coherent response. Overt military action is limited in 
scale and duration to solidify the aggressor’s control over an objective, and levels of 
violence are non-linear and do not necessarily end with the signing of a ceasefire. Further 
efforts toward a general theory should consider independent variables of the nature of the 
aggressor state; offensive-realist power position, lack of delineation between states of 
peace and war, centralized authoritarian government, long-term strategic direction; 
intermediate variables of a strategic design to violate another state’s sovereignty and an 
effort to mask or deny the transition to overt warfare; and the dependent variables of all 
of the possible forms of non-military, above military and military warfare. Further study 
of possible cases of hybrid warfare should evaluate data collected independent of model 
formulation. 
To refine a general theory of hybrid warfare, further study is needed of other 
offensive-realist actors for indications of hybrid attacks against sovereignty. Potential 
supporting cases could include Iran in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Palestine and Syria; Russia 
in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Syria; and China in the South China Sea, Taiwan, Japan, 
and Russia. Statistical analysis of the political and military means employed and the 
effects achieved may reveal a pattern of behavior that can be used for predicting future 
action. As new forms of political and military warfare are conceptualized, they should be 
added to Callard and Faber’s model of Unrestricted Warfare. If Russia’s behavior 
185 
demonstrates anything, it is that Russia is willing to pursue multiple hybrid campaigns 
against both near and far targets simultaneously. Game theoretic analysis of possible 
Russian strategies may indicate Russia’s calculations regarding the conditions for hybrid 
warfare outside of the purely post-Soviet space. This approach may help illuminate 
Russia’s strategic objectives, as well as identify specific vulnerabilities in the 
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